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The 2018-19 Editorial Collective is pleased to present the 28th volume of disClosure: A Journal of 
Social Theory. Our inspiration for this odd bundle of pages is rooted in the aesthetic of the 
self-printed zine. While we regret that we couldn't sneak into Miller Hall in the middle of the 
night to guerrilla-copy the entire issue on a late-80s black-and-white Xerox, we are proud to say 
that each page of this volume was assembled entirely by hand. Every page is bordered or 
backgrounded by collages: these are pages that peel and flake, assembled from bits and pieces 
cut up and rearranged- not dissimilar, we believe, from how "knowledge" itself is made. The 
articles were printed off a wheezing home office Canon, cut on a crooked paper cutter, 
positioned and re-positioned on desks and bedroom floors, glued and taped, and (often, indeed, 
under the cover of night) finally scanned into the openly available and infinitely replicable 
digital artifact you find here. 
In pursuing our vision of the scholarly zine, we have been galvanized by the work of Kara 
Keeling, who in Queer Times , Black Futures (2019) lays out what she calls a "politics of opacity." If 
we want the future to look different than the present, she says, we must disrupt the 
perpetuation of stable, predictable, and expected futures by becoming unrecognizable. This 
means proceeding with an indifference to dominant modes of signification and articulating 
alternate conceptions of the world that may be incomprehensible to common sense ways of 
doing things. In this volume of disClosure, we want to put this politics into action, and make our 
own intervention into what an "academic journal," and scholarship more broadly, can look like. 
We mean this literally. Scholarship today, more often than not, is framed by the strict square of 
the PDF viewer and the standard template of the "knowledge product." We wish to offer a 
re-framing. We believe that a creative impulse lies at the root of all scholarship - a creative 
impulse too often dulled and denied in the interest of sober, self-censored, scientific products. In 
surrounding the words of these authors with color and the kilter of the hand, we hope to 
foreground and to highlight this drive that foments our knowledge, and aspires to such ideals 
as beauty and truth. As a scaffold, then, these slanting columns are meant to confound the 
standard square. This is knowledge production let loose: scholarship askew. 
With this slim volume, we join forces with countless other publications in prying open the seals 
of academic publishing, continuing the collective push that will eventually tip scholarship into 
unrecognizability, and therefore into a more open and inclusive future. Into what might an 
unabashedly creative scholarship begin to bloom? On what might "knowledge" come to rest? 
The articles and interviews contained herein aim precisely at these questions of possibility-- the 
forces that let it fly, and those that reign it in. "Affect" is a slippery concept, and the diverse 
pieces assembled in this volume explore the range of modalities through which it can be 
thought: from the extraordinary contained within the banal to the lingering residues of 
historical trauma; from the mood of global discourse to the sensations of streaming TV; from the 
atmospheres rooted into place to the fleeting experiences of the street; from intimate relations to 
the anti-colonial potentials of poetry; from the body itself to the collectives we comprise . 
.#"K c·~.,. From all this, taking this collection as a whole, we begin to suspect that knowledge itself is 
.•... ~.,,.~ •.. ,., .. _ ... perhaps little more than a quivering potentiality: a feeling. And rather than pump it out to ship 
,....,,,.-=~t..~~~ in ready-made boxes, fitted into reusable frames, faster than we could ever consume, we will 
slow it down, open it up, seize it by the ears, and not be afraid to call it what it has always been: 
a creative act, a work of art. 
We'd first like to thank University of Kentuc}<y professors Arnold Parr (Philosophy), Dierdra 
Reber (Hispanic Studies), Anna Secor (Geography, now at Durham University), Sharon Yam 
(Writing, Rhetoric, and Digital Studies), and Charlie Zhang (Gender and Women's Studies), 
~~~~~ who designed and led the Social Theory Seminar on Affect in the Spring of 2018. The present 
volume sprang from that course, and we would not be here without their expertise and vision. 
-- ~"--""' In sharing their knowledge and prodding us to think about affect in a critical, intersectional, and 
interdisciplinary manner, they laid the groundwork that made this journal possible. 
We were blessed to be able to spend time with three distinguished scholars who were invited to 
'77-~~ the University of Kentucky for the Committee on Social Theory's Spring Lecture Series, Drs. 
e::.rn'Ail Deborah Gould, Brian Massumi, and Shannon Sullivan. In addition, we also had the distinct JrS pleasure of conversing with the Fall of 2018 Social Theory Distinguished Speaker, Dr. Ann 
.,. Stoler. We are thankful to all four of these scholars for so generously sharing their time and 
expertise as they sat with us for lengthy interviews, and for their enlightening and enlivening 
inputs to the present issue. Their interviews show why affect studies is indispensable for 
understanding our contemporary world. 
We also want to extend a special thank you to Dr. Michael Samers, who provided invaluable 
guidance as the editorial collective's faculty advisor. He offered crucial advice throughout the 
entire process, especially as we fielded submissions and navigated the peer review process for 
the first time. 
' ~ I 
We are grateful for the backing of the University of Kentucky's Committee on Social Theory and 
the work of Interim Director Dr. Michael Samers and Program Director Dr. Tad Mutersbaugh. 
Without the enormous efforts of administrators Lori Tyndall and Eva Hicks and Social Theory 
Research Assistant Emily Kaufman, organizing and advertising events, managing travel plans, 
reserving space, and ensuring the smooth functioning of the Committee's operations, none of 
this would be possible. We are the privileged beneficiaries of their unsung labor. The thoughtful 
guidance of Adrian Ho, Director of Digital Scholarship at UK Libraries, has kept disClosure 
running though its frequently bumpy transition periods, and we are grateful for his presence 
and his aid from start to finish. 
, 
Sophonie Bazile, who served as the editor-in-chief for the 27th volume of disClosure, graciously 
shared her experiences and materials with us, and answered our many questions. We would 
have been lost without her. We reserve a special, heartfelt thanks to Meredith Wadlington, for 
her unflagging encouragement and unflinching spirit through the many moments when the 
going got tough. Her support was a great source of strength. Last but not least, we want to 
thank the authors whose work on affect you find in these pages, not only for their brilliant 
contributions, but also for their patience ahd good cheer as we stumbled through this long and 
ever-lengthening process. They are why this volume exists, and we are excited to share their 
work with you. 

Ruwen Chang is a PhD Candidate in the department of Gender and Women's Studies at the 
University of Kentucky. Her research interests include biopower, posthumanism, reproductive 
justice, and transnational feminism. Ruwen's dissertation project examines the interaction 
between the legibility of personhood and stratified reproduction in contemporary China by 
investigating three cases: suzhi ~fPJ: (quality), zuo yuezi ~Fl-T (postpartum bedrest), and 
guanggun )l[;~tE (involuntary bachelorhood). Currently, she is preparing to defend her 
dissertation proposal and to start her year-long fieldwork in China. 
He studies 
Ian Spangler is a failed musician, aspiring playwright, and current PhD student in Geography 
at the University of Kentucky. His research has explored the uneven forms of value capture 
introduced by platform urbanism and how the emerging proptech sector transforms and 
restructures the practice of transacting real estate in the US context. More recently, he has 
become interested in the spatial politics of sweat data. He is a morning person, but only at 
night, and greatly despises fluorescent lighting. 





Feel-Sad TV: Sadness Pornography in 
Contemporary Serials 
This article develops a theory of sadness pornographies in contemporary feel-sad television. Under 
the sad porn category, the essay explores a key sub-genre in contemporary serial dramas: trauma 
porn. The article is anchored in an affective analysis of two contemporary serials: Amazon's 
Transparent and NBC's This Is Us, both of which center multigenerational, familial trauma. Through 
a combined Berlantian and Spinozist optic, the essay attends to various episodes from the two 
serials to illuminate the phenomenon of trauma porn in current feel-sad media. In this reading, the 
essay considers how Spinoza's understandings of the temporality of affect relate to the particular 
temporalities of traumatic TV in its streaming and broadcast formats. In the analytic process, the 
article constructs a speculative spectator, who craves feel-sad media to affectively self-reproduce -
to emotionally endure - in the face of current workspaces' managed non-catharsis. The essay 
concludes with a theory of sad-joy, framed by Spinoza's affective schema, to dramatize a singularly 
contemporary mode of purgation, one which succeeds classical and modern theories of cathartic 
tragedy. 
Bl~ke Karsten Beave: is a PhD student in the Graduate Program in Literature at Duke University. 
H1s. research spans f1ln: and media studies, affect theory, feminism, and queer theory. His current 
proJect explores questions of emotional realism, ecstatic affect, and feminist politics in the 
contemporary docusoap. Contact: blake.beaver@duke.edu 
© 2019 The Author(s) . This is an open access article published under the terms of the Creativ,e Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (https:/ I creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ 4.0/), 
which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
that the original author(s) and the publication source are credited. 
article's founding observation 
states that sadness pornography constitutes a 
vital genre of contemporary media production 
and consumption. Urban Dictionary user 
Brendogfox describes sad porn as media "that 
exists for the sole purpose of 
making people feel deep sadness. Usually there 
is no sexual theme, yet like regular porn, some 
people seem to get off on it" (2016). Sad porn 
constellates a network of exemplary sub-genres, 
each of which are defined and circumscribed by 
sorrowful affects. Prominent examples include 
disability, inspiration, and as we will observe 
most closely, trauma porn. 
The pornography in sad porn designates 
an ironic tone. Oxford English Dictionary defines 
pornography as "the explicit description or 
exhibition of sexual subjects or activity in 
literature, painting, films, etc., in a manner 
intended to stimulate erotic rather than 
aesthetic feelings ." Although sad porn does not 
necessarily represent the sexual, it does require 
from the spectator an erotic attachment to 
unhappy depressive, solemn, and/ or mournful 
viewing affects. I describe these attachments as 
erotic because they mediate a relation of passion 
and amorousness (rather than one of genital 
and other erogenous pleasures) in / to the 
1 
emotional labors of televisual consumption. In 
this way, the metaphoric nature of pornography 
in "sad porn" figures a desirous drive for sad 
media similar to traditional pornography's 
erotic force, while maintaining the full sincerity 
of sadness. Said another way, the descriptor sad 
porn may be tongue-in-cheek, but the actual 
emotional turbulences of its viewership - sad 
porn - represent genuine sorrow. Sadness 
pornography as a genre marks an erotic 
attachment to feelings of sadness when viewing 
contemporary television. 
In imagining sadness pornography as a 
genre, I think with Lauren Berlant's revaluation 
of the term. With Berlant, I argue for sad porn 
as an overarching "aesthetic structure" across 
1 Thus, I distinguish between the sexual and the 
erotic, here, based on the latter 's associations with 
passion and love. 
televisual mediation that creates "affective 
expectations" of joyful sadness (2008, 4). As we 
will see in a discussion of representative serials' 
relation to the contemporary emotive spectator, 
the sad porn genre "brackets structural and 
historical antagonism" by providing spaces of 
affective intensity closely interlinked with the 
saturated yet administered affects of 
contemporary labor, affects upon which 
businesses capitalize at the same time as they 
prohibit a threshold of cathartic intensity, 
whether in the corporate workspace, the retail 
store, or sites of gig-economic production. The 
sad porn genre generates viewers' desirous 
attachments to feeling powerful through feeling 
disempowered. Moreover, sad porn manages 
moods of political powerlessness in the 
governed non-catharsis of contemporary labor 
environments. 
In heavily invoking the concept of 
genre, I aim to do justice to sad porn's 
moving-image genealogy. Regarding the 
sad -pornographic serial's televisual lineage, we 
should look to Michael Z. Newman and Elana 
Levine (2012), who trace the contemporary 
primetime serial drama, perhaps the most 
lauded mode of television programming in the 
convergent era, back to its primary 
serial-narrative predecessor: the daytime soap 
opera. For Newman and Levine, soap operas' 
vanguard approach to "long-form, novelistic 
storytelling" is both co-opted and erased in 
legitimating discourses that inform the 
cinematization of contemporary, high-culture 
television. Moreover, for Newman and Levine, 
the legitimation of current serials at the expense 
of soap operas' denigration poses anti-feminist 
and anti-feminine consequences (82). One 
strategy for distancing serial dramas from their 
soap operatic precursors is to manage seriality's 
temporality. As soap operas are historically 
associated with non-endings, narrative gaps, 
and the modes of feminine fantasy that the 
2 
"forbidden gap" and "illicit non-ending entail, 
2 For a discussion of the relationship between soaps' 
narrative form and feminine political aesthetics, see 
Martha Nochimson (1992), No End to Her: Soap Opera 
primetime serials impose endings "to keep that 
seriality and its associations with feminized 
excess from overrunning the narrative" (92). 
Newman and Levine's generalization, however, 
may not prove so simple. Exemplary primetime 
and streaming serial dramas in the current 
moment nurture the feminized and affectively 
charged never-ending-ness of soaps in what we 
will observe as their multi-generationally 
traumatic and temporally layered narratives. In 
the case of Transparent and This Is Us, the 
"forbidden gap" of trauma sustains seriality 
and the political-narrative potential such 
seriality awards. 
As part of a filmic lineage, sadness 
pornography's soap operatic roots reach back 
even further to a cinematic forebearer: the 
melodramatic "weepie." Linda Williams (1991) 
predicts sadness pornography and sad-joy in 
her articulation of the affiliation between 
pornography and melodrama as 
interpenetrating, excessive, gross, and 
sensational genres. In Williams's argument, the 
relationship between pornography and 
melodrama is complex. Pornography and 
melodrama share an excessive and sensational 
status in their imaging of gratuitous sex and 
emotion; in their treatment of "the spectacle of a 
body caught in the grip of intense sensation or 
emotion"; and in their emphasis on forms of 
ecstasy and the ecstatic body, primarily a 
feminine body "beside herself" in pleasure or 
overwhelming sadness (4) . For Williams and 
myself, what appears to be most gratuitous in 
porn, melodrama, and sad porn, by extension, 
is the mimetic relationship of the viewer to 
representations of ecstatic affect. The 
sad-pornographic spectator, like her 
melodramatic and pornographic predecessors, 
mirrors the rapturous body onscreen. 
Furthermore, for Williams, melodrama 
functions as a meta-genre encompassing the 
unique forms of excess and grossness at play in 
pornography and weepies. This aligns with my 
insight that sadness pornography operates as a 
and the Female Subject, Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, in particular 35-6. 
parallel meta-genre, one 
sub-genres like disability, inspiration, and 
trauma porn in its pleasurably sad 
representational and spectatorial strategies. As 
a "problem-solving cultural form," what I 
would term melo-porn or porno-drama in 
Williams's analysis alerts us to the unique social 
and political-economic complications that 
sadness pornography aims to disentangle: 
namely, a situation of affectively suffused yet 
non-cathartic labor in the workspace. This 
emotional labor in the workplace then 
implicates scenes of spectatorial emotion 
management in pornographic weeping at home 
or on mobile devices, with each viewing 
situation mediated by various televisual and/ or 
digital representations and technologies. 
Under the sad porn meta-genre, I wish 
to explore a key sub-structure of aesthetic 
expectation. In television, across broadcast and 
digital channels, sadness pornography emerges 
in serial dramas, particularly centered around 
the (ab)normal family, through what I and 
others call trauma porn. I anchor this article in 
an affective analysis of two contemporary 
serials, Amazon's Transparent and NBC's This Is 
Us, both of which represent multigenerational, 
familial trauma. I read various episodes from 
the two serials to illuminate the phenomenon of 
trauma porn in current feel-sad TV. In this 
reading, I consider how Benedict de Spinoza's 
understandings of the temporality of affect 
relate to the particular temporalities of 
traumatic TV, both in its streaming and 
broadcast formats. In this analytic process, I 
construct a speculative spectator, who 
embodies the emotional dialectic of 
contemporary capital, torn between cathartic 
(sad-pornographic, purgative, unmanaged) and 
non-cathartic (capitalized, administered, 
supervised) affects. Finally, I conclude with a 
theory of sad-joy, framed by Spinoza's affective 
schema, as a contemporary rev1s1on of 
Aristotle's catharsis and Hume's tragedy. By 
sad-joy, I suggest a dialectical vacillation of the 
mind in which the ambivalent tension of feeling 
sadness economizes joy. Sad-joy expresses a 
paradigmatic affect in recent mediation, one 
which greases the emotional survival of the 
contemporary laborer as televisual spectator. 
The relationship between sadness and 
trauma, and consequently sad porn and trauma 
porn, appears convoluted and deserves close 
consideration. In my analysis, trauma porn is 
necessarily a sub-genre of the mediatic 
meta-genre sadness porn, and we could think of 
the broader relationship between trauma and 
sadness similarly. Thus, I imagine sadness as an 
overarchingly bad affective genre, a meta-ugly 
feeling (following Sianne Ngai), that forms an 
affective-aesthetic umbrella under which 
variously unhappy and grieving emotions fall. 
If trauma articulates states of intense psychic 
upset caused by equally intense emotional 
wounding, then trauma's constitutive upset 
(and the interrelated grief and unhappiness 
associated with such injury) could be thought 
of as categorically circumscribed by sadness as 
an affective meta-genre. 
Turning to the issue of contemporary 
TV's traumatic narrativity, I look toward 
current television programs such as Netflix's 
Orange Is the New Black (OITNB) for context, a 
series that has received backlash for what many 
critics call its traumatic pornographies. One 
headline reads, "Orange Is the New Black Is 
Trauma Porn Written for White People." In said 
article, Ashleigh Shackelford voices grief about 
the "exploitation and voyeurism" of black pain 
"on a platter for the world to gawk at and 
consume" (2016). Critics link OITNB's trauma 
porn to the spectacle of black death in police 
murders and associated historical atrocities. 
Shackleford continues, "Sociohistorically, we 
have seen white people aroused and 
grotesquely infatuated with the violence and 
exploitation of our bodies, pain and agency." 
On the violent murder of OITNB character 
Poussey, who is strangled to death by a prison 
guard, Shamira Ibrahim (2016) writes, "Her 
lifeless body [was] left on the cafeteria floor for 
what seems like days, in scenes clearly drawing 
from the painful tragedies of Eric Garner and 
Michael Brown." These criticisms provide 
necessary context for imagining how the 
viewer's enjoyment of trauma porn is linked to 
histories of racialized, sexualized, and gendered 
violence. These criticisms also speak to the 
legacies of transgenerational trauma in black 
and queer communities.3 Thus, in my reading 
of sad-pornographic TV, I suggest that 
multigenerational trauma accounts for 
numerous identity formations and identity 
histories. 
Amazon's Transparent exemplifies 
trauma pornography in a queer-trans modality. 
The serial focuses on the Pfefferman family in 
contemporary Los Angeles as children Sarah, 
Josh, and Ali, and ex-wife Shelley, live in the 
wake of their father and ex-husband Maura's 
coming out as a transgender woman. The initial 
trauma of coming out constellates a network of 
sub-traumas. In season one, episode four 
("Moppa"), we learn that Josh's college-age 
babysitter Rita sexually abused him while 
sustaining an exploitative age-differential 
relationship for several years (Fitzerman-Blue et 
al., 2014). In season one, episode eight ("Best 
New Girl"), we observe Ali's abandonment by 
her parents at thirteen years of age, when they 
3 For examples of scholarship concerning black 
transgenerational trauma, see Anderson J. Franklin, 
Nancy Boyd-Franklin, and Shalonda Kelly (2009), 
"Racism and Invisibility: Race-Related Stress, 
Emotional Abuse and Psychological Trauma for 
People of Color," Journal of Emotional Abuse 6(2-3): 
9-30; Gilda Graff (2017), "The Intergenerational 
Trauma of Slavery and its Aftereffects: The Question 
of Reparations," The Journal of Psychohistory 44(4): 
256-268; Jennifer L. Griffiths (2009), Traumatic 
Possessions: The Body and Memory in African American 
Women's Writing and Performance, Charlottesville, 
VA: University of Virginia Press; Janice P. Gump 
(2010), "Reality Matters: The Shadow of Trauma on 
African American Subjectivity," Psychoanalytic 
Psychology 27(1): 42-54; and Gabriele Schwab 
(2010), Haunting Legacies: Violent Histories and 
Transgenerational Trauma, New York: Columbia 
University Press. For a seminal example of queer 
transgenerational trauma, see Ann Cvetkovich's 
writings on the gendered-sexualized traumas of 
butch-femme cultures and cycles of incest: 
Cvetkovich (2003), An Archive of Feelings: Trauma, 
Sexuality, and Lesbian Public Cultures. Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press. 
allow Ali to cancel her Bat Mitzvah against her 
best interest, ending in a troubling set of scenes 
in which Ali hitchhikes to the beach only to be 
sexually propositioned by an older man 
(Bedard and Soloway, 2014). In season two, 
episode three ("New World Coming"), we view 
an erotic fantasy in which Sarah partakes, 
featuring Sarah masturbating to flashbacks of 
her high school disciplinarian (Soloway and 
Heller, 2015). Finally, in season three, episode 
eight ("If I Were a Bell"), we see twelve-year-old 
Maura dressing up as a girl and consequently 
shamed by her grandfather; in the same 
episode, we realize the psychic fallout of 
twelve-year-old Shelley after she is sexually 
abused by her music teacher (Our Lady J and 
Arnold, 2016). 
Beyond a content analysis, I want to 
think through the unique modes of streaming 
television as they facilitate forms of 
multitemporal trauma and screen-intimacy. In 
Ali's trauma ("Best New Girl"), the majority of 
the episode features the past. Toward the end of 
the episode, young Ali dances with an older 
man she meets at the beach against a 
background of tango music, intercut with shots 
of Maura similarly dancing at a camp for 
cross-dressing women. Both events occur in 
1994. Ali and the older man begin to wrestle as 
Maura and her dancing partner get physically 
more turbulent and intimate. Then, when Ali's 
traumatic event is coming to a head, we observe 
present-day Ali overlooking her younger self, 
making eye contact with the preying older man. 
We then cut to younger Ali approaching the 
pair, grabbing the man by the shoulder as the 
camera tracks to a shot of adult Ali and the man 
kissing, with younger Ali, behind the man, 
continuing to tug at his overalls. 
In an almost inverse narrative device, 
toward the end of "New World Coming," we 
view Ali's older sister Sarah gazing 
depressively out the window of her new 
apartment (Sarah's separation from her 
husband, caused by her cheating with, 
marrying, and then divorcing her college 
girlfriend, has ousted Sarah from the family 
home). The camera cuts to a reverse shot, in 
which we see Sarah's high school disciplinarian 
"Mr. Irons" at the other end of the apartment; 
another cut presents Sarah matching Mr. Irons's 
eye contact. The following reverse shot images 
Mr. Irons in the hallways of Sarah's high school. 
Similar to the episode with Ali, changes in 
lighting technique and color correction perform 
most of the work of designating another 
historical period. The scene then continues to 
intercut between the high school and Sarah's 
apartment, featuring teenage Sarah walking 
down the high school's hallways toward the 
disciplinarian's office; next a subjective shot 
that pans across the placard on Mr. Irons's door. 
The shots get tighter as Sarah and Mr. Irons 
converge at her apartment table, finally 
including the two in the same medium 
close-up. Sarah bends over the table to be 
spanked, while a subsequent over-the-shoulder 
shot represents her younger selfat the far end 
of the apartment overseeing the scene. 
Reminding us of Williams's feminine body in 
melo-pornographic or porno-dramatic ecstasy, 
the sound of the paddle hitting Mr. Irons's hand 
gets progressively louder and quicker as Sarah 
reaches climax. 
I identify in these two examples a 
complex of sexual-traumatic temporalities: 1994 
and the present; high school and now; confused 
generationalities of primary characters; and 
self-gazes and self-pleasures in the 
contemporary and past. What is unique about 
platforms like Amazon are their streaming 
formats and "binge-watching" conducts, 
engendering something more akin to five-hour 
films (comprised of ten thirty-minute 
"episodes") than the discrete episodic format of 
broadcast TV. Furthermore, the streaming 
format can allow a more intimate contact 
between viewer and screen, often watched on 
laptops, mobile phones, and tablets rather than 
on the traditional television set and its 
contemporary smart capabilities. I suggest that 
these multigenerational, traumatic 
temporalities are a characteristic feature of 
feel-sad TV and televisual sad-joy, in which 
present-day characters and their proxy viewers 
can only process sexual hang-ups and erotic 
frustrations through an inter-
intra-generational sexual gaze and im intimate 
screen-contact. Through a presentist 
temporality of streaming ("I can watch it all 
now! The season is all now!") and vulnerable 
screen-connection, Transparent moves toward a 
unique force of sad-joy, in which the character 
and viewer's increase of power in the present 
relies on a presentism of past trauma. 
Transparent's multigenerational trauma 
speaks to the non-eternal temporality of 
Spinoza's passions and the intensity of the 
imagination as the mind regards a past ~r 
future thing as present. For Spinoza, an affect IS 
stronger if we imagine its cause as present and, 
vice versa, an affect regarding a past or future 
cause is weaker than a presentist affect. By 
imagining a past trauma as present, 
Transparent's characters and consequently the 
viewer are affected more intensely. In 
Transparent, the streaming affect of cathartic joy 
and increase in power in the present relies on 
an imagination of traumatic sadness as past and 
present. 
To account for the viewer's 
sad-pornographic relation to the 
multi-generationally traumatic text, I risk a 
speculative spectator based on t~e 
contemporary emotional laborer. Arlie 
Hochschild's seminal study of flight attendants 
and debt collectors in The Managed Heart (2012) 
proves the thoroughgoing permeation of 
emotional labor in the corporate workspace, 
whether normatively affectively positive (the 
flight attendant) or normatively affectively 
negative (the debt collector) . Though her study 
focuses on middle-to-upper-middle-class 
corporate laborers, we could glean from the 
increasingly service-based economy a trend 
toward swelling affective labor in variable 
workspaces. I think here of professional 
functions from fast food servers to Uber 
drivers, whose "smiles" surely mimic the 
pivotal example of Hochschild's beaming 
stewardess. For example, take notice of Uber's 
rating and tips systems, which measure drivers' 
conversational capacity. Furthermore, note how 
Uber employs a gradient of expressive faces 
from fuming to overjoyed to gauge (and mirror) 
customers' (dis)satisfaction with their service. 
While Hochschild's flight attendant and 
contemporary gig workers are pressured into 
and authorized an at-times jarring smile, I 
wager that they are never, under supervision, 
encouraged to grin or laugh in manic or ecstatic 
affect at customers and superiors. Thus, in my 
speculation, and I argue in accordance with 
Hochschild and other affect theorists' 
interpretations, the affective laborer is barred 
from a level of emotional intensity that I name 
catharsis. By this, I mean to communicate that, 
in normatively affectively positive professional 
functions (positions unlike Hochschild's debt 
collector), the laborer is prevented a level of 
both good- and bad-affective intensity: cackling 
hysterically, screaming in anger at customers 
and managers, crying in situations of client or 
administrative harm, and so on. In this way, I 
suggest that we conceive of the space of 
contemporary affective labor as one of emotional 
saturation without cathartic intensity. 
A more recent example of such 
non-cathartic intensity emerges in Berlant's 
comments concerning the exhaustive 
destruction of contemporary Western service 
labor. For Berlant, the combination of waning 
social security and extending life expectancies 
entails a situation of slow death, "the physical 
wearing out of a population in a way that 
points to its deterioration as a defining 
condition of its experience and historical 
existence" (2011, 95). Most simply, people live 
longer, have fewer societal guarantees to cap 
the length of their labor, and thus work longer 
and die slower. It is Berlant's insight regarding 
the affective conditions of slow death that 
speaks to the contemporary emotive spectator 
in my analysis. To counteract the condition of 
slow death, of working longer and dying 
slower, workers partake in moments of 
"interruptive agency" - what Berlant variously 
calls "self-suspension," "counter-dissipation," 
"self-abeyance," and "floating sideways" - in 
overeating.4 With Berlant, I 
imagine sad-pornographic catharsis as an 
analogous mode of emotional self-interruption, 
a counter-agency- sideways and non-sovereign 
- in which the emotive spectator achieves a 
threshold of affective intensity fenced at work. 
In feeling sad-joy, the emotive spectator 
suspends herself in an antagonistically 
emotional overindulgence beside and against 
the under-authorization of emotion in the 
workspace. It is no coincidence that the 
contemporary rhetoric around excessive 
spectatorship -particularly in the form of binge 
watching - accords with the very example of 
interruptive, lateral agency Berlant describes: 
overeating. 
Having established the emotive 
spectator of sad porn, I look to NBC's This Is Us, 
which returns us to multigenerational trauma 
and the political-economics of its affective 
spectatorship. This Is Us follows the Pearson 
family (adopted African-American son Randall; 
biological twins Kate and Kevin; and parents 
Rebecca and Jack) across multiple temporal 
blocs: the many stages of the children's 
upbringing, the ebbs and flows of Rebecca and 
Jack's past marriage, and the contemporary 
events of Randall, Kate, and Kevin's adulthood. 
In season two, episode seventeen ("This Big, 
Amazing, Beautiful Life"), we follow the 
rollercoaster of Randall and wife Beth's foster 
child Deja, as Deja and her struggling, young 
mother (Shauna) endure poverty. However, 
instead of Deja's plotline, I focus on the very 
beginning of the episode, which features four 
interlocking traumas, all births: Shauna's birth 
of Deja; Rebecca's birth of twins Kate and 
Kevin; Beth's birth of Randall's and Beth's first 
daughter Tess; and the birth of Randall, whose 
father leaves him at a fire station (that same day 
4 Berlant also terms this "self-medication through 
self-interruption" (2011, 115-6). Overeating, as 
opposed to over-drinking, over-smoking, 
over-injecting, and over-insulating, exemplifies slow 
death in that "food is one of the few spaces of 
controllable, reliable pleasure people have," and 
"food is necessary to existence, part of the care of the 
self, the reproduction of life" (Berlant 2011, 115). 
.. - ,; ...-
~ - . 
... , . 
. . 
adopted by Jack and Rebecca, who lose their 
third child in their triplets' delivery) (Oyegun 
and Asher, 2018). I suggest that, by framing 
Deja's multi-generationally traumatic plotline-
racialized poverty experienced across 
generations -within four birthing traumas, the 
writer and director provide the emotive 
spectator with sad-pornographic generic cues. 
The viewer can then attach to these cues in 
passionate endurance from the episode's outset. 
In This Is Us, which is aired and 
consumed in a broadcast format, the presentist 
joy of a past-and-present traumatic sadness 
features a different presentist temporality: the 
weeklong craving for a new episode and the 
consumption of that episode as wholly now, 
discrete from other episodes in the 
season/ serial. Where Transparent requires a 
weekend binge, This Is Us necessitates another 
temporality of non-labor: the weekday night. In 
the broadcast and streaming cases, feel-sad TV 
programs nurture a distinct modality of 
laboring passionate affect and increase in 
power, either in the weekend splurge or the 
weeknight reprieve. Necessarily, these scenes of 
tragic-cathartic viewership materialize outside 
such affectively inundated yet non-purgative 
work environments. 
The episodic catharsis of This Is Us, a 
temporality of the only now, each time this week, 
pairs with the form of the births' representation: 
the temporal ubiquity and simultaneity of the 
interlocking, traumatic deliveries. In the case of 
both the viewing temporality and the birthing 
temporality, episodic trauma-joy formulates as 
an all now, only at this time, with week-long gaps 
separating discrete episodes and discrete 
historical periods demarcating the divided eras 
of the births. The streaming format's "all now, 
all at once" matches Transparent's traumatic 
erotics of past and present, and the broadcast 
TV format's "only now, each time this week" 
dovetails with This Is Us's traumatic 
simultaneity. 
As a cold medium "high in participation 
or completion by the audience" and high in 
empathy television facilitates unique forms of 
personal vulnerability in which an opposing 
non-catharsis can be superseded 
through affective intensity in the home 
(McLuhan 1994, 23, 30).5 Writing on TV 
melodrama and postmodern consumer culture, 
Lynne Joyrich (1992) argues that "television 
draws all of us, women and men, into a shared 
bond of consumer overpresence and powerless 
spectatorship as melodrama becomes the 
preferred form for TV, the postmodern medium 
par excellence" (228-9). While Joyrich writes in 
the pre-streaming era and is concerned with the 
postmodernization of melodrama (and the 
melodramatization of postmodernity), I 
continue to value the convergence of 
"consumer overpresence" and "powerless 
spectatorship" in Joyrich's argument, especially 
as that convergence pertains to melodrama and 
melodrama's generic sprawl across soap operas 
and serials. Continuing my reading of 
Transparent and This Is Us, the consumer 
overpresence to which J oyrich refers 
corresponds to Spinoza's understanding of the 
increased intensity of affect under the 
presentness of the affecting thing (in this case, 
multigenerational trauma in contemporary TV 
melodrama). Furthermore, the powerless 
spectatorship in Joyrich's formulation 
corresponds to the feelings of social 
helplessness that Berlant articulates in The 
Female Complaint, wherein the feminine subject 
experiences a juxta-positionality or asideness to 
politics with consequent feelings of 
political-affective incapacity (2008, 3). 
Spectatorial powerlessness also invokes 
Spinoza' s understanding of sadness as a 
fundamental loss of power, striving, action, and 
virtue. In this vein, I suggest that this particular 
junction of overpresence and powerlessness 
also characterizes trauma porn's 
generic-aesthetic structures of affective 
5 Marshall McLuhan (1994), Understanding Media: The 
Extensions of Man, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 23, 
30. McLuhan's brief aside about a paradigmatic 
affect in the electrical age, boredom, is also relevant 
here. The cool corporate non-catharsis I explore in 
this article is less a genre of anxiety than a genre of 
boredom, a tedious feeling of affective non-intensity. 
See McLuhan (1994, 26). 
expectation. Furthermore, following Joyrich, I 
wager that there is a gendered distribution in 
the emotion management of erotic attachments 
to feel-sad media: an affective labor often taken 
in the home; "marked" by feminized passivity, 
domesticity, and susceptibility; and a feminine 
labor impossible in masculinist spaces of 
managed non-catharsis. 
I propose that the commonplace 
fascination with traumatic, familial situations 
on TV engenders unique feel-sad formats and 
sad-joys that rely on a distinctive relationship 
between the private and the professional. In my 
notion of the contemporary emotive spectator, 
the professional public has managed catharsis 
out of the workplace and delegated purgation 
completely to the domestic/mobile televisual 
space. The exhaustion caused by labor's 
inhibited catharsis leads to an excitation and 
desire for traumatic media in the home in 
which the tele-viewer can achieve an emotive 
threshold barred at work. The viewer expresses 
joy in watching televisual families process their 
own complexly temporal traumas, an intensity 
of joyful passionate imagination in the present 
that necessitates the past-and-presentness of 
trauma in the televisual now. 
I call the particular affective dialectic at 
play in sad-pornographic consumption sad-joy. 
I define sad-joy as a dialectical vacillation of the 
mind in which the ambivalent tension of feeling 
sadness economizes joy. Spinoza defines 
"vacillation of mind" in the demonstration of 
proposition seventeen of the third part of the 
Ethics. The proposition states that, if a thing that 
causes us joy is similar to a thing that causes us 
sadness, we will have something akin to a 
love-hate relationship with that thing. For 
Spinoza, this irresolution between love and 
hate, joy and sadness, defines the vacillation of 
mind as such. Following Spinoza (1996), in my 
articulation, sad-joy, as a mental irresolution, 
exemplifies an affective dialectic in which 
joyfulness- a "passion by which [one] passes to 
a greater perfection" and a virtuous increase in 
power and striving for self-preservation -
emerges as the net distribution of sadness - the 
passage to a lesser perfection (77). 
I categorize sad-joy in classical and 
modern theories of tragic catharsis but with a 
contemporary historical bent. In this way, I 
expand cathartic theory by understanding 
sad-joy's dialectic as a catharsis of the 
contemporary, one specific to the surveillances 
of contemporary capital, in which labor is 
expected to emotionally (re)produce at the 
same time as catharsis is managed out. For 
Aristotle, catharsis was intimately related to the 
"purgation of emotions" facilitated by tragic 
drama and tragic action's unique modes of pity 
and fear (1997, 10). Following Aristotle's classic 
tragic theory, I wager that sad-joy is 
constitutively connected to contemporary 
formats of feel-sad media, in particular trauma 
porn's singular modes of fear (traumatic terror) 
and pity (sympathy for trauma), an effect of 
said sub-genre's equally distinctive purgation 
(a joy economized through sadness) . 
Furthermore, sad-joy as a contemporary 
catharsis emerges in the tragic experiential 
genres of the contemporary workplace and its 
flows of surveilled non-catharsis. 
Sad-joy resonates with David Hume's 
theory of tragedy, in which he points almost 
exactly toward sad-joy in the "unaccountable 
pleasure which the spectators of a well-written 
tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and 
other passions that are in themselves 
disagreeable and uneasy" (1993, 126). In 
Hume's account, pleasure is directly related to 
affliction.6 Furthermore, Hume's sad-joy 
counterpart is an express response to 
unbearable structures of non-catharsis and flat 
feeling, whether "the languid, listless state of 
indolence into which it falls upon the removal 
of all passion and occupation," or "the insipid 
languor which arises from perfect tranquility 
and repose" (126). In my account, the managed 
non-catharsis of the workspace corresponds to 
6 
"[Spectators] are pleased in proportion as they are 
afflicted, and never are so happy as when they 
employ tears, sobs, and cries, to give vent to their 
sorrow, and relieve their heart, swoln with the 
tenderest sympathy and compassion" (Hume 1993, 
126). 
Hume's agomzmg boredom, listlessness, 
indolence, and languor. Finally, Hume's model 
moves us closer to sad-joy's dialectic. Writing 
on the affectivity of oratory, Hume's rhetoric 
emphasizes overpowering, effacement, 
conversion, redirection, and seizing (129). 
Hume's diction moves us into the language of 
sad-joy's affective dialectic. In feel-sad media's 
paradigmatic affect of sad-joy, the 
overpowering of sadness by joy emerges in an 
overcoming of sorrow by an erotically joyful 
attachment to sad televisual objects. 
As I have developed throughout this 
article, the stakes of sad-joy are the affective 
endurance of the subject under contemporary 
capital. In this way, the consequence of sad-joy 
corresponds to the significance of Spinoza's 
striving, an analogue for late capitalist survival. 
Due to the fact that each thing strives to 
persevere in its being, striving constitutes each 
thing's essence, and perseverance in striving 
endows the individual with virtue, Spinoza 
awards desire and striving an ethical content. 
Following Spinoza, we could afford the 
contemporary emotive spectator's striving an 
ethical value, as she pursues her own affective 
endurance in the face of supervised 
non-catharsis. However, the emotive spectator's 
striving is not unlimited; Spinoza stresses the 
fact that external causes will inevitably 
overpower the force of one's perseverance and 
striving. Following the limited nature of desire 
for Spinoza and its surpassing by external 
causes, I wager that the contemporary laborer 
who affectively self-reproduces will always 
respond to and be overcome by the managed 
non-catharsis of contemporary capital, the 
external cause of which necessitates the 
laborer's very affective survival for the 
reproduction of capital. The employee can only 
endure through abiding by an administered 
level of emotional non-intensity. 
Sad-joy is a dialectical ambivalence that 
emerges from the contemporary condition of 
corporate coldness. The tele-viewer craves 
feel-sad media to feel sad-joy, undergoing a 
vacillation of mind whose dialectical push and 
pull will end in a net joyfulness. The 
--.......-
consequences of sad-joy are twofold: first, in 
Spinoza's terms, an increase in power via a 
double decrease in power: the affective 
debilitation of contemporary capital which 
leads to feel-sad media's own affective 
(dis)empowerment; and second, the affective 
perseverance against and for the reproduction 
of capital. 
In summary, sadness pornography 
mediates a unique tragedy of the contemporary, 
or a unique mode of the contemporary tragic, in 
which people "get off" on overwhelmingly 
sorrowful yet cathartic media. As a mediatic 
meta-genre, sad porn constellates a number of 
distinct sub-genres, such as disability, 
inspiration, and trauma porn. An affective 
meta-genre, sadness circumscribes pitiful, 
depressive, and traumatic emotions as an 
overarching "aesthetic structure of affective 
expectation," following Berlant. As a 
contemporary aesthetic category, sad porn 
succeeds a lineage of televisual and cinematic 
precursors, appearing at the convergence of the 
soap opera and the pornographic weepie. 
In my analysis, I stress one sub-genre of 
sadness pornography, trauma porn, and its 
manifestations in serials such as Orange Is the 
New Black, Transparent, and This Is Us. 
Accounting for numerous identitarian positions 
and identity histories, trauma porn 
spectacularizes the contemporary abnormal 
family and its legacies of black, queer, and trans 
multigenerational trauma. In Transparent, 
multigenerational trauma emerges in inter- and 
intra-generational sexual longings and gazes, a 
transgenerationally traumatic erotics that match 
the streaming format's past-and-present 
temporality, what I call the "all now, all at 
once." In This Is Us, four interlocking births, 
which frame a tale of transgenerational black 
poverty, emerge an aesthetics of traumatic 
simultaneity that mirror broadcast television's 
temporality of "only now, each time this week." 
Following affective scholars like 
Hochschild and Berlant, my analysis wagers a 
speculative emotive spectator, who embodies 
the particular friction between emotional labor 
(in the workspace) and emotion management 
(at home or on the go). Experiencing variable 
~abor environments that are affectively 
mundated while administratively non-cathartic, 
the contemporary emotional laborer as TV 
spectator craves feel-sad media to reach a 
threshold of affective intensity fenced at work. 
The sad-pornographic viewer engages feel-sad 
media in moments of "interruptive agency," 
modes of sideways and non-sovereign actancy, 
partaking in an oppositional emotional 
over-extravagance: a "self-medication" in 
which binge watching mimics self-abeyant 
behaviors like overeating. Occupying 
television's larger structures of participation 
and empathy, sad-pornographic . viewership is 
characterized by a distinctive juncture between 
overpresence (such as Spinoza's intensified 
a~ect under the presentness of the affecting 
thmg) and powerlessness (like Berlant's 
understanding of the juxtapositionality or 
asideness of the feminine subject to the 
political). 
Finally, . sad porn generates a unique 
affect, sad-joy, which I define as a wavering of 
the mind, or a mental oscillation. In sad-joy, 
overwhelming sorrow economizes ecstatic joy. 
As a contemporary form of affective purgation, 
sad-joy revises classic and modern theories of 
the cathartic by pointing us toward the current 
dialectic between experiences of tragedy in the 
home/ on the go - through sad pornographic 
media - and professional non-tragedies - in 
non-cathartic work atmospheres. In this way, 
the stakes of sadness pornography regard the 
contemporary laborer as televisual spectator's 
affective endurance. Sad porn lubricates the 
current emotional worker's survival, but 
maybe, even probably, momentarily. 
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This paper considers friendship as an 
affective terrain of feminist alliance among 
subjects that belong to territories with a history 
of colonization able to respond to the 
colonial/modern gender system (Lugones 2007) 
through the arts. To this endeavor, friendship is 
here conceived as an engagement of feminist 
solidarity that unfolds within theoretical and 
practical models of change and resistance 
against the logics of cultural imperialism 
(Lugones and Spelman 1983). Turning friendship 
into a polyphonic relationship of feminist 
reaction, this work is conducted by 
acknowledging the need to incorporate a 
dialogue where different authorial voices and 
feminist positionalities meet, reflect, and 
respond. The paper settles the friendly 
encounter between its authors in conversation 
with Guatemalan feminist rapper Rebeca Lane 
and her song "Alma Mestiza" ("Mestiza Soul," 
2016). 
Examining authors' friendship 
throughout their feminist co-inhabitation, 
positionalities, and respective ethnic 
backgrounds (Mexico and Spain), this paper 
seeks to discern in their alliance a differential 
affective relationality capable of fostering artistic 
responses to contemporary forms of racism and 
neo-colonial exploitation. As part of their 
feminist militancy, the music of Rebeca Lane 
becomes the meeting point in which to mutually 
reflect about the colonial record of their 
ethnicities, and to further articulate artistic 
dialogues implementing a feminist and a 
decolonial awareness. Thus, "Alma Mestiza" 
triggers in this essay both a critical examination 
of decolonial artistic practices with a feminist 
commitment, and a situated encounter of 
auto-phenomenographic poetry (Lykke 2018) 
with Lane's song. In this light, the present paper 
is born out of the authors' will to pose their 
friendship as an affective terrain on which to 
formulate critical and artistically situated 
accounts becoming-with feminist artistic 
material (Straube 2014). 
To this task, the paper is divided into 
four sections. The first section conceptualizes the 
authors' friendship and feminist positionalities 
as an affective engagement informed by their 
respective backgrounds. The second section 
introduces Rebeca Lane's music activism in line 
with the elucidation of contemporary feminist 
decolonial practices through the arts. The third 
section establishes the possibility of fostering an 
encounter between decolonial and posthuman 
theoretical patterns in the elaboration of our 
artistic approach. The fourth section finally 
provides a situated dialogue with Lane's piece in 
the shape of an embodied auto-ethnographic 
poetry. Overall, this paper aims to frame the 
authors' friendship as a feminist alliance in 
which the colonial records of their ethnicities are 
further complicated via their affective 
identification and artistic conversation with 
Rebeca Lane's music. In this sense, our account 
enacts the feminist potential of considering the 
personal and the arts as joint realms in the 
production of analyses and critiques of the 
colonial/modern gender system. 
1. Friendship as a feminist engagement: 
positioning authorial voices 
In mid-July 2017, the authors of this 
paper were sent an email confirming our 
acceptance as students of a transnational 
master's degree in Women's and Gender Studies 
across Europe .. For two years, we had the chance 
to experience a feminist training and 
co-inhabitation in the company of feminist allies 
from all over the world. The city of Oviedo 
(Asturias, in Northern Spain) was our first 
destination, and from September 2017 to July 
2018, we became friends and flat-mates in, as we 
would call it, casa feminista (the feminist house, 
see Figure 1). For all of us Oviedo was a new 
city, and English or Spanish was not our 
mother-tongue. Coming from different ethnic, 
linguistic, social-class, academic, and feminist 
backgrounds, the meetings at casa feminista 
greatly helped us to shift our theoretical training 
towards a friendly engagement of feminist 
participation. Weekly dinners, endless debates, 
feminist marches, sharing of readings, movie 
sessions, evening walks, occasional trips, and the 
exciting calmness of a shared routine turned our 
co-inhabi tation into a friendly space of feminist 
kinship (see Figure 2). By July 2018, some of us 
either graduated from the master's, or left to our 
second home institution in another European 
country. As of July 2019, the authors of this 
paper are able to discern an academic and 
personal continuum made possible thanks to a 
feminist engagement of friendship and alliance 
primarily knitted in casa feminista. 
Bound to depart from the program, the 
authors felt the need to academically and 
artistically portray a part of our feminist 
co-inhabitation. This simultaneously displays 
the conflictive nature of our particular yet 
interrelated backgrounds, which have constantly 
confronted in dialogue our positionalities with 
our former and present experiences as subjects 
committed to feminism. As a place of human 
and non-human co-existence, casa feminista is not 
only a house but rather a communitarian space 
where objects, food, sounds, and non-human 
living companions have differently coincided in 
the evolving of our friendship. For this reason, 
the authors want to consider friendship as a 
fruitful affective engagement to pose systematic 
analyses and critiques incorporating a feminist 
awareness. This awareness is here informed by 
Marfa C. Lugones and Elizabeth V. Spelman's 
(1983) conceptualization of feminist friendship 
as a relationship facilitating the development of 
theories aiming to change and resist the logics of 
cultural imperialism (576, 579). 
Jointly emphasizing the need for 
white/ Anglo feminists to make room for women 
of color, both authors thread a quasi-manifesto 
providing a few guidelines to talk and to be 
talked about (Lugones and Spelman 1983, 
578-581). In these, Lugones and Spelman 
remarkably touch upon the importance of 
articulating situated accounts in feminist 
academia that acknowledge as many women's 
standpoints as possible, while also pointing out 
a sort of hermeneutics reminding white/ Anglo 
feminists what Adrienne Rich (1984) would later 
define as "politics of location," that is, the ethical 
duty for white/ Anglo feminists to recognize 
themselves as "outsiders" when addressing the 
experiences of non-white women (Lugones and 
Spelman 1983, 577). Lugones and Spelman 
(1983) inform the "fragile psychic state" (575) 
women of color suffer because of the silencing 
invisibilization exercised by white/ Anglo 
feminism. In Lugones and Spelman's view, such 
an exclusion leads women of raza - as they coin 
to refer to women of color - into an alienation 
that unspeaks in-between ethnic, linguistic, and 
social-class backgrounds. 
In unspeaking, feminists of raza are 
caught in the constant accommodation of their 
accents, knowledges, and behavior under the 
lens of mainstream feminism (Lugones and 
Spelman 1983, 573-576). Out of their alliance to 
raise awareness about the dominating character 
displayed by white/ Anglo feminism, Lugones 
and Spelman (1983) consider friendship among 
white/ Anglo and feminists of raza as the "only 
sensical motivation" in the fostering of a 
non-imperialist feminism (576). This motivation 
induces white feminists into a self-fragilization 
state that critically reflects the asymmetry 
permeating their friendship with women of raza, 
and that renders their imperialist modes of 
behavior vulnerable. In so doing, white feminists 
could learn " to become unintrusive, 
unimportant, patient to the point of tears," while 
having their world of experience "disrupted [ .. . ] 
criticized and scrutinized from the point of view 
of those who have been harmed by it" (Lugones 
and Spelman 1983, 580). As a result, white 
feminists might be able to see women of color in 
their own communities, to understand their 
cultural texts, and eventually to desacralize 
white epistemological authority and their 
"ready-made theories" that tighten the 
experiences of women of color (Lugones and 
Spelman 1983, 581). 
Paola comes from Mexico and Miguel 
from Spain, countries with tense and unresolved 
colonial records. In the provisional attempt to 
approach these from our respective feminist 
positionalities and shared intimacy, we felt 
prompted to find in the memories of our 
friendly living in casa feminista a differential 
affective relationality responding to 
contemporary forms of racism and neo-colonial 
exploitation. Out of these memories, music is 
fundamental. Day and night, casa feminista 
played the songs of Javiera Mena, Rebeca Lane, 
Gata Cattana, Princess Nokia, Francisco El 
Hombre, Mala Rodriguez, Ray BLK, Calle 13, 
Young Fathers, Lady Gaga, (Me Llamo) 
Sebastian, Alex Anwandter, Natalia Lafourcade, 
Cafe Tacvba, or Jorge Drexler. From this 
inspiring playlist, Rebeca Lane's music became a 
point of encounter in our feminist crises and 
debates. Paola, as a Mexican feminist allied with 
women's indigenous vindications, found in 
Lane's rhymes triggering instances of decolonial 
I 
feminism through the arts. Miguel, as a Spanish 
feminist belonging to a country that continues to 
dismiss its imperialistic legacy, saw in Lane's 
music an artistic means to actively rethink his 
colonizing background. 
Emplaced in the safety of casa feminista, 
but also within the Spanish escalation of far 
right-wing populism, Rebeca Lane's activism 
provided us with some support in our respective 
feminist interventions, and the socio-political 
scenarios where they are inscribed. A case in 
point was the recent Spanish denial, both by the 
monarchy and the caretaker socialist 
government (2018-2019), to offer any kind of 
apology to Mexico for the Spanish colonization 
2 
on its territories. As it will be examined in the 
following section, European colonization was 
not an isolated historical event. Instead, it was a 
dehumanizing system of Western negation of 
indigenous peoples and cultures enacting a 
gendered modus operandi that has pervaded 
through time, and that keeps nurturing the 
exploitation of human and natural resources in 
territories with a history of colonization. This 
denial has coincided with the rise of far 
right-wing mobilization in Spain, as seen in a 
shameful Francoist revival, the glorification of 
the Spanish imperial past,3 the targeting of 
4 
feminisms, and the entrance of an extreme 
1 Henceforth, by decolonial feminism we refer to the 
theoretical framework developed in U.S. academia, 
particularly by Maria Lugones (2007). We 
differentiate this school of thought from the 
des-colonial (translated as well as decolonial) practices 
and theoretical approaches of Latin American 
feminisms. The latter focus on the situated lived 
experiences of latina women, as for instance the 
feminist activism of Rebeca Lane in the hip-hop 
scene. 
2 For more information about this event, see: 
<https:// elpais.com/ elpais/2019/03/26/ inenglish / 1 
553587549 _240799 .html>. 
3 An example would be the social and institutional 
opposition to exhume the remains of former dictator 
Francisco Franco from the public basilica of El Valle de 
los Caidos (The Valley of the Fallen) in Madrid. For 
more information about this event, see: 
<https: // elpais.com/ elpais/2019/06/04/ inenglish/1 
559644855_670635.html>. 
' A recent instance would be the inspection by the far 
right-wing political party VOX of feminist 
right-wing political party to Congress for the 
first time in democracy after the fall of the 
dictatorship.
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These few glimpses, together with 
the difficulties of forming a stable government, 
inform the urgency of tackling right-wing 
populism from an intersectional feminist 
militancy contesting the Spanish dismissal of its 
colonization, while rendering visible the 
experiences of colonized women. 
Regaining Lugones and Spelman's 
formulation, we want to acknowledge in this 
paper the potential of conceiving our friendship 
as an affective terrain of feminist alliance in 
response to the current socio-political scenario 
via a critical and artistic approach to Lane's song 
"Alma Mestiza." To this task, we simultaneously 
address the naive pretension to briefly address 
our feminist commitment, artistic inspirations, 
and vital experiences over the last two years. 
These have undoubtedly made us aware of the 
systematic asymmetry investing the affective 
relationality of our friendship, but also of the 
power of the arts in posing this awareness in 
constant dialogue. Throughout this process, 
Lane's discography becomes a sonic material 
that displays her own agency and feminist 
positionality, as well as a musical memory of our 
co-existence in casa feminista . The present paper 
reunites our memories, critical knowledge, and 
artistic skills in the articulation of a theoretical 
and practical response of change and resistance 
to the colonial / modern gender system (Lugones 
and Spelman 1983; Lugones 2007) through our 
friendly engagement with "Alma Mestiza." As a 
whole, our response attempts to fully frame our 
friendship as a reflective space of feminist 
participation, and as a means to position our 
voices together in conversation with the artistic 
activism of Rebeca Lane. 
organizations working with gender violence, 
migration, and LGBTIQ rights. This is part of a 
right-wing campaign of hate speech, institutional 
framing, and public shaming of feminisms in the 
country. For more information about this event, see: 
<https: // elpais.com/ elpais/2019/02/22/ inenglish/1 
550852190_868783.html>. 
' For more information about this event, see: 
<https:/ I elpais.com/ elpais/2019/11/10/inenglish/1 
573407794_574125.html>. 
2. Contemporary moves of decolonial feminism 
through the arts 
Rebeca Lane is a Guatemalan sociologist 
and feminist rapper. As a sociologist, she has 
explored the political contexts of urban tribes 
and new youth identities, particularly hip-hop 
cultures. Her musical interests led her to 
different art projects displaying her feminist 
activism in the overall visibilization of Central 
American women's struggles and contributions 
to the hip-hop scene. Her style and political 
stance has opened a gap in a world dominated 
by men and co-opted by a cultural industry with 
a specific commercial agenda that Lane has 
openly criticized. In an interview with a digital 
magazine, Lane stated: "I did not come here to 
please them or to repeat the phrases that we 
supposedly have to say ... politically, I am not 
going to swallow things in order to receive a 
prize" (Vichez 2016).6 Rebeca Lane is part of an 
emerging generation of Latin American female 
rappers who touch upon common problems that 
women and girls face in the region, such as 
abortion criminalization, lack of sex education, 
deficient healthcare, sexual and domestic 
violence, femicides, human trafficking, and a 
deep-rooted machismo founded on the structural 
inequalities of patriarchy. 
Hip-hop in Guatemala, as in her origins 
in the popular neighborhoods of New York and 
Los Angeles, has become a political platform to 
express the griefs caused by the long-lasting 
aftermaths of the civil war held between 
1960-1996, as well as the resistances that have 
emerged to deal with the wounds left by 
enforced disappearances, political incarceration, 
ethnic cleansing, and genocides caused by the 
7 
resulting Guatemalan dictatorships (Lane 2012). 
6 Translation by Paola Mendoza TeJ!ez Giron. 
7 Guatemala was the scene of four decades of internal 
armed conflict that ended up with more than 200,000 
deaths. About 83% of the victims were Mayan 
indigenous who suffered a series of systematic 
tortures as a plan from the army to end their eHmicity 
and take possession of their lands. Within this 
context, dictatorships have been the central political 
feature of colonial domination and imperial interests 
controlled by the ruling sectors and the Army. The 
civil war ended in 1996 with the Agreement of 
Lasting Peace between the Government and the 
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) 
Indeed, Rebeca Lane decided to fuse her poetic 
vein with rap rhythms as a homage to her aunt 
Rebeca Eunice Vargas, who was a poet and a 
guerrillera (guerrilla) disappeared in 1981 at the 
hands of Guatemalan militaries during the civil 
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war (Rigby 2015). In an interview with The 
Guardian, Lane stated that hip-hop is a healing 
tool for younger generations that have learned to 
survive in violent contexts: "It gives young 
people ways of organizing beyond armed 
conflict, beyond military or gang violence" 
(Rigby 2015). In this manner, hip-hop speaks to 
the power relations that underlie cultural 
practices, while also becoming a cultural space 
in which political action occurs and further 
impacts its audience's subjectivities. 
As informed by Lane's career, feminist 
criticism through art is an invitation to challenge 
traditional representations of women in order to 
configure new social and cultural significances. 
Feminism brings into the Latin American 
hip-hop scene the opportunity to give an 
account of women's standpoints. Women's 
testimonies have the potential to situate 
particular women's efforts and struggles within 
common structures of gendered oppressions, 
which in Latin American countries display a 
record of colonization following the logics of the 
"colonial/modern gender system" (Lugones 
2007). As decofonial feminist philosopher Marfa 
C. Lugones has theorized, race and gender were 
the marks of civilization settled and reproduced 
by the Eurocentered modern coloniality. 
Therefore, the dichotomy man/woman and its 
compulsory heterosexuality, along with its racial 
hierarchization, became a long-standing pattern 
of power that has shaped the bodies and 
subjectivities of the colonized ever since the 
in 1996 (see Conzisi6n para el Esclarecimiento Hist6rico 
(Guatemala) [Commission for Historical Clarification], 
1998). 
Since the 1970s, the insurgent movement 
incorporated the Mayan people that had not been 
present in the first stage of the conflict. In this 
manner, Mayan people expanded the social base of 
the guerrillas, which provided greater support from 
the civilian population. As a result, from 1981 
onwards the Army started an offensive against civil 
society, unloading disproportionate 
counterinsurgency actions (See Comisi6n para el 
Esclarecimiento Hist6rico (Guatemala) [Commission for 
Historical Clarification], 1998). 
colonial expansion (Lugones 2007), and one that 
is further replicated in the current exploitation of 
human and natural resources in places with this 
history of colonization. Especially for women of 
color, the enactment of their own accounts is 
crucial in the constellation of intersectional 
feminisms, avoiding thus the homogenization of 
women's needs and interventions under the 
agenda of white feminism (Lugones and 
Spelman 1983), and the overall commodification 
of women's bodies in patriarchal societies. 
In this guise, feminist hip-hop subverts 
women's objectification as depicted by 
masculinized lyrics that construct violent 
meanings and practices while invisibilizing 
women's agencies and lives. By portraying their 
own imaginaries through music, feminist 
rappers make room for more women into the 
hip-hop scene, thus contributing to the 
empowerment, collaboration, and education 
among poor girls and women (Rigby 2015). 
Rebeca Lane's discography (2014-present) 
revolves around identity, culture, feminism, and 
anarchism, speaking up against the racialized, 
gendered, and capitalist hierarchies imposed 
since the European colonial expansion to the 
Americas and the Caribbean. Particularly, the 
production of the album Poesia Venenosa 
(Poisonous Poetry, 2015) took the rapper into an 
identity process in which she re-appropriates her 
indigenous roots without dismissing the 
internalization of Western values and education, 
which inform her (self-)racism and privileges 
(Vichez 2016). Later, in the poetry, the music, and 
the aesthetics of the album Alma Mestiza (Mestiza 
Soul, 2016) she deals with the conflicts and 
possible encounters of indigenous, ladina , and 
mestiza identities. Politically identified as mestiza, 
Lane defines herself as "ethnically diverse," 
advancing a notion of a mestizaje that accepts 
and negotiates cultural contradictions (Vichez 
2016).9 
In Guatemala, ladina/o identity refers to 
non-indigenous people. Within a caste model that 
reproduces the colonial racialized matrix of 
domination, /adina/o identity implies exclusion, 
exploitation, and dispossession of indigenous Mayan 
peoples, which are the majority of the population. 
Mestiza/a identity, understood as a cultural-biological 
mixture shared by a collectivity after colonization 
processes in Latin America, is used by Lane as a 
By proposing decolonization of 
knowledges and of the self, Lane challenges the 
colonial impositions that continue to deny the 
languages, identities, and even the sounds of the 
colonized. In line with these ideas, Lane's music 
merges the African American and Caribbean 
diaspora roots of hip-hop with Guatemalan 
Caribbean rhythms and cumbia. According to 
Chilean artist and researcher Julia Antivilo 
(2015), Latin American artists revaluate popular 
world ritualization in the recovering of 
traditional arts and ancestral cosmovision, a 
move that enables them to elaborate their 
identity out of colonial chains. From a decolonial 
feminist perspective, deeply embedded in Lane's 
pieces, non-hegemonic local productions 
through the arts tend to dismantle the idea of the 
North American and Eurocentric masculine 
objective truth, whose universal scope has long 
concealed colonized knowledges, memories, and 
subjectivities (Mignolo 2012; Maldonado-Torres 
2007, 2011) . This universal thinking, inherent to 
the installation of colonial modernity and 
displaying racializing and gendering hierarchies, 
is thus challenged by local critical initiatives. As 
a result, protest art provides remarkable 
instances of local mobilization against colonial 
patterns of cultural representation, and thus of 
colonial power, performed by gendered and 
racialized subjects in territories with a colonial 
record. 
Lane's song "Alma Mestiza" (2016) 
explicitly acknowledges the contradictions in 
rendering visible the colonial oppressions of her 
indigenous roots and gender identity under the 
colonial/modern gender system (Lugones 2007). 
Artistic representations and performances that 
resist the erasure of indigeneity and of any 
difference destabilize the hegemonic gender 
system, easing the right to self-representation in 
decolonizing processes. In Lane's political stance 
through music, her mestiza identity navigates the 
contradictions that arise when women belonging 
to colonized territories visibilize their 
indigenous backgrounds. Accordingly, and as 
informed by Lugones' theorization, Rebeca 
Lane's music contests the colonial/modern 
gender system, while articulating an identity 
political stance to recognize the indigenous roots of 
national identity and the fusion of cultures that must 
be (re-)signified. 
repertoire seeking an artistic and political 
liberation. In the musical elaboration of her 
situated decolonial critique, Lane poses her body 
as a locus from which to react against the 
colonial lens that has distorted her indigenous 
roots, (self-)perception, and acknowledgment. 
In the words of Antivilo (2015), the body 
"is a reduction modeled by the patriarchal 
vision" (7). For this reason, approaching the 
body as a physical terrain for the reworking of 
colonial imprinting becomes fundamental in 
feminist performance through the arts. In so 
doing, decolonial feminist artists can envision 
alternative identifications with their gender, and 
face the structural power dynamics that lie over 
their racialized and gendered corpo-realities 
(Young 1997; Grosz 1997). In a similar fashion, 
Latin American communitarian feminism 
recognizes the body as a primal territory against 
the material and symbolic impressions left by 
neo-colonial power relations. Considering 
therefore the colonized body as a battleground 
for feminist reaction, the corporeal realm 
simultaneously becomes a place for 
epistemological creation, life alternatives, and 
identities relating to community, history, and 
nature (Paredes 2010; Valadez 2014). 
Instead of building upon complex 
theoretical corpora, only accessible to certain 
intellectual audiences and political forums, Lane 
communicates and connects with people via her 
direct engagement with the body. This is 
approached from her own embodied impulse, 
and it is capable of reaching a local and 
transnational audience with the aim of raising 
awareness about neo-colonial oppressions 
shared by numerous territories with a common 
colonial record (Vichez 2016). In this regard, the 
artist asserts: "I can't write anything if it doesn't 
happen to me through the body, through my 
experience" (Sierra 2016). 10 Departing from these 
premises, both in the visuals and in the poetics 
of "Alma Mestiza" the singer performs a 
(re-)appropriation of the colonized subjectivity, 
body, and memory through the reconfiguration 
of her own identity. In this vein, she responds 
against the perpetuation of the colonial/modern 
gender system through time, while rendering 
herself as a woman from a territory experiencing 
local struggles among women and indigenous 
communities. Lane's bodily-political space of 
artistic enunciation thus subverts the 
"disembodied and unlocated neutrality and 
objectivity of the ego-politics of knowledge" 
(Grosfoguel 2011, 98) inflicted by Eurocentric 
thinking that delinks the racial, ethnic, gendered, 
and sexual epistemic location of colonized 
subjects. 
The re-appropriation of the mestiza 
identity leads the rapper to reinforce elements of 
ancestral cosmovision in the aesthetics of Alma 
Mestiza as a purposeful decolonial strategy. The 
healing powers of natural elements, the 
cleansing rituals, and the portrayal of myths and 
traditional clothes become then symbols of 
resistance against neo-colonial powers, and also 
the tools for the reconfiguration of her identity 
(see Figures 3 and 4). This can be interpreted in 
the lyrics of the song "Alma Mestiza": 
"Mother-Nature I Tenderly sutures I The 
rupture of my body I Once I freed myself from I 
My tough armor. Because it does not mature I A 
wound that is not healed I A mind without 
madness I A heart without ties. To flow is to 
des troy and to construct again I A house 
without walls I And to lose the fear to die" 
11 . . (Lane 2016). Evokmg the coloma! wounds that 
she still embodies in the re-elaboration of her 
mestiza identity, Lane revalidates Guatemalan 
ancestral knowledges and spiritual practices that 
have been systematically disregarded over time 
in the interest of colonial dispossession. 
Throughout "Alma Mestiza" (2016), the 
artist conceives the body from a cosmos-centric 
view, discerning in her materiality a space of 
inhabitability. In so doing, Lane moves away 
from androcentric abstractions of the (female) 
body to further articulate the collective-body, the 
body-territory, and the spiritual-body, all of 
which are imagined as an identity assemblage. 
In this vein, Lane has shared with a Chilean 
magazine that she cannot refer just to the 
material body because "what happens to us as 
women, what happens to the peoples in 
resistance, what happens to the native peoples, 
the Afro-descendant peoples, what happens to 
the communities historically excluded from 
social welfare, happens to me too" (Viancos 
11 Translation by Miguel Angel Blanco Martinez. 
2019).12 Likewise, Judith Butler (2019), talking 
about emotions at the body's limit, has pointed 
out that the clamor of the marginalized "is the 
living reminder that it is at the level of the body 
that political suffering takes place and it is 
through embodied action that the disfranchised 
make themselves known as existing." 
Altogether, Lane's musical reactions and Butler's 
reminder pinpoint the erasure and the 
exploitation of the colonized bodies and 
territories of the colonial/modern gender 
system. As theorized by Frantz Fanon (2009), 
these have been pushed out to the "zone of 
non-being" (42), a zone of racial oppression and 
exclusion where they struggle to be heard and to 
be noticed (Grosfoguel2011). 
3. Setting the terrain to become-with feminist 
artistic material 
The unfolding of a differential affectivity 
informed by the memories of our feminist 
friendship through the arts, and triggered by 
Rebeca Lane's music, will be performed by 
combining Rebeca Lane's decolonial feminism 
with recent feminist research on posthuman 
engagement with artistic material (Straube 2014), 
and embodied auto-ethnographic poetry (Lykke 
2018).13 Throughout our living together, the 
authors of this paper have discussed if 
posthuman theory could meet a theoretica l 
encounter with decolonial feminism. As the 
colonial/modern gender system reveals, 
dehumanization was inherent to colonization. 
Hence, to remain human, or to theoretically 
question this category, has been a privileged 
stance held by an intellectual elite, which usually 
belongs to countries with an epistemic 
colonialist agenda. Furthermore, the emphasis of 
feminist academia to re-evaluate the relationship 
12 Translation by Paola Mendoza Tellez Giron. 
13 The notion of the posthuman has been widely 
theorized in the last decades. For this reason, there is 
a great number of different authors and approaches 
addressing this concept. In this paper, posthuman 
refers to our feminist and affective engagement in 
casa feminista as one informed by a human and 
non-human co-existence, playing music a vital role. 
For a quick temporal overview of academic 
posthuman research, see: 
<https: / / literariness.org /2018/07 /25/posthumanist-
criticism/>. 
of the human with the non-human in affect, 
animal, animacy, or posthuman theories (Ahmed 
2004; Haraway 2008; Chen 2012; Braidotti 2013) 
has been differently approached within feminist 
academic circuits. Anti-colonial and decolonial 
feminisms, as for instance the efforts developed 
by indigenous peoples, have considered the 
engagement with the non-human as 
foundational, while being long researched by 
Western academia and its "ready-made" 
theories. 
However, there have also been academic 
attempts to foster possible encounters among 
decolonial and posthuman theories 
incorporating a feminist awareness. 14 In light of 
these contributions, and as a result of our 
diverse formation during our master's program, 
we would like to address "Alma Mestiza" by 
enacting a posthuman approach of critical 
engagement with the arts. Such an approach is 
greatly inspired by Wibke Straube's research on 
trans-cinema (2014), and Nina Lykke's 
auto-phenomenographic poetry rooted in 
lesbian widowhood (2018) . By incorporating 
their personal needs and struggles as queer 
feminist researchers against the systematic 
conjectures that oppress them, Straube and 
Lykke turn the posthuman nature of their 
inquiries into affective healing frameworks. 
These are potentially useful for others suffering 
from the dynamics of compulsory 
heterosexuality (Rich 1980), and thus, for others 
belonging to the gendered human realm and its 
de-privileging dynamics of the neo-colonial 
exploitation of human and non-human 
resources. In order to provide an artistic 
embodied response to "Alma Mestiza," Straube 
and Lykke offer the theory and the methodology 
to come near to Lane's work without absorbing 
her own artistic approach under ours. 
Furthermore, the implementation of their 
14 Two recent instances would be Schaeffer, Felicity 
(2018), "Spirit Matters: Gloria Anzaldua's Cosmic 
Becoming across Human /Nonhuman Borderlands," 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 43(4): 
1005-29, and Kaiser, Birgit M. and Kathrin Thiele 
(Eds.) (2018), "The Ends of Being Human: Returning 
(to) the Question," philoSOPH/A 8. This last one 
includes contributions by Denise Ferreira da Silva, 
Vicki Kirby, Max Han tel, William Paris, and Bracha L. 
Ettinger. 
relates to the European 
background Miguel, and to his 
non-heterosexual identity and affects. What will 
be later developed is a situated posthuman 
account through the arts responding to the 
colonial/modern gender system as inspired by 
Rebeca Lane within the affective engagement of 
our friendship, our different ethnicities, and 
reflective tools . 
Becoming-with audio-visual material 
Wibke Straube is a queer feminist scholar 
whose research focuses on the environmental 
humanities, transgender, and visual studies. In 
2014, and as part of their PhD dissertation on 
trans-cinema, they proposed a critical 
framework of embodied engagement with 
audio-visual material rooted in feminist, 
posthuman, visual, affect, and queer theories. 
The author develops an audio-visual 
terminology and methodology surpassing the 
binary and occularcentric logics that have 
predominated in the relationship between films 
and spectators, as well as feminist visual 
theorization exclusively displaying 
psychoanalytic analyses (Mulvey 1975) . As a 
matter of fact, Straube dismantles the ableist 
implications of the spectator figure, suggesting 
instead the notion of "the entrant-body": "The 
entrant becomes a permeable body, 
multi-sensorial rather than optical, touched and 
interpellated by music, other bodies and objects 
while touching upon different futures" (Straube 
2014, 64). Out of the entrant-body, Straube 
widens the "haptic body" initially proposed by 
Laura Marks (2000), while contributing to a 
branch of feminist theorists dealing with the 
body and its affects in visual material (Sobchack 
2004; Barker 2009). 
These authors characterize the body as a 
locus affected by audio-visual material, thus 
fostering alternative identifications with it that 
rework gendered, vertical, and dichotomous 
relationships between the two. As the affective 
turn has been differently conceived by a number 
of authors since the early 2000s (Massumi 2002; 
Sedgwick 2003; Ahmed 2004), Straube 
acknowledges the blurring boundary between 
affect and emotion. In Straube's research, affect 
is hence defined as "an emotional ( ... ) as well as 
physical response to representation," ultimately 
enabling "an emotional 'becoming-with' 
between film and entrant" (Straube 2014, 54). 
Such a "becoming-with" stresses the mutual 
engagement among artistic material and the 
entrant-body at an affective level, consequently 
leading to embodied identifications that are 
necessarily situated. In being situated, and by 
enacting a feminist awareness, the encounters of 
body-entrants with audio-visual material 
specifically relate to the systemic intersection of 
oppressions. In Straube's study, audio-visual 
engagements navigate the liberating moments 
experienced by trans characters through dance, 
music, or dreams, which inform their need to 
differently identify with their environments. 
Straube terms these instants as "exit scapes," 
which also become for the entrant-bodies an 
opportunity to move away from their 
oppressions and tore-imagine better futurities. 
Embodied engagements with 
audio-visual material not only facilitate feminist 
analyses of patriarchal oppressions through the 
arts, but also the possibility of articulating 
responses to them from our affected, and hence 
political, bodies. In Straube's dissertation, sound 
becomes a means to temporarily fade from 
hurting states, physically and psychically. When 
the body is then permeated by the touch of 
music, Straube highlights the activation of an 
"embodied listening," a concept retrieved from 
Gascia Ouzounian's research on the topic (2006) . 
Also placing the body at the core of artistic 
encounters, Ouzounian implements Donna 
Haraway's idea of situated knowledges in the 
interaction with sonic material. By the end of the 
1980s, feminist scholar Donna Haraway 
delineated her critique toward scientific 
rationality as a disembodied universal vision 
(Haraway 1988, 582) in the debate of Western 
feminist epistemologies. She considered the 
body and its senses as agents rather than 
resources, setting the ground for the 
development of situated know ledges and partial 
objectivities (Haraway 1988, 583). By 
incorporating Haraway's proposal, Ouzounian 
argues that "[i]n reviving the corporeal with 
respect to sonic experience, we cross the 
boundary from the impartial to the very 
personal, reclaiming that marginalized space as 
a space of significance" (Ouzounian 2006, 71). 
Following the premises 
Ouzounian, and Haraway within the scope of 
this paper, we discern a non-intrusive encounter 
with Rebeca Lane's song. Out of this, the 
entrant-body, its senses, and feelings are 
socio-politically affected by Lane via her lyrics. 
This encounter better elucidates the feminist 
potential of holding a conversation among 
different subjects and positionalities, which 
through music become-with without subsuming 
their respective languages, bodies, and critiques 
under one another. As previously discussed, the 
authors conceived this paper as an affective 
alliance among peoples with conflicting 
backgrounds that have found in friendship a 
relationship of mutual reflection and support. 
For us music is a healing tool to think about and 
to care for the other, as experienced in our 
co-inhabitation and listening to Lane's music. In 
the case at hand, we decided to render our 
becoming-with Lane's music through a poetic 
piece that ethically relates to our positionality 
and personal experiences, together with Lane's 
as depicted in" Alma Mestiza." Continuing with 
the feminist, affective, and posthuman input of 
our approach, the enactment of an embodied 
auto-ethnographic poetry, as displayed by Nina 
Lykke (2018), proves to be helpful in the artistic 
depiction of our becoming-with Rebeca's song. 
An auto-phenomenographic methodology 
Nina Lykke is a queer feminist scholar 
whose later work has focused on queer love, 
death, and mourning. Rooted in her experiences 
as a lesbian widow, Lykke has recently 
published a posthuman account of queer 
mourning merging a critical and a poetic 
approach. She develops the concept of 
"auto-phenomenography" (2018), a situated 
methodology of queer mourning and resistance 
through the arts . After the death of her life-long 
lesbian companion, Lykke underwent a 
prolonged mourning that had to face both the 
mandates of ableism and the medical stigma 
derived from compulsory heterosexuality (Rich 
1980). Feeling diagnosed because of her 
queerness and willful mourning, Lykke finds in 
poetry a relieving tool to not overcome her 
mourning, but to frame it as an artistic medium 
of queer resistance. The author provides a 
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"method of inquiry" (110) shaped as a "situated 
argument" in the fostering of a new ethics of 
intimate relations and of difference (122). She 
relies on a model deeply influenced by theories 
of affect, philosophies of immanence, and 
feminist neovitalist materialism (110), as well as 
by Donna Haraway's decentering of 
companionship as strictly human (116). In the 
elaboration of her situated argument, "bodily 
relations and affective intensities are given 
central attention" (109). 
Lykke conceives of the bodies of the 
becoming-widow (herself) and becoming-corpse 
(her partner) as terrains on which to formulate 
an artistic response of queer mourning and 
resistance. Accordingly, she poses her body as 
the carrier of affective relations which, after the 
death of her wife, nurture a posthuman poetry 
among the two. In this process, Lykke's 
embodied memories lead to an ethics of affective 
difference through the arts that delineates a 
relational affectivity which is ethically 
asymmetrical: "There is no hierarchy of pain and 
suffering [ .. . ) the relationship between the 
positions involved is asymmetrical and 
existentially different, and for ethical reasons 
they should not be collapsed into one another" 
(Lykke 2018, 118). Such a differential affectivity 
deserves specia) attention for the purposes of 
this paper. Lykke maintains that the artistic 
tracing of her queer mourning shall begin from 
her differential affectivity as a becoming-widow. 
For this reason, Lykke witnesses the trauma of 
losing her companion to death, that is, in 
conjunction with but not as her partner. The 
shaping of her asymmetrical affective 
engagement with her wife is then primarily 
informed by the memories of their 
companionship once the latter has entered into 
the posthuman realm of death. 
This remembrance, in which the body 
and its affectivities are centrally placed, 
configures in Lykke's poetry what she terms a 
"compassionate companionship" (Lykke 2018, 
109). Lykke situates her mourning as a vital 
condition to produce a posthuman account 
against hetero-normative dynamics of family 
and diagnosis . Since both display an ableist 
attitude invisibilizing queer mourning for its 
non-heterosexual fulfillment, Lykke fosters a 
compassionate companionship in which there is 
a shared striving of being-with as well as being-for 
the other (117). This is possible thanks to 
empathetic instances of quotidian sympathy, or 
what Lykke reworks in philosopher Ralph R. 
Acampora's lexicon (2006) as "symphysis": an -
"embodied rethinking of the notion of sympathy, 
stressing [ ... ] that the subject, in a material, 
corpo-affective sense, is affected and 
co-experiences the ways in which hir significant 
others are bodily affected" (Lykke 2018, 116). As 
a result, Lykke's auto-phenomenography revisits 
daily life as a (becoming-)widow to portray the 
shared yet differently experienced everyday 
episodes of her wife's disease. The focus on a 
differential corpo-affective everyday thus 
enables, in Lykke's mourning, a psychic 
identification with her partner after death, 
placing embodied remembrance as central to 
posthuman co-inhabitation. 
Extracting from Lykke's work an 
attention to mourning, the body, the everyday, 
sympathy, asymmetrical affective relationality, 
and to the memories of former co-inhabitation, 
we want to develop in this paper an embodied, 
auto-ethnographic, and poetic becoming-with 
"Alma Mestiza" from our friendly engagement 
and alliance, and without forcing Lane's 
performance, or our own positionalities, into the 
theoretical models detailed above. By 
incorporating Lykke's writing method, we can 
better capture our differential affectivity in 
engaging with Lane's song, as well as with the 
backgrounds that asymmetrically invest our 
feminist politics. These, as the Spanish denial of 
its colonization reveals, encapsulate the negation 
of indigenous peoples and cultures, and the 
neo-colonial practices currently fostering the 
exploitation of human and natural resources in 
countries with a history of colonization. As 
stressed beforehand, the Spanish negation of its 
colonization invisibilizes the gendered violences 
suffered by colonized women and the killing of 
countless lives under the name of conquest and 
religious conversion. Hence, mourning, both for 
colonized peoples and for Spanish society, has 
been strategically prevented. On the one hand, 
mourning has been a forbidden practice 
entrapping colonized peoples into social and 
institutional oblivion. On the other, mourning 
has been systematically dismissed by and within 
countries with a colonizing agenda - past and 
present - therefore passing 
colonial killing onto current 
generations. 
In this paper, we would like to challenge 
this rationale by providing a situated account 
that opposes the colonial/modern gender 
system through the arts, and simultaneously 
addresses a decolonial artistic move enacting a 
feminist commitment. The reflection of our 
differential yet joint becoming-with "Alma 
Mestiza" will thus necessarily navigate our 
memories, former co-inhabitation, daily 
experiences, and the state of our friendship as 
particularly affecting our bodies. As Lugones 
and Spelman advise, we will see Rebeca's, 
Paola's, and Miguel's feminist politics within 
their own communities and cultural texts in the 
progressive demystification of colonizing, 
universal formulas of knowledge production. As 
a concluding note for this section, it is our will 
not only to facilitate a theoretical encounter 
among decolonial and posthuman feminist 
patterns, but also to discern within it the training 
and co-existence we have differently 
experienced throughout the last two years. 
During this time, our daily lives have been 
touched by the power of music, especially that 
which incorporates feminist claims. By 
positioning our.authorial voices in this paper, we 
acknowledge Rebeca Lane's contribution to the 
learning and unlearning of our feminist ethics 
and praxis. We want to encourage anyone 
reading these words to seek in friendship a 
relationship of mutual growth, support, and 
alliance in the counteraction of patriarchal 
confinement nurturing the logics of racism and 
neo-colonial exploitations. 
4. A posthuman artistic response to the 
colonial/modern gender system 
Prologue 
It has been almost a year since this paper 
started as a reflective exercise to portray our 
fruitful conversations in casa feminista within the 
context of our conflicting backgrounds, feminist 
training, and posthuman co-existence. The 
intention to become-with "Alma Mestiza" by 
enacting an auto-phenomenographic effort came 
up thanks to Paola's encouragement to Miguel 
to render his poems as situated accounts in his 
academic research. We believe that creative 
writing is a medium to approach systemic 
socio-political scenarios from an academic 
feminist standpoint. In conjunction with a theory 
and methodology that enable us to come near to 
Lane's song, Miguel's poetry attempts to reflect 
the feminist potential of conceiving friendship as 
an asymmetrical affective terrain from which to 
better counteract racism and neo-colonial forms 
of exploitation. 
Throughout this year, we still embody 
the discomfort of the possible contradictions that 
emerge from our academic positions, language, 
and privileges. How to foster a theoretical 
encounter between decolonial and posthuman 
frameworks without replicating Western 
academic hierarchies? How do gender, ethnic 
background, and overall politics of location 
come into play when writing about our 
friendship and Rebeca Lane's activism? In sum, 
is it possible to initiate a conversation among 
peoples from territories with a history of 
colonization, without falling into the logics of 
epistemological colonization? Again and again, 
we have discussed these questions, trying to find 
in each other's words and vulnerability some 
healing to the unending contradictions of the 
world-system we live in. 
Being willing to render ourselves 
vulnerable in our friendship, through music, or 
in the formulation of an artistic or academic 
piece, implies finding in friendship an alliance to 
resist and contest the colonial/ modern gender 
system, as well as the relief to the anxiety 
permeating any possible attempt to take a stand. 
Following Lugones and Spelman's manuscript, 
the co-authorship threaded all along this paper 
simultaneously voices the affective, positional, 
and territorial asymmetry investing our feminist 
and friendly engagement. For the matter of this 
paper, our memories in conjunction with specific 
academic references, not only inform but also 
stimulate these stances, as differentially shared 
in their affective expression. 
In mid-June 2018, Miguel went to a 
Rebeca Lane's concert at La Ingobernable, 15 in 
15 La Ingobernable (The Ungovernable) was an 
occupied space in downtown Madrid operating as a 
feminist communitarian enclave from May 2017 until 
November 2019, when the newly elected right-wing 
remembers walking 
communitarian space, listening to Lane, and 
sending Paola a recorded note of almost every 
song. Later on, in October 2019, Paola went to a 
concert of Lane in Mexico City. Likewise, Paola 
sent Miguel recordings, pictures, while letting 
him know all her impressions of the event. Even 
if physically separate, there was a differential 
affective sharing of the concert between us. 
Framed within the two concerts of Rebeca Lane, 
Paola and Miguel have repeatedly doubted, 
questioned, denied, silenced, interrupted, and 
misunderstood the validity, legitimacy, scope, 
structure, and poetry of this paper. 
Despite vulnerability, listening, 
communicating, (co-)writing, reading, thinking, 
and feeling can become contradictory sites of 
encounter, we would like to stress again the 
power of friendship as an affective engagement 
nurturing feminist militancy, in and outside 
academia. This might not find rigid answers to 
any of these questions, nor wishes to do so. 
Rather, friendship can provide support and 
alliance in a time when neoliberalism and the 
circulation of capital entails patriarchal violence 
against and destruction of living bodies. In the 
face of it, we vulnerably hope to have 
documented Rebeca Lane's activism, a relatable 
academic corpus, and an artistic contribution in 
the most friendly possible way. 
government of Madrid forced its eviction. During its 
running, La Ingobernable worked as a self-managed 
social center offering a number of open courses and 
activities. As part of Rebeca Lane's European tour, 
she offered a concert at La Ingobernable to raise 
funds to help those affected by the eruption of the 
Volccin de Fuego in Guatemala in June 2018. 
Cosmic consciousness 
From a magical heritage 
Seeking in the shadow 
16 
The traits of my soul. 
Learning how to become an animal, like a Nahual 
I am a body transiting the spiritual path 
It is not linear 
My language is ancestral 
I travel spirally. 
Miguel 
Tengo el alma asustada. 
fadeando como un perro 
I listen to your soul 
To the heritage of the never grieved, 
Of the never mourned, 
That now, as ever, 
Seek for a calling of their names. 
Tengo el alma asustada. 
fadeando como un perro 
It is harder and harder to hear. 
The TV screams at you, 
While the president denies your consciousness, 
And the king ignores the magic 
They could never convert. 
In this blinding noise, 
The beating 
Where your pains inhabit 
Affects my body, 
Its odysseic back, 
Its thin skin, 
Flesh, 
Sex, 
Drowning under this ocean 
That after stealing my breath, 
Teaches me how to swim 
Otherwise. 
And so, I follow. 
And so, I breathe again, 
Or perhaps for the first time. 
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In-between worlds and borders 
Questioning the real 
The good and evil 
The unequal 
The inherited, the acquired, and the equally imposed. 
I am a creature 
In-between cultures 
Navigating through the trash 
The beliefs that nullify me 
To bury them. 
Mother-Nature 
Tenderly sutures 
The rupture of my body 
Once I freed myself from 
My tough armor. 
Because it does not mature 
A wound that is not healed 
A mind without madness 
A heart without ties. 
To flow is to destroy and to construct again 
A house without walls 
And to lose the fear to die. 
Even though I follow, 
Even though I hear, 
Sometimes, 
When breathing underwater 
I still fear they might scream. 
They with a universal name. 
They with a masculine voice. 
They with gentle speeches built 
Upon dead bodies, 
Silenced tongues, 
And burned traditions. 
Yet it's this terror 
The source of my deception, 
The colonial suffocation 
Where the erasure of your body 
Incarnates the privilege of mine. 
This fear 
Lies as the reminder 
Of what they left behind. 
The armor of 
Self-denial, 
The armor of 
Colonial killing. 
To bridge anew. 
With homes surpassing borders, 
With bodies knitting on each other 
The healing colors of 
Mother-Nature. 
Atrocious contradiction 
The four colors of corn in my color. 
Looking for my identity in a racist society 
The colonial mind installed in my pupil 
The reflection in the mirror gives me back what I believe 
If I do not mold my soul. 
I do it in the Eurocentric phallocentric models 
That transform my experience into an exotic object 
Painting cultures as something folkloric 
Skipping the subjective from theoretical models. 
They wanted me to keep quiet about the heritage of my blood 
They wanted me to forget the violence against my mother 
But they could not take from us the internal fire 
The eternal knowledge 
The signals found in dreams. 
Abhorrent they say. 
Dirty they say. 
Animal they call you. 
Because ignorance is 
As fragile as fear, 
And unlike yours, 
Their skin is so thick 
They cannot speak the 
Wisdom of their bodies. 
Uttering instead 
The universal speech, 
The unhuman solitary tone. 
But not you. 
Contradicci6n atroz. 
Voz mestiza. 
Echoing the power 
Of self-calling, 
Of collective calling, 
Of nature calling. 
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That is why we defend our land and its secrets 
With two raised fists and amulets in the soul 
With the force of the volcano 
The roar of the jaguar 
The strength of the female warrior and of the animal spirit. 
/ 
They know it. 
They know how disruptive 
Bodies can be, 
And how deceptive 
Seeing can be. 
And it is. 
Because my eyes couldn't see, 
And the mirror that reflects us 
Is the same one that divides us. 
Transforming the personal into 
The laughable, 
The cultural into 
The exotic, 
And the cosmic into 
Madness. 
But once I turned my back to the mirror, 
I happened to see what was around me. 
There I felt the haunting force 
Of unspoken genealogies 
And the roots of an earthly survival. 
Because the power of the oral exceeds 
The privilege of the written. 
And so, I listen. 
It's almost full moon, Paola. 
And lunatic I remember 
Our last ritual. 
It was full of love, 
And you taught me to call me back. 
To call my back 
So I could bridge with you, 
Nature, 
Myself. 
Together we heard you, 
Rebeca. 
We heard you 
Calling yourself 
And all the names, 
Traditions, and tongues 
Colonial killing attempted to silence, 
But never dared to bury. 
~ ' 
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Atrocious contradiction 
The four colors of corn in my color. 
So here we are. 
Here we all are. 
Calling our backs, 
And the backs of the others, 
So we can see, 
And feel, 
Backwards, 
Non-linear, 
And only with 
Corporeal reflections. 
Figure 1. A winter view from casa feminista. Personal photograph. 
Figure 2. Our backs, as we face the waters that connect us (Gij6n, Asturias). 
Personal photograph. 
Figure 3. A screenshot from the video-clip of "Alma Mestiza" showing 
Rebeca Lane singing with an aesthetic that addresses the message of the song. 
Figure 4. A screenshot from the video-clip of" Alma Mestiza" showing 
Rebeca Lane along with a group of women in friendly companionshipY 
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Derek P. McCormack (2010) argues, "Affect, is like an atmosphere: it might not be visible, but at 
any given point it might be sensed ... Emotion, in turn, can be understood as the sociocultural 
expression of this felt intensity" (643). This paper puts McCormack (2010) and Ben Anderson 
(2009) into conversation to think through the ways in which atmosphere in relation to affective 
and emotive life has been conceptualized. I center the affective atmospheres that happen with 
queer bodies that make New York's west side piers queerly affective. I use "queer bodies" to 
signal the dis-identification with heteronormativity or binaristic sexualities. Queer sexualities 
carry political weight with regard to the comments that the politically loaded term "queer" 
brings to public consciousness. So queer sexualities and queer bodies substantively challenge 
cisgender and heteronormative social institutions that are disgustingly oppressive to the queer 
bodies that, perhaps, use the piers as a space to mark their affective and emotive capabilities. 
Ultimately, my aim is to situate atmosphere as an analytic to explore the socio-spatial meanings 
that are attached to spaces and places. As a result, I wish to further spatial knowledge that 
considers atmospheres as a legitimate dimension of space and placemaking. 
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impact of socio-spatial marginalization and gentrification on Black queer people in Brooklyn, 
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spaces, including sensation, desire, and nostalgia amid gentrification. He uses critical 
ethnography, photovoice methods, and archival research to explore representational and 
non-representational dimensions of Black _queer spatial production. Contact: rmillhou@asu.edu 
This paper thinks through the ways in 
which places and spaces - two spheres of 
endless and unprecedented possibilities -
become queerly and erotically atmospheric not 
by simply who or what occupies the place or 
space, but what bodies do or potentially do while 
sited to a locale such as Manhattan's West Side 
piers. LaToya Eaves (2014) argues that Black 
women's geographies support spatial 
epistemologies and ontologies as well as 
analyses of space, place, and landscape. I argue 
that atmosphere is a spatial epistemology, an 
analytic, and a concept that is almost already a 
consequence and an affect of spatial production 
and placemaking. I rely on the images from 
Alvin Baltrop's The Piers to think through how 
people who have been cast at the fringes of 
society such as gay men, re-fashioned 
Manhattan's West Side piers from the early 20th 
century to the mid-1980s not by simply being 
placed in space, but their queer performances 
and acts alongside and within the piers. I deploy 
queer as a critique, a social formation, and an 
identity; it refers to people who embody and 
enact forms of gender and sexual nonconformity 
(Eaves 2014, McGlotten 2012, Bowden 2012). 
Alvin Baltrop (1948-2004) was an important 
Black queer photographer from the Bronx who 
captured decaying landscapes, despair, and 
sexuality, simultaneously. He documents a 
period of queer eroticism between Stonewall and 
the AIDS pandemic (1980s), his friends who 
were in the Navy with him, the graffiti art of 
Tava, and Gordon Matta-Clark's "Day's End." 
He is widely known for his images of New 
York's West Side piers in the 1970s. His images 
are distinct insofar as they are voyeuristic, queer, 
and erotic. Dreams into Glass notes that Baltrop's 
photography does not end and begin with The 
Piers, but rather, he documented images of the 
homeless, young runaways, sex workers, and 
public sexual acts throughout the city. 
, Affect and Manhattan's West Side Piers 
Defining Atmosphere and Attunement 
Geographic thought frames atmosphere as 
an important dimension/ effect of Black queer 
spatiality. On the one hand, Marxist geographers 
have considered the reproduction of social 
formations and class relations. On the other 
hand, feminist geographers have thought about 
the sex-gender system and the extent to which it 
is spatialized. Yet humanist geographers who 
take lived experiences as a point of departure 
fail to address the point at which "bodies' 
interiorities and exteriorities, depth, and 
surfaces come together or apart" (Longhurst 
2001, 24). Atmospheres help us contend with 
this disconnect and find ourselves amongst the 
complication that is characteristic of space 
(Eaves 2014). Atmosphere is a becoming that is 
felt rather than seen. Ben Anderson (2009) 
defines atmosphere as the "shared ground from 
which subjective states and their attendant 
feelings and emotions emerge" (78). Anderson 
also argues that it is the very ambiguity of 
affective atmospheres - between presence and 
absence, between subject and object, and 
between the definite and indefinite that enable 
us to reflect on affective experience as occurring 
beyond, around, and alongside the formation of 
subjectivity. Considering his theorization, 
atmosphere envelopes social relationships in 
place with people's subject formations, which 
together make a given space-place distinct. 
According to Kathleen Stewart (2011, 
445), "Atmospheric attunements are a process of 
what Heidegger (1962) calls worlding - an 
intimate compositional process of dwelling in 
spaces that bears, gestures, gestates, worlds. 
Here, things matter not because of how they are 
represented but because they have qualities, 
rhythms, forces, relations, and movements." 
Take Chinatown as an example. As a place, it has 
forces, relations, and movements that are 
responsive to the social and cultural desires of 
the spaces in which it resides. This is to say that 
the process of worlding and placemaking are, in 
fact, political processes with cyclical affectual 
consequences: attunements. Stewart explains 
that when worlding happens, inhabitants may 
fall in line with the status quo - even if that 
status quo is derived from normalization 
initiated by the state. "Chinatown" for instance 
is a product of worlding that has been 
co-produced by people and the state (an 
institution that has now acted out its fetish of the 
"other"). Attunement is called into being when 
we consider the affective orientation of daily life. 
Shaka McGlotten (2012) takes up attunement to 
think through affective ordinariness that is 
prompted by advanced or late capitalism in an 
effort to do justice to a young Black gay boy who 
was a victim of racist and homophobic violence. 
McGlotten (2012) says, 
[I]f theories of intersectionality work to 
identify the structural inequalities that shape 
everyday life as a world of violence, unequal 
access, and limited or nonexistent resources 
punctuated by a range of minor resistances, 
then everyday life comes to refer only to 
those forms of life lived under what bell 
hooks has famously called White 
supremacist capitalist patriarchy. This tends 
to subsume what I take up to be some of the 
critical stuff of life, the something-else-ness 
of life - the ephemeral, or incoherent modes 
of awareness, attunement (5). 
I ask us to consider the something-else-ness that 
seldom gets mentioned in writings on space and 
place. Thereby, I take up attunement and 
atmosphere as analytics that help us think 
through how we - as social actors - understand, 
produce, and utilize space, place, perhaps 
outside of normalization; they signal a way to 
craft and do spatiality. Spatiality is the theory 
behind the production of space t~at is inherently 
co-constitutive (Kirby 1996). Spatiality engages 
the premise that space/place-making is a 
process that involves remembering, animating, 
and feeling. These practices and affects produce 
atmosphere. The benefit of using the analytic of 
atmosphere, and by extension, spatiality, is to 
analyze what people do alongside what is felt in 
a place - where social relationships and 
performances are sited to understand some 
extent of the desires and social identities that 
mark the place. Atmosphere is the feeling that 
encompasses the place and looms over and 
between people. 
Ben Anderson (2009) has conceptualized 
atmosphere in relation to affective and emotive life. 
Affect is an unmediated potential for things to 
happen. Affect, according to Raymond Williams 
(1977), involves a happening across structures of 
feeling. There are a number of social, cultural, 
and political inspirations that channel affect 
ranging from media and capital to governments. 
Emotive life, on the other hand, is the mediated, 
static, and conclusive personal reaction of affect. 
In this paper, I center the affective atmospheres 
that happen with queer bodies that make New 
York's west side piers queerly affective, and 
make it, well, a distinct place. I use "queer 
bodies" to signal the dis-identification with 
heteronormativity or binaristic sexualities. 
Queer sexualities carry political weight in regard 
to the comments that the politically loaded term 
"queer" brings to public consciousness. 
Anderson's (2009) conceptualizations 
and theorizations regarding atmosphere have 
been motivated by Karl Marx (1856) who argues 
that the capitalist mode of production conditions 
people's lives; it presses on social life. 
Simultaneously, atmosphere envelopes and 
affects social life. Anderson (2009) is also driven 
by the phenomenology of aesthetics by Mikel 
Dufrenne (1973). According to Dufrenne, and by 
extension, Anderson (2009), "atmospheres are 
perpetually forming and deforming, appearing 
and disappearing, as bodies enter in relation 
with one another. They are never finished, static, 
or at rest" (79). In this sense, Anderson is 
alluding to the spatia-temporal and kinesthetic 
aspects regarding movements, people, and as a 
result, atmospheres. 
Baltrop's The Piers (1977) and Becoming 
Atmospheric 
To think through the structures of feeling 
that preempts the production of space (Henri 
Lefebvre 1974), I will center Baltrop's The Piers 
(1977) to consider how New York City's 
Christopher Street Pier (Pier 45) was 
re-appropriated by gay men to meet, hangout, 
and have public sex. While hiding from his 
subjects, Baltrop strived to capture the liveliness, 
unrest, and becoming of Pier 45. 
Pier 45 and the West Side piers have 
historically carried a queer atmosphere by what 
people did in the area: hookup. In the early 20th 
century, the area was a temporary outpost for 
well over 500,000 seamen and other workers 
who had traveled from all over the world. By 
World War I, Pier 45 and the surrounding area 
(see Figure 1 and Figure 2) was dense with bars, 
warehouses, and men. Its isolation made it an 
ideal location to have privacy in public (see 
Chauncey 1994). There were a number of bars in 
the area that had become a common cruising 
area for gay men. Will Kohler (2016) says that 
gay men in the mid-1960s would cruise between 
the trucks that were parked under the raised 
West Side Highway (now demolished) at night. 
He goes on to say that that the trucks were 
empty and unlocked, which allowed gay men to 
have public sex, which was common up to the 
early-1980s. Stonewall (1969) marked Pier 45 as 
the nucleus of gay life since the riot was the act 
that pushed back on the state and its arms that 
were oppressing LGBT people who made claim 
to the area. Considering public sex was a 
common occurrence at the piers, they carry a 
distinct atmosphere, which is historic and queer. 
Atmospheres have both subjective and 
objective qualities that are felt (emotional) and 
pre-personal (affective). According to German 
philosopher Gernot Bohme (1993), 
Atmospheres are neither something 
objective, that is, qualities possessed by 
things, and yet they are something 
thing-like, belonging to the thing in that 
things articulate their presence through 
Affect and Manhattan's West Side Piers 
qualities - conceived as ecstasies. Nor are 
atmospheres something subjective, for 
example determinations of a psychic state. 
And yet they are subject-like, belong to 
subjects in that they are sensed in bodily 
presence by human beings and this sensing 
is at the same time a bodily state of being of 
subjects in space (122). 
In light of this quote, though 
non-definitive, atmospheres are thing-like and 
subject-like, simultaneously. In my sense of the 
atmosphere of Pier 45, they are both/ and the 
object of inquiry waiting to be discovered 
through its (im)materially emotive and affective 
capabilities. Atmospheres are realized· through 
the senses; they are spatial happenings within 
their indeterminate boundaries. Atmospheres 
become through what bodies or things do. Think 
how energies and intensities between bodies are 
felt rather than traced or mapped. Perhaps 
Bohme (1993) was accurate to leave his 
estimation of atmosphere intentionally vague 
and non-static. 
Baltrop' s images in The Piers consider the 
ways in which queer people make the piers 
atmospheric instantaneously. Baltrop captures 
the possibilities that the subjects make of the 
space by what they do at the piers - either 
through sex, sunbathing, or being physically 
harmed. To be frank, Pier 45 becomes 
atmospheric through distinctive behaviors and 
body attractions and repulsions that are felt. 
According to Anderson (2009), "atmospheres 
have a characteristic spatial form - diffusion 
within a sphere. Returning to Deleuze and 
Guattari, we can say that atmospheres are 
generated by bodies - of multiple types -
affecting one another as some form of 
'envelopment' is produced" (80). In this case, the 
sexualized bodies that are captured by Baltrop 
are affecting. The images have the capability to 
affect at the moment you may experience them 
from elsewhere. In this regard, where and when 
you may experience the images envelopes the 
space, making it atmospheric. 
Pier 45 becomes erotically atmospheric 
through the ways in which the queer bodies 
have been positioned relative to the piers, and 
relative to one another. In Figure 3, two men lay 
naked on the pier. The man pictured to the right 
lays flat on the pier while the man pictured to 
the left faces the man to the right; both men's 
body language as it is captured in the image is 
welcoming - their bodies attract. In Figure 4, 5, 
and 7 men sit naked on the pier; lumber rests at 
their feet. Their pensive gazes are oriented 
toward the Hudson River (see Figure 1). 
Although they are naked, their bodies rest; they 
are comfortable with one another. Two men walk 
past each other in a large, dilapidated 
warehouse in Figure 6. The man pictured to the 
left is smiling. He is wearing wide-legged jeans, 
a white, plain t-shirt, and black shoes. He is 
walking toward the camera and his gaze is 
focused on the naked buttocks of the man on the 
right. The man pictured to the right is walking 
away from the camera. He is wearing black 
boots, a leather vest, and wristwear on his right 
wrist. In Figure 8, two men are engaging in oral 
sex in front of a window in a room that is 
cluttered with old lumber and crumbling cement 
walls. The man pictured on the left wears only a 
white t-shirt while his pants are below his knees. 
His knees are bent, and his body is lowered close 
to the ground to perform oral sex on the man 
pictured to the right. The man on the right is 
wearing a dark t-shirt and his pants are down; 
he towers over the man on the left and his left 
hand is touching the man on the left's shoulder. 
Considering Baltrop's images, the gay men who 
are sited at Pier 45 produce an atmosphere 
which is queer and erotic due to their relative 
queer acts - either through engaging in public 
sex or resting on the pier. The queer and erotic 
atmosphere is a significant dimension of queer 
spatiality. 
To borrow from Anderson (2009), "there 
are two different spatialities. The first is the 
spatiality of the 'sphere' in the sense of a certain 
type of envelope or surround. The second 
spatiality is spherical, but it is, more specifically, 
a dyadic space of resonance - atmospheres 
'radiate' from one individual to another" (80). 
For me, the intersection of spatialities, 
atmosphere, and queer life envelopes the 
possibilities of queer sexual behavior and queer 
place-making that underscores how places are 
almost always sites of becoming. Anderson's 
approach to spatialities and their connections to 
atmospheres is informed by Edward Relph's 
Place and Placelessness. Relph (1976) argues that 
spatial experience has various intensities which 
fall on a spectrum: "direct experience at one 
extreme and abstract thought at another" (9). 
Thereby, the placelessness of the piers, 
particularly Pier 45, is an attitude, not a fact. The 
attitude of the photos that are captured by 
Baltrop is, in my opinion, characterized with 
depth, rhythm, and intentionality of the queer 
subjects that move within the sexualized 
atmosphere of Pier 45. What I mean by depth is 
what is seen and not seen but gestured towards. 
Specifically, Baltrop's queer subjects are 
gesturing towards the ways in which Pier 45, as 
a place of becoming, is, perhaps, a site of 
conceived and perceived sexualization and 
queer identities. Secondly, the rhythms of Pier 
45, as it has been captured by Baltrop have 
affective and emotive capabilities through the 
slowing of time-space by the gay men at Pier 45. 
Consider how men are positioned in a way that 
signals to the onlooker how time-space is 
perhaps slowed through the leisurely gestures 
and nudity. Now, closely gaze at the 
intentionality of the queer subjects that are 
captured by Baltrop. The intentionality of the 
queer subjects to make the space of Pier 45 
become erotically atmospheric through their 
body comportment is rooted in the 
understanding that Pier 45 is public space that is 
not inviting to those who do not adopt 
heteronormativity or politics of respectability. In 
this regard, the piers are presented as an illegal 
mechanism of colonialism- they are a publicly 
private space, which means that they are only 
understood to be a space reserved for those who 
adopt respectability and live their public lives in 
a heteronormative manner. 
In a nuanced sense, spaces and places 
become atmospheric according to people's 
actions, their engagement with objects/things, 
and the immaterial aspects that are felt. Taking 
this further, the requirements for becoming 
atmospheric involves some degree of depth, 
rhythm, and intentionality. So, a space ~nd plac.e, 
such as the piers, broadly, and P1er 45, m 
particular, as they have been captured by Baltrop 
have affects - that is, rhythms that have 
intentionality and depth with felt consequences. 
The requirements and the sensing of 
atmosphere(s) are motivated by a set of politics 
as well. Besides, ask yourself: for whom and for 
what meaning making end do atmospheres 
unfold? The answer may lie in the intentions of 
the people who produce the space and place, 
and, by extension, the atmosphere. 
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Dispatches from Queer Potluck: 
[Extra]ordinary Affects as a Project of 
Belonging 
This essay takes an approach that is part autobiography, part meditation on theory, in order to 
engage with the tension between "ordinary affects" (Stewart 2007) and the queer extraordinary. 
Drawing on my own experiences as part of an intentional community in Philadelphia, I 
consider what it means for me to experience affect in queer space. How does that manifest in 
the body, and the world in turn? How do these experiences fit into a larger desire for kinship 
and belonging? My purpose here is not to make broad claims about what affect is (or is not), but 
to provide a template for auto-ethnographic writing about the topic that is critical, self-aware, 
and exploratory. Situated within a queer context, it highlights connections between moments of 
everyday life and participation in discursive processes about what being [extra]ordinary means. 
© 2019 The Author(s) . This is an open access article published under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (https:/ I creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ 4.0/), 
which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
that the original author(s) and the publication source are credited. 
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We sit silently in a circle, on cushions and mats, some of us bare to the waist, some of us in flowing fabric. 
We sit around a string of beads lying in the center on the floor. One of us- I can 't remember who- tossed 
it there to serve as the talisman or skeptron: whoever takes it up will have the right to speak and be heard. 
The room is warm but dim, high-ceilinged and with walls covered in paintings. There is soft music and 
the smell of freshly-burnt sage in the air. Memories of silent worship at Friends schools are on my mind, 
and I think of the spirit moving me to speak. But I have nothing to say, at the moment; and it's my first 
one of these meetings, so whenever I feel about to stir to action, the impulse is noticed, caught, and 
suppressed. I want to see how it's done. So I wait until some imperceptible cue catches me off-guard: the 
twitch of a hand, a tension in someone else's shoulders, their intake of breath. After a moment, it happens. 
We all know [he] is about to do it just before [he] does it, leaning to grab the beads and begin -
• • • 
What I want to do here is feel my way in. For some time, I've been keenly aware of the 
.-.-~ difference between attending potluck - one of the core activities of this self-proclaimed radical 
association- and being present at potluck. At some point (when?), I transitioned from showing up 
"'..._~,""""" .. , to entering. Many of those who come to the dinners each week, spanning the range of the gender 
Hf;l~~,.. spectrum or casting it off entirely, have become my friends. Thursday night rituals of greeting, 
embracing, lining up with plates in hand, have become second nature. But as comfortable as I 
am now with being here, listening and learning, I still feel that something keeps me from total 
engagement with the spirit of the group. I want to write my way into this, recording my senses 
before they are assigned too much meaning; the aim is one of "disorienting and disrupting[ ... ] 
impermanence and change" (Holman Jones and Harris 2019, 7). 
• • • 
I became aware of the group through social media comments from friends of friends, allusions 
to parties and dinners, the occasional oblique reference in literature. It is an intentional 
community: wholeheartedly and unabashedly queer, centered around elders (but ultimately 
without hierarchy), politically and civically engaged, a dash of universalist spirituality. For 
years, I moved on the fringes, and when I was finally granted access, it was by luck more than t-- -
anything else. It was during a date in Manhattan, as we sat at Christopher Street Pier watching 
the sunset; my companion mentioned the group and suggested I come to an event the next 
night. (I didn't want to seem too eager, but I accepted.) It wasn't exactly the camaraderie I'd 
hoped for and needed, at least at first -life in New York was too hectic, the get-togethers too 
performative. Only after moving back to Philadelphia a few years later did it begin to feel like I 
had time and breathing room to appreciate it more deeply. 
Niedt 
I've been thinking about the experience of my body in queer space, trying to the capture with 
definitions the intensities it feels and the way stimuli create responses. In its presentation, my 
body signifies oppression: white, cis-male-presenting, mobile. The challenge is to know exactly 
how much to self-negate, and how much to actively flex my embodied and exbodied privilege 
1 for the benefit of others. Within spaces where queerness is the default position, I am aware of 
relaxation. My movements feel more natural, less pre-judged and pre-determined. It seems like 
an entirely different body than I am used to, unstable but celebratory. But when I think about 
affect, I lean towards its preconscious aspect, occupying the interstices between actions and 
conceptions, tangible in the body before it can be definable (Deleuze and Guattari 1988, Massumi 
1995). Given the array of approaches to grappling with a topic that is, by (some) definition, 
indefinable (Figlerowicz 2012), here is my own attempt at operationalizing affect: the landscape 
of not-quite-noticeable physical intensities that underlie our experience of the world, which give 
rise to things we name and categorize as emotions, reactions, understandings ... To be more 
metaphorical about it, maybe affects are the seeds (or rhizomes?) whose character only becomes 
apparent after they have already bloomed into discernibly different flora. They render 
themselves unknowable, and yet each blossom carries the material to pollinate the next. 
It is an imperfect definition. But it is what I use for the ruminations in this essay, whose 
structure owes a great deal to Patricia Clough's (2008) genre-bending work. Feeling and writing 
my way in means reading between the lines of my own history, looking for the affects in the 
negative space. And when it comes to queerness - well, to paraphrase Eva Green in Casino 
Royale, there are queer affects, and then there are queer affects. This is my attempt at the latter. 
First and foremost, it is the story of my participation in a network of like-minded queer folks. 
• • • 
My eye gets lost in the artwork covering the walls, wide strokes of tempera paint on sheets of brown 
paper, abstract but with shades of Haring. In the half-lit room their riotous colors are somewhat muted. I 
know that the apartment's owner created them, though I never watched [him] do any of these particular 
pieces; I have seen [him] make other works; and my mind combines these two pieces of information to 
visualize [his] hands holding the brush, tacking the finished paper to the plaster. This assumed history 
unfolds even as the two of us are sitting together on the other side of the room, talking about 
who-knows-what. Later, [he] will see me drawing sigils of my own; later still, one of these will take their 
place in the kitchen, like a proud parent adding a child's scribble to the fridge. But how do I confess that 
[he] was the one who inspired me to try in the first place? That the echo of [his] past is what the 
wandering eye translated into the unlocking of (one small corner ofJ my future? It feels too simple to call 
this inspiration, but I search for some other way to honor what moments like this have done for me, to 
articulate the connecting spark -
• • • 
(I've resisted using many specifics here when talking about the community. This is not out of a 
desire for secrecy but to maintain privacy, even given the encouraging feedback from members 
who have read the draft of this essay, some of whom appear in it. Perhaps I'm also afraid of 
disturbing the enchantment that I've been able to feel time and again within the boundaries it 
constantly seems to re-invent. But as one friend said before I made contact with the group in 
New York, "If you need to find them, you'll find them.") 
My first experience with the Philadelphia branch was one of these potlucks, at an apartment in 
Center City, a space rich with more body positivity, fluid identity, and ritualism than I had ever 
encountered at one time before. Tables groaned from the surfeit of homemade dishes. There 
seemed to be much greater bodily, psychological, and socioeconomic diversity among those 
present than among the New Yorkers. They were not as self-conscious about their overt 
expression of queerness; they cared more about safety and survival, an atmosphere of home, 
recognizing and understanding each other. Certainly there was all the language and structure of 
"fictive kin," interactions that indexed a familial connection, echoing Weston's descriptions of 
dinner with a self-declared family of choice (1997). But forming deeper ties that endured from 
one week to the next was a benefit, not the Point; what stands out to me as the central 
experience was the process of displacement, sense-making, and alignment that kept recurring 
every week. Each time I walked through the door, arms full of vegan, gluten-free casseroles, 
there was the potentiality of that cycle. Halberstam (2011) talks about forgetfulness as a strategy 
of disconnection from more retrogressive, even damaging, ideas of kinship. Given the large size 
of the community, there were always different configurations of people with shifting gender 
expressions, names, relations. To strategically forget was a prerequisite of attendance, creating a 
fugue state from which new potentialities of queer kinship, new social ties and the significances 
they bear, could emerge . 
• o;....• ,.. • 
. . . ----
• • • 
We begin by joining hands and announcing our names and pronouns. The pronouns are a recent 
addition, and some of the more traditionally-minded are not fond of the change. But there are many 
younger folks here now, bearing different ideas about the world and how it is put together, so we want to 
be respectful. We go around the circle one by one. There are some faces I recognize, and some I don't, 
either of which may correspond to the names I recognize, or don't. (People come and go so strangely here!) 
The wave of voices comes to me, and I say for the first time about my pronoun, "whatever you like." I 
mean it, I realize. Does it make a difference to me if someone in this space refers to me by this third-person 
pronoun or. that one, especially if I'm not standing there to hear it? Not particularly. There is a nervous 
sensation that I begin to understand is a feeling of liberation; I think I came to a decision about gender 
and my destination in relation to it. Some part of my brain conducted that into my answer just before I 
spoke it. Now the words are echoing in the air, which is when words always feel truest. And then the 
pause is over, and the next voice begins to sound -
• • • 
Affect seems to occur in the moments when our shared breaths mysteriously synchronize. I am 
suddenly, specifically aware of the bones and muscle tension in my neighbor's hand as I hold it. 
There is someone across the room who I find myself attracted to, or more precisely intensified by. 
Before this is translated by the undeniable privileging of sexuality in queer space, there is a 
sudden, inexplicable compulsion to merely be close that pre-empts lust. Each sensation 
recognized and assigned meaning in a queer context; it is like gathering wildflowers. 
Lately, as though it were some kind of bibliomancy, I've been flipping through Kathleen 
Stewart's Ordinary Affects (2007) each night before bed, looking for resonance in the slice-of-life 
vignettes that populate the book. When I first read it, some of the moments, framed by Stewart's 
theoretical comments, felt familiar to me; others call on places and circumstances that are so 
foreign, I struggle to find any kind of connection with the people (should I call them subjects? 
characters?) that are described. The affects that echoed in me as I read and digested those stories 
resolved into feelings that didn't sit right, that were almost clinical. How sad. How charming. 
What I recognize now is that I had approached these stories on unfamiliar terms rather than 
their own. Perhaps it's just that as a queer urbanite, moments from the rural U.S. don't generate 
the same intensities in me. Maybe I've internalized a combative stance towards what they 
represent, reading into their heteronormative framework an implicit (or, at certain points in the 
book, explicit) homophobia. Whatever the cause, I find myself searching too consciously for 
connections between my own experience of affect and what is going on in this book. Why can't I 
get hold of it? Stewart's language is by turns elegant and meditative, always as complete as it 
needs to be; linguistically, I can understand the content, so what is the fundamental break? 
If ordinary affects underlie some set of universal experiences and sentiments, then presumably 
there must be extraordinary affects as well, with the basic denotation of "outside the ordinary"-
nothing more, nothing less. But it's all relative, of course. Martin (1994) and Love (2015), among 
others, take queer theorists and those who seek to enact their ideas to task for creating a 
differential experience that doesn't necessarily have to exist. Why try so hard to be 
extraordinary or deviant at all? I think there is room for both attitudes: as long as mainstream 
culture continues to draw lines of exclusion, then folks who do queerness ought to reclaim and 
reframe their deviance as exceptionality. Yet surely most people believe that the average 
moments of their lives aren't that special. Cavalcante (2018) argues for broadening the concept 
of the ordinary to encompass the everyday experiences of those whom mainstream society 
usually considers and represents as anything but (in particular, transgender folks). And even 
affects arising from the most substantial events, generating the most dizzying of emotions, must 
eventually lose their extraordinary character with enough repetition or time to acclimate to 
them. But if forgetfulness is a virtue, isn't is possible to resist that? What would it mean to keep 
the affects always extraordinary, to make a life out of those? How unusual! How queer! 
It's too easy to say that my experiences in the community never seem to get old (because they 
often do), or that they are always entirely new (because they often aren't). Rather, as they build 
up a life, they are in turn built upon an impossibility of expectations. Like a villanelle or a 
ghazal, being part of the community has a rhyme scheme and refrains, but the frisson comes 
from the anticipation of the unknown that fills in the rest of it. Extraordinary affects are the ones 
you never feel coming, even though some part of you knows they will. 
• • • 
I offer what I can. For some folks, this might be their only meal today, and I want to contribute. This 
evening I've made something that I hope will tick all the dietary-restriction boxes: sweet potato and apple 
crumble, verified gluten-free oats on top, soaked in maple syrup steeped with ginger. [They] come to the 
table, looking over the ingredient cards and considering what is edible and what is not. My dish is put to 
the test: vegan, gluten-free, soy-free, perfect! But alas! [they] don't care for sweet potato. There is a 
tightening in my chest that resolves into a mix of emotions that can't be teased apart, although certainly 
disappointment is in there. As I sit across from the table in silence, I see [them] hold one hand over a bowl 
of hummus, dangling a pendulum that oscillates in small loops. Disappointment gives way to curiosity as 
I comprehend that [they] are divining the food. What sensation must that produce? I imagine it would be, 
and thereby I feel through some kind of sympathy, a flutter in the stomach. But more likely it's a tremble 
in the hand, some distinctive magnetism that points this way and that-
• • • 
To move queerly through the world entails an experience of queer affects, and if those proceed 
from the body, they can also be positioned in space. The same could be said of queerness itself: 
whether it is an affect, an identity, or some other construct entirely, it has something to do with 
the body - therefore space. I am thinking in particular of how Ahmed (2006, 2010) outlines a 
form of queer phenomenology that addresses this concept, and points to how far it extends. 
Individuals, deep-seated social and cultural structures, arrangements within arrangements of 
objects ... what is it like to encounter them? Perhaps the most useful thing I've learned by going 
to potluck is to resist the attribution of gender, reflexively. Having met so many wonderful 
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people who mix, flex, and otherwise trouble the parameters of gender has made it easier, but the r~JU"]~ 
affect still persists. My eyes take in the visual data of clothing, body shape, facial features, et 
~~~~~~ cetera. In that yawning half-second where they are assembled into an individual, the impulse to 
categorize male/female is still there, and I don't know if it will ever go away. 
(Note that Stewart (2007) refers to herself as "she" throughout her book in order "to mark the 
difference between this writerly identity and the kind of subject that arises as a daydream of 
simple presence" (5). The approach appeals to me, but my daydream, and the daydream of the 
others who populate my memory, have become progressively more ungendered. If third-person 
gender mu~t be assigned at all, I want it to be bracketed, asterisked, to denote its uncertainty.) 
There should also be a distinction drawn between queer and extraordinary affects, even though 
the definition of the former implies that it must be part of the latter. Take the dinner table, for 
instance. (As Ahmed (2006) points out, "Queers have their tables for sure. Stories of queer 
kinship will be full of tables" (167).) If I were thinking queerly, I look at the potluck table and 
know, before I even realize that I know, that there is difference here with every other potluck 
table around which I've sat outside this space. But then I also recognize difference of the 
experience itself, simultaneous to my recognition of the object. The meanings layered into the 
table that follow my translation of that intensity separate: I understand the nature and 
non-standard familial origins of the food, queer by virtue of what this represents in discourses 
of various shapes and sizes. And memories of all the encounters with potluck tables in my life 
become a metric in my mind, extraordinary by virtue of what this represents only for me. 
• • • 
Dispatches from Queer Potluck 
L_:~~g!~~ [She] is young, barely twenty-two; [she] identifies as Black, and [she] is in the process of transitioning 
(transgressing, transcending) gender. [Her] nerves sometimes fire unexpectedly: a gasping laugh, a 
strained exclamation, the flutter of hands. We are in another room of the apartment after the meal has 
finished, sharing a decaying couch as we gather with others at the coffee table, sorting through markers 
~t::IINl'll and sketches. I could hardly be more different from [her], and it is true that we have little common 
conversational ground. [She] has endured more hardship than I could ever dream of But we are 
physically close, our skin just about touching. Energy thrums between us. It generates an impulse to say 
something, do something, as though by overcoming our immediate nearness, I should do my part to 
narrow our ongoing distance, negotiating the disparity between these two coexisting states. But I am not 
the one who acts. A cup of cheap wine is passed around like communion. [She] gives it to me, teaches my 
hand the feel of reassurance. A firm and warm reminder that [she] is still here-
• • • 
What can I call gratitude? It's not just what stems from the physical sensation of nourishment, 
or from the honest acknowledgment for those in need; I am fortunate to have other parts of my 
life where I receive these things. What the group has taught me most in its coming-together, 
what I am most grateful for, are the lessons in hearing from others' experiences, understanding 
the differential between theirs and mine, and the encouragement to do something about it. From 
each according to [their] ability, to each according to [their] needs. 
The trap is the inclination to center my own experience at the expense of others, running the 
risk of committing one more form of violence. The intersectionality of my identity is largely 
unhindered by forms of systemic discrimination. And while that of many other potluck guests 
can become a "prism" (de Vries 2015) that sheds complex light on the unfolding of identities, 
bodies in space, it would be inappropriate for me to make claims about how that revelation 
happens for anyone else. This account is self-centered because it has to do with affect, which is 
about as intensely personal and phenomenological a thing one can explore. I did not conduct 
interviews or provide direct quotations, this time. (In this regard, besides his attention to the 
difficulties and horrors of the trans experience, de Vries' work is a further inspiration for its 
interplay of perspectives.) Yet the feeling of contrasting experience in interaction has been 
enough to make me question my own positioning, as I try to grasp what affects I might 
engender in others, before they become full emotions. If someone at potluck tells me I make 
them uncomfortable, it is my duty to change my behavior, but my hope is that this never has to 
happen. Before their moment of conscious discomfort, my task as one of the most unreasonably 
privileged is to allow awareness to permeate my muscles, nerves, and skin, habituating myself 
to automatically do or not do whatever it takes to put others at ease. I have to accept that this is 
not always possible, and equally that I must keep trying. 
Ahmed (2006) refers to the "hesitation" that characterizes putting a queer body forward into 
space, an exposure of the body that - depending on the nature of the place, the nature of the 
body and its expression, and that of other bodies present - opens up a range of possibilities 
from violence to "[giving] the world a new shape" (102). I recognize my own bodily capital. Key 
elements of the gender identities I perform can be put on or removed, stored in a backpack or 
hidden under a coat as I walk to and from the potluck through the Philadelphia Gayborhood. 
My being doesn't really challenge anyone as I pass, which is a source of something that grows 
into guilt, especially when I hear stories of the harassment or threats that others have received 
for their more overtly non-binary appearance and behavior. I tell myself that I should be flexing 
my privilege and trying to tear down heteronormativity in my own city; I fail to do so, again 
and again. On some level, maybe I feel that I deserve happiness, and as Heather Love (2007) 
puts it, "Sometimes it seems that the only way for queers to start being happy is to stop being 
queers" (62). But it is ridiculous for me to feel that I have to suppress myself, when there is 
already so little to suppress, and balanced against that is my desire for kinship, for solidarity. 
• • • 
We see each other in the coffeeshop on some random Tuesday afternoon; I am stopping in on my way from 
point A to point B, [he] is there canvassing for work. We hug and exchange pleasantries; I show off my 
latest nails, an iridescent navy topped with blue glitter that took me an hour to get right. At the table for 
two, covered in flyers, stickers, clipboards, these few minutes feel like a micro-potluck. The same rules 
apply. There are no assumptions of gender. Yet there is something uneasy, as though we have pulled back 
the curtains on our own private space and let the world gather at the window. [He] is wearing a nametag 
with [his] Christian alias, not the name I know [him] by. And when the barista calls mine, my throat 
tightens into embarrassment. Now we have been given weaponry to use against each other, that we did 
not ask for and will not use. I take my coffee in hand and say my farewells. We hug again. I move towards 
the exit, feeling that I could have added something more or done something differently-
• • • 
My goal here was not to be opaque or self-important about affect and my relationship with it. 
But I think it is a concept we all could think about a little more, not just within the queer 
community. Increased attention to how the world brushes against us (and vice versa) can lead 
us to greater self-awareness. That being said, any group that is consistently reified as an Other 
needs every tool it can get its hands on to make sense of every quality of their experience. To be 
labeled as queer suggests that one's affects are seen as similarly skewed. I believe in writing into 
this experience: even though there is insufficient language to accurately convey the 
preconscious, there is still some benefit to be gained in describing what it surrounds. To narrate 
one's own history, to dig as deep as one can down the roots of the emotions therein, to pay 
attention to one's own body as it moves through space and encounters other bodies, floating 
among the webs of discourse - all of these are valuable elements of a project whose end goal is, 
perhaps, a queer and affective belonging. 
Dispatches from Queer Potluck 
I don't mean to say that everyone who identifies as queer will have the same visceral reaction to 
everything that befalls them, in no small part because such a wide variety of other factors 
influence what does. Nor will every queer individual interpret their responses in the same way. 
But what does cut across this diversity of phenomena is the outsider's expectation that those L-----::11 
responses will be something other than "normal," their impressions of the world distorted by - - -
their queer orientations (Ahmed 2006). Rather than allowing this to be a mark of negative •--""';z__· 
distinction, we can build contexts where it becomes a source of strength. Despite all the 
fractures within the queer population, the affects we share can empower us to reject the 
normative understanding of how one "should" approach the world. And while I have focused 
on queer issues here as the disjoint I feel, the same potential is there (as long as it is borne out of 
support and validation) for any group whose way of being is nonstandard, demonized, or 
suppressed. From what I have experienced, I believe the best way to find that kind of existential .. _...., 
security is through sharing space with those of like mind- or rather, not-quite-mind, the thing 
that comes before thought. 
This essay was an attempt to explore one possible unfolding of this idea, with its 
communitarian result. I do sincerely believe that queer space enables intensities that are 
somehow ineffably different, if for no other reason than they are discursively positioned as such. 1!-="!'!!'!!!!W:· 
Even in that difference, some kind of comfort and connection can be found. In the most esoteric, 
ritualistic moments, the ones that would most perplex those who most stringently believe in 
normativity, there is an opportunity for a new and familiar kind of ordinary that is 
simultaneously extraordinary. 
• • • 
After the plates have been cleared and the compost tucked into plastic containers, some of us are sitting or 
reclining on cushions, chatting and listening to music. We talk flea markets, politics, recent moves across 
town. A track comes on the speaker with an insistent beat that moves underneath our talk. It's impossible 
to say how it starts: someone begins tapping [their] fingers against a metal bowl, someone else the armrest 
of a chair. Heads nod. Feet move. Even as we keep discussing the matters of the week, rhythms arise and 
dissipate as each person's body in the circle finds its own way of engaging with the music. Our host steps 
away for a moment and returns with more bowls and a drum. Soon enough, the conversation is drowned 
in percussion and -from one corner - wordless singing. No one prepared for a jam session, but everyone 
was ready for it, it seems. The kind of synchronicity and improvisation one might expect from session 
musicians is replicated here, around the potluck table. Motive force replies to motive force. This is our 
affect - kinship created by the unified action of bodies, upturning chairs now and banging on floors, 
someone has produced a trumpet, of all things, from who-knows-where- just another night at potluck in 
something we can call home -
• • • 
disClosure 
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For many postcolonial diasporic subjects, 
belonging and not belonging are often negotiated 
within conceptions of home. Home is a geography 
that contains memories and emotions that are, in 
the postcolonial context, linked to displacement, 
histories of conflict, and colonial exile. As a result, 
home, or the idea of home, can be defined as an 
emotional location rather than a strictly material 
and three-dimensional geographical location. The 
manifestation of these emotional locations -
whether through human relationships, spaces, or 
the memory of metaphorical and physical 
heirlooms and artefacts - have affective qualities 
that can engender intergenerational linkages 
among postcolonial diasporic subjects, creating 
potential spaces for recovery and belonging. In 
other words, the idea of home, and its emotional 
meanings and its familial significations, can be 
transferred on to objects, artefacts, and heirlooms. 
I suggest that the question of home and 
belonging, specifically in the context of South 
Asian postcolonial diasporas, is connected to past 
traumas of colonization and displacement.1 This 
article addresses, therefore, how trauma, 
displacement, and colonialism can be understood 
through and with material culture, and how 
familial objects and items emit and/ or carry 
within them, emotional narratives. I expand upon 
1 In this article I refer to members of the South Asian 
diaspora as postcolonial subjects and to their 
experiences of trauma as both postcolonial and colonial 
experiences of violence. I slide between postcolonial 
and colonial violence, in this context, because of the 
ways in which some subjects experienced the violences 
of pre-Partition and Partition, which were moments of 
direct colonial encounters with the British Raj. Some of 
those same subjects and their family members, 
generations later, continue to experience the ripple 
effects of that catastrophic event in a postcolonial 
context. Thus, my slippage between the terms colonial 
and postcolonial indicates the ways in which 
colonialism is part of the on-going present (Bhabha 
1994). I am referring here to the argument in the field of 
postcolonial studies that the "post" in postcolonial does 
not refer to an "after", but rather works as a marker 
from where we start to recognize the presence of 
"coloniality" or "modernism" (7). 
existing conversations regarding objects and 
homes having emotional value in the context of 
displacement by arguing that understanding 
material things as affective objects allows us to 
rethink the ways in which colonial histories of 
violence are taken up within official archives; and 
that considering material things in this way makes 
room for alternative epistemological sites to exist. 
Put simply, my argument addresses how within 
the context of colonial and postcolonial violence 
for South Asian diasporas, there are some 
experiences of trauma and violence that are 
beyond words. The inability to articulate 
experiences of colonial and postcolonial violences 
results in a lack of space within official state 
narratives about personal experiences of 
displacement. The absence of voices of those 
diasporic subjects in official records then in turn 
allows for practices of silence to permeate 
intergenerational understandings of home and 
belonging for those communities. Thus, I turn to 
the affective currency that emit and transfer on 
and down from objects, by diasporic subjects, to 
access the potential recovery of otherwise silenced 
narratives of colonial and postcolonial trauma. 
In this article, I situate affective objects 
within postcolonial frameworks by using 
diaspora, trauma, and object theories. I begin by 
unpacking the ways in which affect as a concept is 
taken up within the field of affect studies and how 
it extends to non-organic matter, or objects. In this 
way I attend to the question of "why objects?", or 
what about the nature of physical things allows 
for a useful discussion on affect? This then leads 
into a discussion of how affective objects inform 
notions of belonging through the loss of home. 
Here, I look to the ways in which ideas of home 
and belonging are particularly contentious for 
diasporic subjects within postcolonial histories 
and discourses. I consider how home, for South 
Asian diasporic subjects, can thus become mobile 
when we consider affective objects as narrative 
and voice-giving entities. I use the specific 
example of the Partition of India in 1947 as a 
violent historical moment that saw the 
displacement of millions of people - where 
individuals were forced to flee and abandon their 
dwellings only to resettle in the abandoned homes 
.:v- -•-
of their "enemies" on the other side of the border. 
In this way, I examine the ways in which survival 
and recovery of such traumas are 
intergenerationally passed on and down through 
physical objects. Finally, these theories and 
discussions come together to recognize that the 
potential space created by affective objects can be 
voice-giving to otherwise silenced narratives in 
postcolonial archives. 
Affective Objects 
Affect is described by Sarah Ahmed (2010) 
as "what sticks, or what sustains or preserves the 
connection between ideas, values, and objects" 
(29). Affects are those prediscursive forces that are 
outside our conscious knowing and emotions that 
impact our thoughts and types of relationships. 
Melissa Gregg and Gregory Steigworth (2010) 
explain that there is no pure or original state of 
affect. It is something that can be found in the 
"in-between-ness" of our ability to act and is 
therefore a result of a state of relation and the 
passage of that force (1). As well, affect is an 
ever-changing and ever-evolving force and its 
movements vary depending on the type of body 
or thing it encounters. Emotional geographer 
Steve Pile (2010) describes affect as "a 
transpersonal capacity which a body has to be 
affected (through affection) and to affect (as the 
result of modifications)" (8). That is, affect has 
potential possibilities through its capacities. Affect 
is always expanding into areas of (and beyond) 
living, non-living, matter, sensation, events, 
atmospheres, and feeling-tones (Gregg and 
Steigworth 2010, 2). 
In this paper, I look at affect specifically as 
it extends onto objects and things. An object's 
affective quality can be determined based on its 
location and time -when and where the object is 
situated is when and where one would experience 
its affect. This is to say that to experience an object 
as affective is to consider not only the object, but 
also what is around the object (Ahmed 2010, 33). 
As Ahmed explains, to be affected by something is 
to assess that thing, to understand it (31). In 
pairing affect with objects in order to reassess 
certain postcolonial histories of violence, what is 
thus created is a space to get to the truth (Morrison 
1998) of lived experience, which are often left out 
of official state-sanctioned histories. I am referring 
here to Toni Morrison's discussion on truth vs. 
facts as she states, "[ ... ] facts can exist without 
human intelligence, but truth cannot" (93). I 
particularly push against investigations of 
"official" histories of the South Asian diaspora -
those narratives that are deemed "legitimate" or 
"acceptable" (whether it be memorials, official 
documents, history books, etc.). These 
"acceptable" narratives were, mostly, written by 
those who had not experienced the trauma of 
displacement or indeed were the very colonial 
bodies that incited the violence. In this way I 
attend to the voices of displaced postcolonial 
Indians that were otherwise silenced. The 
importance of this idea lies in its exploration of 
those silences and the ways in which we can 
access them without disrupting the well-being of 
the victims of displacement. 
In understanding objects as affective sites, 
we can find that materiality is not only the value 
of an object. The value, for the most part, exists in 
the tangible processes of humans' interactions 
with things (Hockey 2007). Humans are as 
material as the objects they make and are also 
moulded by the supposedly "dead matter" that 
they are surrounded by (138). As Hockey et al. 
state in reference to Peter Pels, "things also tell us 
who we are, not in words, but by embodying our 
intentions. In our everyday traffic of existence, we 
can also learn about ourselves from objects, almost 
as much as from people" (138). Objects and 
material agency foster powers that raise hope, 
induce loss and sadness, and create fear and 
happiness- along with other human-based senses 
and emotions. They can also engender a space for 
memories and memory-sharing, particularly when 
we begin to consider objects as "inalienable 
possessions" - things that cannot be replaced by 
any other object (Myers 2001, 9). It is to this 
approach that I consider a very particular 
human-object relationship in cherished items. 
"Inalienable possessions" are types of 
objects that are categorized as artefacts, heirlooms, 
and familial belongings. Heirlooms are 
symbolically heavy with cultural meaning and are 1 
collected as prized ancestral relics (Myers 2001, 9). 
Annette Weiner (1992) describes how the 
heaviness or "denseness" of such objects is created 
through ancestral histories, the object's association 
with its "owner," secrecy, sadness, and sacredness. 
Heirlooms and objects are also exchanged, passed 
around, passed on, and if they are tied to familial 
histories, can be read as replacements to 
memories. As identity-bearing objects that hold 
memories, heirlooms become what Weiner 
describes as "keeping-while-giving" (13). The 
residual effects of the individual's experience are 
intermingled with the heirloom's affects as it is 
passed along. Therefore, the materiality. of 
everyday objects and their survival across tlme 
and location illuminates a particular relationship 
between human lives, memories, experiences, and 
culture. 
The memories of such objects, I argue, are 
accessed through genealogical connections and 
intergenerational stories. This is to say that these 
culturally specific objects, which have 
transmittable memories, do not do this same kind 
of emotional work if separated from their 
ethnographic ties when, for example, they are 
reclassified as "art" and placed in museums in a 
Western context
2 (Myers 2001, 10). Within 
postcolonial frameworks, the relocation of 
2 To clarify the concept of the varying types of 
emotional work done by the narratives attached to 
affective objects, I consider their context. That is, the 
narrative that is given or prescribed to objects (in the 
form of panels or didactic texts) that have been taken 
from the homes and possession of postcolonial subjects 
and put into Western institutional settings, like a 
museum or archive - usually at the hands of the 
colonizer -does not evoke this same kind of connection 
when it comes to familial narratives and objects. That 
is, the object itself may resist the narrative that it is 
assigned in a museum setting (through its affectual 
currency and residue), but its assigned panel or 
description (which has been written by the institution) 
.....r---. that it accompanies, does not tell its truth, but rather, 
more of its "facts" (Morrison 1998, 93). 
materials and material culture insists on an 
understanding that value cannot be simply 
defined but that is engrossed in various routes of 
exchange, display, and storage (12). The 
appropriation of culturally significant items into 
colonial routes of exchange are historically loaded, 
thus the ways in which affective objects can be 
read as sites of recovery can only be done so 
within the setting of familial narratives of victims 
of colonial and postcolonial violence. In the 
context of familial heirlooms, a genealogical link is 
used as a space to communicate, but while 
keeping in mind the complexity of such 
relationships. Thus, the spaces in which these 
affective objects are held become important vessels 
in which belonging and not belonging is 
negotiated. This space is traditionally considered 
to be the home or familial dwelling. However, for 
South Asian postcolonial diasporic subjects, the 
loss of such a space opens the possibility of 
notions of home becoming mobile, as home 
attaches itself to its affective objects. 
Home and Belonging 
Anat Hecht (2001) powerfully states, "to 
lose a home. is to lose a private museum of 
memory, identity and creative appropriation" 
(123) . To be separated from one's home and 
belongings is often equated to being separated 
from all that is familiar and steady. When 
discussing the South Asian diaspora, this 
separation is particularly important to note 
because diaspora cannot exist without the loss of 
home or the displacement from homelands. This 
unfolds vis-a-vis identity formation (the loss of 
home is a kind of identity loss, too). Moreover, 
homes are not just sites of conditioning, social 
relations, and economic management; they also 
represent a position that is in relation to the nation 
as a whole. The house is not only integral to the 
individual identity, but that of the community and 
nation in its entirety. This is to say that place and 
home represent belonging in terms of individual 
identity as well as citizenship and national 
identity (Hua 2011, 52). 
In understanding the home as a pivotal 
component in both the construction of individual 
and national identity, we can then look towards 
the physical things that make up the home. A 
house holds an array of different materials and 
therefore collectively creates a living experience 
that is more important than the total of its parts 
(Hecht 2001, 123). All of these materials are 
supplied with meaning, memory, and emotion, 
which are what turn a house - infrastructure, 
property - into a home. However, in the context of 
postcolonial diasporic experiences, homes and all 
their various held objects become lost or 
displaced. This concept exposes the tangled 
tensions that exist between humans and objects, 
drawing specific attention to objects that are 
removed or demolished and thus do not "out-live" 
their owners. With this I ask: if objects are 
supposed to be cherished sites of memory, what 
happens when these sites are destroyed or ruined? 
What is at stake if an identity-forming 
environment, like a home, disappears? And, 
finally, how does the idea of home, and 
displacement, play out across generations? 
One of the ways to begin thinking about 
the connections between objects, memory, 
emotion, diaspora, and location, is to notice how, 
during war and conflict, objects are both removed 
and cherished. The emotive energies emitted by 
artefacts and objects appropriated during war by 
members of the "enemy" community demonstrate 
the non-human agency and consequential affective 
ties that material goods have. Yael Navaro-Yashin, 
in her work Affective Spaces, Melancholic, Objects: 
Ruination and the Production of Anthropological 
Knowledge (2009), for example, considers people 
who are displaced from their homes and are 
forced to flee and take shelter in other abandoned 
houses, producing the odd result of a diaspora 
living in homes of another diaspora; and in doing 
so, she explores how it feels to live with objects 
and within ruins left behind by the earlier, 
displaced, community. Navaro-Yashin describes 
the things within houses as being charged with the 
traces of other people's lives. She demonstrates 
how homes are charged with "cultural agency" 
and as objects of political and legal substance 
(179). Her specific study examines 
Turkish-Cypriots' relations to houses, land, and 
objects that they appropriated from 
Greek-Cypriots during the war of 1974 and the 
subsequent Partition of Cyprus. 
Through this work, the notion that those 
who have been uprooted from their homes 
because of the threat of war, conflict, or violence is 
investigated by the ways in which they become 
surrounded by objects of ruin. For Navaro-Yashin 
"ruined matter" refers to things that are a result of 
an act of violation (5). She explains that these 
abject objects and environments have acquired 
their status because they could not be carried or 
taken with their owners due to the displacement 
incited by conflict or war, rather than because 
these things were not needed or wanted. This 
rejected material is then reused, recycled, and 
appropriated by those who are left behind. 
The emotive energy of focus in 
Navaro-Yashin's work is melancholia, or what she 
calls "maraz" (4). According to Navaro-Yashin, 
maraz is a way the displaced Turkish-Cypriots 
described their condition of depression in their 
inner state of being. It is a state of deep and 
unrecoverable sadness that is located by the lack 
of calmness and happiness within their internal 
selves (4). It is a concept that represents a feeling 
that is beyond words; an affective state that 
permeates experiences of survival for victims of 
displacement. These spatial and experiential 
tensions highlight the dualism between the 
material and the ideational, between tangibility 
and social imaginaries (1), which becomes key in 
analysing the colonial discourses that encapsulate 
the portable affective objects. That is, what 
becomes apparent are the limitations of language 
when it comes to experiences of trauma. 
The limitations of language when 
expressing experiences of colonial and 
postcolonial trauma results in some members of 
postcolonial diasporic communities becoming 
emotionally attached to, and therefore internally 
(psychically) responsive to, family mementos, 
objects, and artefacts; it is this process that helps 
underscore the connections between the material 
and the ideational. As a result, emotion can be 
understood alongside memory and affect in order 
to draw attention to how the human "senses" are 
inseparable from the ways people act and live. 
This coupling allows us to think about the 
relationship between human and object and 
encourages new understandings of how colonial 
histories are inseparable from material objects that 
existed in and through conflicts, displacements, 
and migrations (Edwards 2006, 4). 
Remembering Difficult Histories 
In the context of the South Asian diasporic 
subjects, histories of colonialization and 
displacement are most notably centered around 
the catastrophic event of the Partition of India in 
1947. The end of the British Raj resulted in the 
birth of two nations: India and Pakistan- an event 
that led to murderous riots, unspeakable violence, 
and mass loss of lives and homes. Partition saw 
the division and separation of Hindu, Muslim and 
Sikh populations into newly assigned countries, 
creating interethnic conflicts and fissures that 
continue to have rippling effects to date. This 
event, in many ways, parallels but does not twin 
with the Partition of Cyprus that Navaro-Yashin 
focuses on in her study. The Partition of India and 
Pakistan also resulted in a mass displacement of 
between eight to ten million people who were 
forced to flee across the border into their newly 
created country of either India or Pakistan (Didur 
2006, 4). The violence of this rupture saw the death 
of half a million people, and whole communities 
abandoned their homes and belongings on one 
side of the border to resettle on the other side in 
the deserted homes and spaces of their "enemies" 
who were doing the same thing in their homes 
(Das 2007, 20). 
The suddenness of this loss and relocation 
manifested a lasting trauma on victims of this 
violence that have been passed on 
intergenerationally. Dhooleka Raj (2000) notes that 
amongst the three different generations that 
experienced different stages and moments of 
Partition and post-Partition, there are various 
understandings of what Partition is and was. 
These generations grew up in different periods 
and their family narratives are disjointed. At the 
same time, those who directly experienced 
Partition often obscured their stories when passing 
them on to other generations by often sharing 
or "different" memories of the events. As 
Gyanendra Pandey (2001) explains, these new 
memories did not often include Partition when 
they were retold; what emerged was the mentality 
that stated, "what is the point telling today's 
children about these things? [ ... ] All that has 
nothing to do with their lives and their problems" 
(16). From this, the story of Partition as told to the 
children and grandchildren of victims, becomes 
faded from shared stories. In this way, the voices 
of the victims are strikingly silent and many do 
not recount their experiences unless asked (Das 
2007, 80). As well, the knowledge of Partition's 
trauma is not explicitly shared between parents 
and children - therefore the sharing of stories 
between family members becomes understood as 
silent practices (Raj 2000, 31). Raj explains that 
individuals do not want to remember, that families 
do not want to "recall the bad times" (36), and that 
many would rather avoid the stigma of being 
known as a refugee. This becomes particularly 
potent for Sikh diasporas in post-Partition India, 
as the newly formed India became a Hindu state 
and Pakistan a Muslim state, and the Sikh 
community suddenly found themselves belonging 
to nowhere. 
The absorption of Partition narratives into 
silent practices has meant that many descendants 
of the refugees do not realize that when their 
refugee family members left the Pakistan side to 
come to India, and vice versa, they assumed the 
move was temporary (39). There is a lack of 
understanding, by the later generations, of how 
the migration was perceived as impermanent and 
what difficulties were faced when the refugees 
realized they were, indeed, not going back home. 
What resulted for the displaced was a deep feeling 
of nostalgia and a desire to see their homes one 
last time, which they could not do, leaving many 
not wanting to speak about Partition at all (39). 
On the side of official state narratives, 
Partition, as a subject, has been generally 
neglected in Indian public culture - there have 
been no attempts to "memorialize Partition" 
through monuments, museums, or even public 
hearings and trials (Das 2007, 19). This approach 
has had an impact on how refugees feel 
stigmatized and uneasy about sharing their 
experiences with family members. Veena Das 
describes the lack of response to Partition as a 
reoccurring trope in Indian historiography that 
views trauma as "witness to some forgotten 
wound" (102). What results, then, is an "official 
history" that is largely accepted and structured 
based on statistical figures and timelines, leaving 
out the lived experiences of those victims of 
violence. 
In the general silence that surrounds 
narratives of Partition as an event, something else 
emerges. In many cases, a different kind of 
remembering happens where familial stories that 
are intergenerationally passed down from 
refugees of Partition to their next of kin often takes 
on a quality of a "frozen slide." In other words, the 
storytelling that does transpire tends to focus 
more on life pre-Partition- what life was like "on 
the other side." Stories would therefore include 
the details of everyday life: stories of neighbourly 
gossip, how fresh the fruit used to be in their old 
homeland, or how they missed the shopping at 
their neighbourhood bazaar (80). Through this, 
there is an attempt to recover aspects of the past 
that re-enters life experienced prior to 
displacement. 
Items that were somehow carried across 
the border in the chaos of Partition become now 
cherished possessions as they represent survival -
a nod to the fact that if the item survived, so did 
its owner. As a descendant of refugees of Partition 
myself, I have experienced this very moment with 
my own family members. Stories of "what 
happened" always centered around an object or 
physical thing that stands as proof that there was 
indeed a time before this rupture happened. For 
example, my Sikh grandmother - who died when 
I was much too young to remember her -left with 
her son, my father, a wedding necklace known as 
a Rani Harr. This heirloom was one that was 
beloved and charged with familial history but was 
also one that was almost lost during the upheaval 
of Partition. Yet, now it sits in my possession as a 
physical link to a past that I would have never 
otherwise known or understood. There are no 
words that come with the Rani Harr, only an 
affectual residue that this item once sat in the 
hands of my grandmother and acted as a witness 
to a moment of horrific trauma and violence as it 
'I 
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was tucked away against my great-grandmother's 
body to be carried across the border into a place 
that promised safety. 
Recovery in the Loss 
The difficulties that resulted from the 
intergenerational traumas of Partition have led to 
a reliance on official state records and archives for 
general knowledge and understandings of its 
history. As Gayatri Spivak (2008) explains in her 
discussion of the gendered subaltern, 
communication between daughters and mothers, 
and between grand-daughters and grandmothers, 
is difficult. Language, location, and time create 
barriers that are difficult to penetrate (7). This is 
where the affective object becomes useful when 
thinking about the ways in which post-partition 
subjects may be able to recover an 
intergenerational connection to their familial past. 
To put it simply: there are some traumas that are 
beyond words. 
Dina Georgis, in her work in The Better 
Story: Queer Affects from the Middle East (2013), 
elucidates, "indeed, when it comes to trauma, the 
only thing we can be sure of is that our experience 
resists thought and language" (169). With this 
explanation, the question of survival is not only 
understood through what is said; it can also be 
understood through experiential knowledge and 
silences. Here I argue that affective objects not 
only complicate language, but do not always have 
to depend on language. I contend that survival is 
articulated through the object's tangibility and 
materiality as well as oral narrative or storytelling. 
The affective feelings surrounding objects, and the 
desire to keep, discard, and share objects, aids in 
the production of diasporic recovery to colonial 
trauma in the postcolonial present while offering a 
new or different set of thematics linked to, but 
outside of, embodied personhood. 
The affective quality of the objects can 
create or destroy "the better life" depending on 
whether the object projects a melancholic history 
or what Georgis calls "the better story" (1). 
Georgis argues that narrative is an emotional 
resource for learning and for generating better 
futures. She suggests that narrative gives us 
insight into understanding the unknowable 
processes by which we create collective memories, 
histories, and identities. Georgis uses stories to 
link us to forgotten spaces of history; she 
highlights narratives that have been disregarded 
and thinks about how social injustice is articulated 
(and how some narratives, despite wanting to 
speak against injustice, fail to do so). 
Understanding affect, memory, and 
narratives as power, and connecting this power to 
the task of retelling postcolonial histories, 
complicates how "legitimate histories" are 
conveyed. With this I highlight the power of 
counter-narratives that emerge from sites and 
voices that are otherwise silenced. For example, 
my grandmother's wedding necklace allows for a 
connection between her and I, generations apart. It 
is a gendered object that represents her gendered 
experience as a Sikh woman, who was never given 
space to speak about her experiences of trauma 
pre and post-Partition. As such, objects do not 
speak in a written language but, in their very 
existence, they can create a space and incite us to 
return to forgotten memories from forgotten 
peoples. 
The affective qualities of such laden objects 
give them capacities for survival. They work as 
"unaffected witnesses" to everyday lives (Olsen 
2010, 8); they are unbiased participators of the 
everyday. Indeed, they are participators as they are 
intrinsically and indispensably involved in 
enabling actions. As Jas Elsner (2013) explains, 
objects work against our assumptions about the 
motives, character, actions, and causes of the past 
through the ways in which they place a literal 
material obstacle within discursive patterns of 
writing, thereby moving these writings to an 
actuality (167) . In other words, objects inject a 
"realness" into writings of histories in their ability 
to withstand history without changing in form -
they are physical and metaphorical evidences of 
the past. Elsner states, "Objects are part of the 
story or agenda or theme they have been 
summoned to help on its way. They can conjure 
imaginations from a space of real-life experience 
, outside the narrative. They exist in a space that is 
outside the narrative while being within it" (167). 
~L--- ~--~ ... 
By accepting the suggestions that the 
question of survival can be understood through 
what is unsaid, affect as it attaches itself to objects 
and artefacts - material things - creates points of 
inquiry into, and potential understandings of, 
experiences that are beyond words. In linking 
these concepts to trauma and displacement, the 
emotions surrounding the affective object - the 
subjective meanings attached to things -uncovers 
some of the unspoken and unsaid complexities of 
displacement. The very characteristic of portability 
of objects creates an ability to carry a history, 
narrative, and even home. What is lost in 
upheaval and violence can, once again, be found 
in the memories the objects hold. 
Conclusion 
Belonging, for many in the South Asian 
diaspora, is a contentious issue that is connected 
to feelings of colonial exile. Their narratives and 
histories of home are often rooted in displacement 
and violent ruptures. Through traumatic events 
that occurred to the Indian nation during the 
twentieth century, including the Partition of India 
and Pakistan in 1947, voices of survivors and 
victims have oftentimes been undermined by the 
"official" histories of the South Asian diaspora (as 
seen in memorials, official documents, and history 
books) or through the wilful erasures that seek 
recuperation in silence. 
In order to uncover these otherwise 
silenced stories, I have turned to objects and 
theorized how they provide us with alternative 
sites of remembering. By attending to emotion, 
memory, and affect through the medium of 
material culture, I have drawn connections 
between objects and the human experience. In 
order to access the narratives that come from 
affective objects, in the context of post-Partition 
India, I have argued that a genealogical link is 
produced through affective objects and their 
attendant narrated memories, which are often 
found in material things passed down through 
generations. I emphasized the importance of 
familial and intergenerational ties within this 
discussion as it is key in accessing the objects' 
affective currency. Ultimately what the study of 
affect affords, when thinking about the ways it can 
attach itself to physical things, are alternative 
epistemological sites that can provide potential 
spaces for recovery to postcolonial trauma and 
violence. 
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Weatherlessness: Affect, Mood, 
Temperament, the Death of the Will, and 
Politics 
First, I develop an account of the nature of moods and the relation of mood to emotion 
and temperament. This account stresses that social and individual moods are marked 
by four features: They are transactional - neither wholly subjective nor objective; in 
experience they shade into and blur back and forth with feeling and temperament; they are 
ambient and atmospheric, a habit of living ·in the world more expansive than a habit of 
mind; and, whether conscious or not, moods have causes that, if known, may be 
manipulated to advance both personal and political ends. Second, I focus on a particular 
mood that, following the novelist John Barth, I term "weatherlessness." I then 
distinguish weatherlessness from both learned helplessness and manufactured consent. 
Third, I conclude by showing ways in which weatherlessness is fatal to democracy, to 
government of, by, and for the people. Here I suggest ways in which weatherlessness can 
be a tool used by authoritarian regimes, including those that disguise themselves as 
democracies. 
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1. Moods 
Supposing that truth is a mood- what 
then? Supposing every philosophy and every 
politics expresses the mood of its originators-
what then? 
OK, don't even try to answer these 
questions, don't even start to read this ~ssay 
until you're in the right mood. Followmg a 
good sleep and healthy breakfast. Your mouth 
holding a pen crosswise, not by its end. A 
sunny day and pleasant breeze, maybe some 
exercise or some time in the park. When you 
want to be right here, right where you are. 
After an ocean of love. That could make all 
the difference. And this difference . is not 
merely personal: Associations, organizations, 
governments, and cultures call forth., are 
marked by, and nourish or starve particular 
moods. Moods may be political; they may be 
manipulated to advance both personal and 
political ends. 
What is a mood? With roots in Old 
English, Gothic German, and Old Norse 
words for mind, spirit, courage, and anger, 
mood is typically defined as an individu~l 's 
particular and temporary feeling or state of mmd, 
a distinctive emotional quality or tone, a 
pervading impression or general attitude or tone of 
some thing or some time, and a person's 
inclination or disposition or receptivity or temper 
to some activity or thing. (The term also has 
specialized and precise meanings i~ logic (as 
classification of categorical syllogtsms) and 
grammar (as categories of verb inflection to 
indicate syntactic relations among clauses or 
attitudes of speakers with respect to 
certainty I uncertainty, wish/ command, a~d 
emphasis/hesitancy. I note here that the m~m 
character discussed in this essay's next sectwn 
is a grammar teacher - in part a teacher of 
moods.) Mood is most often attributed to 
individuals, but a mood may be a feature of a 
social group, political regime, or historical era 
- e.g., the mood of a people during a wa~ or 
the mood of an age of enlightenment or hme 
of famine - or to creative works - e.g., the 
characteristic mood of a painter's period of 
work or the tone of a piece of music - or a 
location - e.g., the mood of a military 
cemetery or the feel of a lake house. In her 
song, "Ventura," Lucinda Williams (2003) 
sings: 
Haven't spoken to no one 
Haven't been in the mood 
Pour some soup, get a spoon and 
Stir it up real good. 
Sometimes "mood" is used almost 
synonymously with "feeling" or "emotion"-
such that, for example, to be in a good mood 
is simply to feel cheerful or have positive 
emotions and to be in a bad mood is to feel 
irritated or suffer from negative emotions. 
Many psychologists, however, differentiate 
emotion and mood. In these cases, an emotion 
or "emotional episode" is characterized as an 
experience marked by: a particular (usually 
relatively short-term) quality and caused by 
particular physiological (e.g., neurol~?ical 
and endocrinal) changes and condthons; 
behaviors (e.g.; smiling or running away) 
caused by and consistent with this experience; 
attention directed toward an eliciting 
stimulus; cognitive appraisal of the meaning 
and possible consequences of the stimulus; 
and, attribution of the genesis of the 
experience to the stimulus. An important 
point here is that emotions are not reacti,ons to 
perceptions and then, afterwards, th~ caus~ of 
bodily expressions. Instead, perceptions gtve 
rise to bodily expressions the awareness of 
which is emotion. William James (1981 [1890]) 
put this nicely: "Bodily changes follow 
directly the perception of the exciting fact, 
and . . . our feeling of the same changes as 
they occur is the emotion." We feel sorry 
because we cry and afraid because we 
tremble, James explained; we do not cry 
because we feel sorry or tremble because we 
are afraid. Without the bodily expressions 
following perception, those perceptions 
would be wholly cognitive - we might judge 
it best to run but we "should not actually feel 
afraid" (1065-66). So characterized, emotions 
are brought about by something, are feelings of 
bodily reactions to something, and are about 
something cognitively appraised. Examples 
include anger, fear, sadness, happiness, 
disgust, and surprise. Indeed, many 
researchers argue that these are the six, and 
only, universal emotions. That may be right, 
but I'd like to think that the sentiment of 
rationality - James's phrase for the fact that 
rationality itself is a sentiment - might be 
very widespread too. 
By contrast, a mood is characterized as 
an affective state that lasts longer than an 
emotion and often is temporally distant from 
the stimulus and its resulting behavior that is 
its cause (e.g., waking up one morning in a 
bad mood because of an argument several 
months earlier or being depressed years after 
the death of a loved one). This includes 
moods brought on by causes unrecognized by 
the given individual - causes such as 
nutrition, weather, facial muscles, physical 
activity, persistent poverty, a culture of 
violence, structural absence of opportunity, 
and so on. A mood is more diffuse and 
general than an emotion - less about 
something in particular that is cognitively 
appraised and more about everything in 
general (e.g., anxiety not about an important 
exam in an hour but about one's whole 
future); less a reaction to something in 
particular than a reaction to life more 
generally (e.g., irritability brought on not by 
one particular co-worker but by absolutely 
everyone around); and less brought on by 
something particular but, instead, more 
sustained across many different particular 
experiences (e.g., a depressive state due to the 
totality of one's self). So characterized, 
moods are relatively long term, broad scope, 
and diffuse affective states. From this 
perspective, moods are generally viewed as 
having two primary dimensions or valences: 
positive affect (and the positive consequences 
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of this affect) and negative affect (and the 
negative consequences of this affect); that is, 
being in a good mood or being in a bad 
mood. Examples of moods include 
depression, anxiety, resignation, confidence, 
and serenity. 
I accept and want to make use of the 
notion of mood understood in this brief, 
unfinished but, I hope, workable sketch. That 
said, I also want to add four important points 
to this account of mood. First, any adequate 
account of mood must be shady. This means it 
must not claim neat separations between 
instincts, emotions, moods, and 
temperaments. Rather, they blur into one 
another. To note this is simply to extend an 
observation by James (1981 [1890]): 
"Instinctive reactions and emotional 
expressions thus shade imperceptibly into 
each other" (1058). So too do emotions, 
moods, and temperaments. We can feel 
hopeful or be in a hopeful mood or have a 
hopeful temperament. Somebody can just be 
an anxious person, find one's self in an 
anxious mood, or feel anxious. As James (1981 
[1890]) noted, "The result of all this flux is 
that the merely descriptive literature of the 
emotions is one of the most tedious parts of 
psychology. And not only is it tedious, but 
you feel that its subdivisions are to a great 
extent either fictitious or unimportant, and 
that its pretences to accuracy are a sham" 
(1064). Differences in both life and language 
among instincts, emotions, moods, and 
temperaments are shady, blurry, vague. An 
emotion can coexist with or produce a mood 
or a temperament over time, but so too a 
mood can call forth and exist simultaneously 
with a particular emotion. 
I go out with a friend 
Maybe a little music might help 
But I can't pretend 
I wish I was somewhere else (Williams 
2003). 
Second, any adequate account of mood 
must be transactional. This means that moods 
TEXAS 
are not wholly subjective or wholly objective. 
Rather, they are what James called 
"double-barreled," applying to both the how 
and the what of experience, features of 
irreducibly interrelated consciousness and 
object. Moods are what John Dewey (1989 
[1949]) called "unfractured" -without radical 
separation between knower and known, 
namer and named, organism and 
environment, subject and object (96-97). For 
Heidegger as for Dewey, moods are features 
of a world, not simply subjective overlays or 
reactions to it. Just as Dewey asserted that 
reality possesses practical character, so too it 
possesses affective character. Reality is 
moody. Our ordinary language captures this 
and displays our unsettlement about our 
being in a mood or a mood being in us. Place: 
The dark streets were foreboding, tense, 
unforgiving, full of danger, without hope. 
Action: The gunfire was terrifying, scary, 
frightening, horrific. Person: After her death, 
he was disconsolate, depressed, unable to 
cope, dark, without joy. Time: "Ah distinctly, I 
remember, it was in the bleak December," the 
mood was grim, there were shootings almost 
every day, it was a dismal period. The 
affective is thick and stretches across our 
lives. In now-outdated language, tertiary 
qualities are features of reality - and that 
includes emotion, mood, and temperament. 
Mood colors, fixes, and transforms both the 
how and the what of experience. 
Third, affect includes more than instinct, 
feeling, and mood. It is ambient and 
atmospheric. It also includes temperament. By 
temperament I mean not just a person's or a 
group's habit of mind, but something more 
expansive - one's habit of living, one's 
constitution or characteristic modes of feeling 
and action. As feelings come and go and 
shade into more diffuse moods that may last a 
while or longer, so too moods often shade and 
blur into temperaments. In such cases, moods 
become habitual in duration and wide in 
scope - affective undergoings, doings, and 
dispositions across wide swaths of one's life. 
They become whole climates rather than the 
weather one particular day or even one 
season. This points to another standard or 
dictionary meaning of "temperament" that 
sheds additional light: temperament is the 
condition of the weather or climate, regarded 
as resulting from a combination of heat or 
cold, dryness or humidity. One's 
temperament is one's personal weather. We 
all know some people who are warm, others 
who are cold, some who are arid, and yet 
others who are stormy (and so on). 
Understood this way, temperament shares 
more with feeling and less with mood a 
connection with action and disposition to 
action. Icy feelings and an icy temperament 
are called forth and displayed in icy behavior; 
an icy mood is more atmospheric - "I had no 
idea you were in that kind of mood!" -and 
may be barely evident in action. Affects blur 
along a temporal arc of shorter-term feelings, 
longer-lasting moods, and relatively durable 
tern peramen ts. 
The fourth point about moods is this: 
They have causes. They are the product of 
physiological, environmental, and cultural 
conditions. The fact that a person may not 
know what brought on a mood (e.g., "I have 
no idea why I'm in such an unhappy mood") 
does not mean that the existence of the mood 
is irreducibly mysterious or unknowable. Just 
as it is possible to manufacture feelings (e.g., 
"If I let her in on this secret, she will be so 
jealous"), so too it is possible to manufacture 
moods (e.g., "We had to get out of the Pacific 
Northwest to cure his seasonal affective 
disorder," or, "Whenever the manager turned 
on Fox News, I felt anger at Trump and my 
whole mood turned confrontational and 
hostile"). This has potential practical 
implications for anyone marketing products, 
ideas, or regimes - or even philosophies if one 
accepts Deleuze and Guattari's (1994 [1991]) 
observation that "philosophy has not 
remained unaffected by the general 
movement that replaced Critique with sales 
promotion" (10). As it is possible to inflame a 
crowd, create desires, learn emotions and 
emotional responses, produce belief, and 
engineer consent, so it is possible to 
manufacture mood - crucial perhaps in some 
kinds of administration of populations. 
Individual and social moods, then, are 
shady and transactional, blurring back and 
forth with feeling and temperament, and 
caused by conditions that, if known, may be 
manipulated to advance both personal and 
political ends. 
2. Weatherlessness 
In light of this general understanding of 
mood, I want to focus briefly on a particular 
mood for the purpose of reflecting on its 
origins and its political as well as personal 
uses. I take the name for this mood -
weatherlessness- from the novelist John Barth. 
To be weatherless is to be in a moodless 
mood, to be without climate, without feeling, 
freedom, or purpose. When habitual, it is the 
complete absence of disposition and 
inclination, the absence of any temperament. 
It is to be helpless, unable to act and without 
desires or goals, paralyzed to the point of 
inaction. Just as Hemingway recorded the 
death of love after World War I in The Sun 
Also Rises, so Barth recounted the death of the 
will after World War II in his 1958 novel, The 
End of the Road (1969 [1958]). Hemingway 
chronicled the "lost generation" while Barth 
illuminated the "submission generation." For 
the book's "hero," Jacob Horner, there is no 
convincing reason to prefer or do anything 
and so he does nothing (except at the 
command of the "Doctor," a 
psychiatrist-counselor-men tor-God, as 
impersonal, aloof, and inexplicable as fate). 
The book opens with a six-word 
sentence suggesting uncertainty and 
absurdity: "In a sense, I am Jacob Horner" 
(Barth 1969 [1958], 1). Next: "It was on the 
advice of the Doctor that I entered the 
teaching profession." The mood of 
weatherlessness and a temperament of 
paralysis are set quickly: Readers are treated 
to two long paragraphs dealing solemnly 
with the vexing problems of how to sit 
properly in the Doctor's office and the equally 
grave problem of how one's arms should be 
placed. After discussing the shifting of 
positions and arms, Jacob Horner tells us that 
the story of his life is contained in the 
sentence which says that this shifting is a 
"recognition of the fact that when one is faced 
with such a multitude of desirable choices, no 
one choice seems satisfactory for very long by 
comparison with the aggregate desirability of 
all the rest, though compared to any one of 
the others it would not be found inferior." 
This sentence, which Jacob Horner describes 
as "a double predicate nominative expression 
in the second independent clause of a rather 
intricate compound sentence" (Barth 1969 
[1958], 2-3), not only shows that Horner is a 
grammar teacher but also reveals Barth's 
contempt for conventional rules and societal 
customs, for sense and order, for logic and 
principles. Jacob Horner's mastery of these 
techniques was no avail against his 
impotency. 
You like it under the trees in autumn, 
Because everything is half dead 
The wind moves like a cripple among the 
leaves 
And repeats words without meaning. 
... you yourself were never quite yourself 
And did not want nor have to be, 
Desiring the exhilarations of changes: 
The motive for metaphor, shrinking from 
The weight of primary noon, 
The ABC of being (Stevens 1993 [1947], 
288). 
Factually and briefly, The End of the Road 
is a story supposedly written by Jake Horner 
in 1955 about an incident, which took place in 
1953, an event caused by the advice of the 
strange Doctor whom Horner met in 1951 and 
with whom he is doomed to serve the rest of 
his aimless, empty life. The novel opens with 
the Doctor's advice to Jake Horner to go to 
third-rate Wicomico State Teachers College in 
Maryland's Eastern Shore to get a job 
teaching grammar. At Wicomico, Jake's first 
and only friend is Joe Morgan, a liberal 
academic "emancipated" from objective 
values: "What the hell, Jake," says Joe, "when 
you say good-by to objective values, you 
really have to flex your muscles and keep 
your eyes open, because you're on your own. 
It takes energy; not just personal energy, but 
cultural energy, or you're lost. Energy's what 
makes the difference between American 
pragmatism and French existentialism -
where the hell else but in America could you 
have a cheerful nihilism, for God's sake?" 
(Barth 1969 [1958], 47). Jake had also said 
goodbye to objective values -after all, he had 
been ordered by the Doctor to read Sartre and 
to be an existentialist and instructed that 
"Choosing is existence: To the extent you 
don't choose, you don't exist" (Barth 1969 
[1958], 83) - but he did not accept Joe's 
cheerful spirit. He had no experience of 
himself as a unified self. Jake claimed: 
"Indeed, the conflict between individual 
points of view that Joe admitted lay close to 
heart of his subjectivism I should carry even 
further, for subjectivism implies a self, and 
where one feels a plurality of selves, one is 
subject to the same conflict on an intensely 
intramural level, each of one's selves claiming 
the same irrefutable validity for its special 
point of view that, in Joe's system individuals 
and institutions may claim" (Barth 1969 
[1958], 142). Here Barth pokes fun at the 
American Dream, American progressivism, 
and meliorism that smile in the face of 
adversity and hope for better things ahead. 
Jake does not smile. He is immobilized, 
helpless, sapped of will, doomed to 
immobility and living what Wallace Stevens 
(1993 [1949]) characterized as a "skeleton's 
life" in" As You Leave the Room": 
I wonder, have I lived a skeleton's life, 
As a disbeliever in reality, 
A countryman of all the bones in the 
world? 
Now, here, the snow I had forgotten 
becomes 
Part of a major reality, part of 
An appreciation of a reality 
And yet nothing has been changed except 
what is 
Unreal, as if nothing had been changed at 
all (488). 
Joe kept pushing his wife, Rennie, 
toward Jake and found ways for them to 
spend time together. When he learns of their 
affair, Joe makes it the subject of long, open 
philosophical conversations, as he does when 
Rennie becomes pregnant (whether by Jake or 
Joe no one knows). After a discussion of death 
as the only alternative to bearing the 
unwanted child, the three discuss another 
alternative, abortion. Jake's Doctor agrees to 
perform the abortion, the price being 
complete ownership of Jake for the rest of his 
life. Rennie is killed on the operating table, 
leaving Jake to break the news to Joe. Joe 
disappears into oblivion while Jake departs 
by taxi for the Doctor's Remobilization Farm 
where he is fated to live his life in complete 
dependence on, and total submission to, the 
Doctor. The book's final word- Jake says this 
to the driver - is "Terminal" (Barth 1969 
[1958], 198). 
Weatherlessness: After recounting a 
dream in which a meteorologist announces 
that there simply will be no weather 
tomorrow, Jake says this: 
A day without weather is unthinkable, but 
for me at least there were frequently days 
without any mood at all. On these days, 
Jacob Horner, except in a meaningless 
metabolistic sense, ceased to exist, for I was 
without a personality. Like those 
microscopic specimens that biologists must 
dye in order to make them visible at all, I 
had to be colored with some mood or other 
if there was to be a recognizable self to me. 
The fact that my successive and 
discontinuous selves were linked to one 
another by the two unstable threads of 
body and memory; the fact that in the 
nature of Western languages the word 
disClosure 
change presupposes something upon 
which the changes operate; the fact that 
although the specimen is invisible without 
the dye, the dye is not the specimen- these 
are considerations of which I was aware 
but in which I had no interest. On my 
weatherless days my body sat in a rocking 
chair and rocked and rocked and rocked, 
and my mind was as nearly empty as 
interstellar space (Barth 1969 [1958], 36). 
And like the bodies of individual persons, so 
too political bodies may sit in a rocking chair, 
just rocking and empty. 
3. Manufactured Helplessness and Politics 
Barth's novel presented a mood of 
weatherlessness, the absence of temperament 
and disposition - the death of the will- and 
the resulting paralysis and impotence of 
action primarily as an individual's (Jacob's) 
psychological condition and as a 
philosophical problem (if one makes certain 
"existentialist" assumptions about the world, 
freedom and choice, and values). I want now 
to consider weatherlessness and the death of 
the will in a more explicitly political context 
because I find these ideas illuminate central 
commitments and problems for democratic 
practice - for practices that broadly value and 
are marked by broad participation, consent, 
and benefit of the governed. To do this, it is 
necessary to view weatherlessness not simply 
as an individual trait but as a social product -
something socially manufactured (indirectly-
whether fully conscious or not - via 
sentiments) in particular ways in particular 
times and places with particular 
consequences for particular selves. The reason 
for doing this is straight-forward: the self, to 
use the language of George Herbert Mead, is 
a social product (and so there can be no 
question about mood being either only 
wholly personal or only wholly social). It is 
also necessary to view weatherlessness as a 
cultural deployment - a strategy (conscious or 
not) on behalf of particular interests and 
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powers, particular forms of government, and 
particular cultural relations. 
In this light, it is helpful to contrast 
weatherlessness and the death of the will with 
two other phenomena: learned helplessness 
and manufactured consent. Following 
Seligman (1975a, 1975b, and 1993), learned 
helplessness is a condition in which a person, 
after a traumatic experience or repeated harm 
and failure, learns powerlessness and absence 
of control and then gives up even trying, 
taking no action to avoid subsequent harm -
even in subsequent changed conditions in 
which the harm could be escaped or stopped. 
Two points stand out here: the helplessness 
learned in the original situation is warranted 
- the subject actually is helpless with respect 
to the given trauma or harm; and, in later 
changed conditions, the habituated 
helplessness does not appear warranted to 
third-party observers who know surely the 
conditions have changed such that the person 
is no longer helpless, but it does appear 
warranted to the person who has no reason to 
realize that conditions have changed - and 
who finally does act to avoid trauma or harm 
only after being shown that this is possible. In 
learned helplessness, then, the self first 
discovers it has no effective power to act, no 
ability to achieve its goals, and then 
concludes there is no point acting. This 
paralysis of will, understood as a habit, is the 
result of actual helplessness in a given 
environment. In cases of weatherlessness, in 
contrast, the self first finds itself in an 
indifferent, no-mood mood, without 
temperament or disposition, and this mood 
washes over will, drowning it, the self then 
having no inclination to act at all. In learned 
helplessness, the self's will to act is defeated 
by its actual environment. And the self learns 
that fact. In weatherlessness, the self's will is 
defeated by its own indifferent mood and 
a-disposed temperament (and the 
physiological, environmental, and cultural 
forces that create and sustain this mood and 
temperament). And the self expresses that fact. 
The result is the same - paralysis of action; 
however, the cause is different (and, therefore, 
any remedy also would be different). 
Manufactured consent, following 
Lippmann (who coined the term in his 1922 
Public Opinion) and Herman and Chomsky 
(who took it up in their 1968 Manufacturing 
Consent), is the idea that formally or 
outwardly democratic regimes can support 
themselves without any overt coercion by 
employing propaganda-functioning mass 
communications that create citizen consent. 
Here the roles of the media and manufactured 
consent in a democracy are viewed as 
functionally parallel to the roles of the 
military and violence in an old-fashioned 
dictatorial or openly authoritarian regime. 
Understood in a political context, both 
manufactured consent and weatherlessness 
are societal creations. However, in these two 
cases of manufacturing, both the immediate 
producers and the resulting product are very 
different. Manufactured consent produces just 
that - consent - through the work of 
profit-driven corporations and investors who 
utilize mass media, government agencies, and 
regulation of social interactions to serve their 
private interests. Weatherlessness, on the 
other hand, produces vapid spectatorship, 
non-engagement, and non-allegiance in 
politics as a result of an indifferent mood and 
a temperament lacking all disposition. 
Weatherlessness does not manufacture 
consent or dissent; it manufactures 
a-consent, even "sleeping through a 
revolution." 
And it may well be that we will have to 
repent in this generation. Not merely for the 
vitriolic words and the violent actions of the 
bad people, but for the appalling silence and 
indifference of the good people who sit 
around and say, "Wait on time." (King, Jr. 
1968) 
Yes, but weatherlessness is not a long 
marking of time, a waiting on time. It is not 
waiting, even long-game waiting; it is only 
sitting - paralysis without expectation or 
anticipation. 
Viewed it is clear that 
weatherlessness is fatal for democracy - for 
any government of, by, and for the people. The 
point is not simply that those who are 
weatherless do not participate. That is true at 
the individual level. However, at the social 
level, weatherlessness is not simply the death 
of some individual's will. Rather, 
weatherlessness in effect is the outsourcing of 
the will, a space that allows the creation of a 
people's surrogate will. In the End of the Road, 
for example, from the novel's start at 
Wicomico State Teachers College to its end en 
route to the Remobilization Farm, Jake does 
not really himself act at all- but only on the 
instruction of, only under the control of, the 
Doctor. Weatherlessness is a means to, and a 
mark of, authoritarian political regimes. 
Here is a natural history or genealogy of 
authoritarian politics in democratic disguise: 
At first, those who will not consent must be 
rendered unable to oppose effectively - the 
work of armies, jailers, and executioners; 
then, that opposition, frequently so difficult to 
control, must be remanufactured more 
efficiently into consent - the work of 
advertisers and marketers, mass media 
professionals, and private corporations; 
finally, consen_t, frequently unable to keep 
hidden the traces of its manufacture (and so 
remain effective), must be retooled as 
weatherlessness and its paralysis of 
inclination and action - the work of mood 
managers and temperament creators via one's 
physiology, environment, and culture 
(including one's self). 
Like all forms of government, democracy is 
moody (and I think it is very useful to think of 
democracy as a mood, affect, and 
temperament rather than merely a doctrine or 
set of practices). The mood of illiberal 
democracy - external trappings of democratic 
government adopted by anti-democratic ways 
of life is, at least in large part, 
weatherlessness. In such regimes, popular 
unrest, political protest, and social action are 
mood disorders. The Doctor's message to 
Jake, Donald Trump's message to Americans, 
Xi Jinping's message to the Chinese, Viktor 
Orban's message to Hungarians, Hitler's 
message to the Germans: Trust me. When 
Trump proclaims "Make America Great 
Again," he is not laying out any platform; ~e 
is expressing and strengthening, among his 
tribe, a mood. Mood blurs into temperament. 
Temperament separated from will is an abstraction 
and without motivation. Will separated from hope 
makes hope ineffective, mere wish. This hope is a 
mood. 
I close with three points about 
weatherlessness in political contexts. First, it 
is rarely aU-or-nothing. One can be, for 
example, weatherless with respect to a 
national election but deeply concerned and 
involved with local school board issues. This 
means that if one views weatherlessness as a 
mood blurring into a feeling, there may be 
little weatherlessness. One feels the school 
shooting is tragic, feels NRA funds in politics 
are obscene, or feels perplexed by the idea of 
schoolteachers carrying guns. But if 
weatherlessness is seen as a mood shading 
toward temperament, inclination, and 
disposition, then weatherlessness clearly .is 
widespread today in American society and I.n 
other traditionally liberal and democratic 
societies. One sees the televised school 
shooting, reads about dark money in politics, 
watches pictures of the rainforest set on fire to 
clear it, drives past extreme poverty and does 
nothing -rocking with Jake Horner in one's 
chair. This is paralysis - or its practical 
equivalent. Weatherlessness is not merel~ the 
paralysis of wish; it is also the paralysis of 
action. 
Second, how is this produced? Both 
psychologically and politically. James 
described brilliantly the physical process on 
the nerves - he called it an "economy of 
nerve-paths" - by which emotion slides in~o 
inattention and indifference. (This 
explanation captures many lives to date in the 
Trump Era - and while I appreciate the 
"economy" here, I resent the difficulty of 
keeping "perturbation" alive.) Emotions, 
James (1981 [1890]) wrote, "blunt themselves by 
repetition": 
The more we exercise ourselves at 
anything, the fewer muscles we employ ... 
The first time we saw [some stimulus] we 
could perhaps neither act nor think at all, 
and had no reaction but organic 
perturbation. The emotions of startled 
surprise, wonder, or curiosity were the 
result. Now we look on with absolutely no 
emotion (1089). 
Third, finally and importantly, 
weatherlessness has more indirect cultural 
causes as well as proximate 
emotional/ physiological causes. If every 
claim is met with a counter-claim, if every fact 
is suspected on the basis of alternative facts, if 
a commitment one day is not a commitment 
the next, if all news is fake according to 
someone, if science and its critics both are 
suspect, if many voices shout many messages 
equally loudly, if every claim is a lie, there 
may come to seem to be little reason to listen 
at all. Or, it may be impossible to hear 
anything at all but collective background 
noise. Indifference in mood and in practice, 
weatherlessness, can result from there really 
being no difference among all alternatives, 
but it also can result from situations in which 
it is impossible to judge differences, 
impossible to differentiate, impossible any 
longer to look on, as James put it, with any 
emotion or care. In such cases, Joe was right 
when he told Jake that pluralism and 
democracy take political and cultural, not just 
personal, hope and effort. Hope for that effort 
is hope for conditions for a more fully 
democratic mood. 
Suddenly everyone was run over by a 
truck (O'Donoghue 1971, 16). 
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What is going on in the affective sphere 
between the street musician and their audience 
on the street? It is more than a mix of visual and 
aural sensations of bodies in transit, bodies that 
are either working in, passing by or touring the 
place, and that are lured by an immediate, 
short-lived yet repetitive, sometimes makeshift 
musical performance. Reasons to perform on the 
street vary from managing precarity to making a 
public statement of an alternate politics of music 
and life, even to building confidence out of 
difference. But street performers' motives are 
beyond this short essay's focus . Here, I 
problematize the audience's obsession with 
visualization in their fleeting affective 
encounters with street music(ians) in Istanbul, 
Turkey. My role there as a researcher was to take 
account of moments of performance and record 
events, encounters, ruptures and flows 
surrounding those moments in Istanbul's street 
music scene between 2014 to 2016. 
One immediate note was that so many 
photos, videos and notes got posted on social 
media - not always with geotagging - of a 
performance that was found endearing or 
interesting or touching or just weird. From time 
to time, when interaction with musicians took 
place, it was with its twists and surprises: for 
example, think of the peculiar rhythm of when 
someone in the audience was getting too close to 
the performer without permission in order to 
take a picture without even having a word with 
them, treating the stage as dead as a sculpture. 
Or, when communication is much more relaxed 
between the band and a small group of 
onlookers who cheered to songs, danced, 
clapped and hung out with the performers: it 
turns out part of the audience knew some of the 
musicians, and so they shared an even ground-
sometimes they are among friends. Both of these 
situations hinted at a temporary - yet strong -
bond at the same level, but they contrasted in 
the sense that each flowed from an uneven end 
and met here on the shared street stage. 
Encountering such curious and sometin:tes 
sinister moments made me question how the 
affect worked there - or, to be more accurate, 
I approached this affective sphere even 
more carefully after having repeatedly observed 
that people who stopped to listen to the music 
took selfies at the scene and photos of the scene 
like in an enchanted reflex. I found it perplexing 
how space that was so open to influences from 
all over the place allowed listening, yet skipped 
hearing. Perhaps the need to make it visual 
comes up naturally by being there; then, does 
witnessing the auditory dimension command 
visual documentation? It seemed to me that 
international and local tourists alike strived to 
prove they're listening - was it a kind of duty? 
Was that act required to verify an abstract 
purchase (in an economy of experience), and 
functioned like a certificate of the fact that they 
had been affected by what they found there on 
the spot? Perhaps an act of appreciation is not 
quite distanced from an act of capturing the 
practice on camera? After all, I occasionally 
recorded these stages too, for my own purpose 
of documenting what happened there, even if 
my rhythm was different: I did not listen and hit 
the share button hastily to move on quickly with 
my route afterwards. Besides, the musician-body 
shares a similar obsession with the touring-body, 
that is to say, the want of visibility. When on the 
feeble, makeshift yet seamless stage that is built 
out of the street, band members habitually ask 
people to "take and share photos of their 
performance on Facebook" if they "like [the 
band] on Facebook." That would do them good. 
The online presence will presumably affirm and 
expand their struggle, a proto-business that is 
more in the form of a pursuit of art and life (or 
the other way around?). Does being visible equal 
appreciation and promotion? Does it secure that 
the musicians and the context of their song are 
being heard all right? Perhaps it is for the sake of 
being visible . What did it mean when the 
musician I ran into and asked for an interview 
repeatedly pointed me to visit their online 
presence so that I would send them a message 
online to check when they are downtown, 
playing, and then we could have a chat? 
This essay is an effort to come to terms 
with a gap between listening and hearing, 
between immobility and mobility, between 
"sonorization of images" that Virilio (2003) 
criticized, and getting immersed in soundscapes, 
a practice sound studies have spoken so fondly 
of (Schafer 1993, among many others). This is a 
gap full of affective bonds. What is the matter 
with affect when we recognize and problematize 
a rift between listening and hearing? Murray 
Schafer (1993), a pioneer of listening to one's 
environment actively, defended an active, almost 
biophilic listening: he went against the grain and 
suggested that dominant soundscapes of the 
urban and the industrial silenced the richness of 
life around us. It takes effort and patience to 
actively listen to one's environment, to its less 
visible components, thanks to an aggressive 
urbanization. However, for the audience in my 
case, listening in the city center remains a rather 
superficial act; if they listened to the sounds and 
music a la Schafer, they would not necessarily 
like what they heard; it would be too long, too 
detailed, and even noisy. That is why I present a 
twist between listening and hearing in this 
essay: hearing patiently where the music comes 
from and goes to is serious work that an 
audience member, who pauses to photograph 
street music, would not easily be willing to 
undertake. The passing audience member allows 
themselves to get affected by the sound and 
space in a peculiar way. Hearing sound and 
space would mean to let go of a touristic control 
in a sense; yet, people in the audience are 
selective when they take a selfie or choose to 
pause to listen to a certain sight for a while. It is 
not about patience, it is not about opening up 
and defending the sounds of an environment 
beneath an aggressive urban context. What 
touristic hearing does is socially reproductive. I 
pick up on this behavioral nuance thanks to their 
haste, their short span of attention, and, when 
they, as touring-bodies, do not engage in 
conversation out of curiosity about the 
mus1c1ans. On an interesting note, Marie 
Thompson (2017), who returns to Michel Serres' 
work on parasitism in order to write about the 
materiality of affect, suggests that noise is he?rd 
as a "generative force" (60): we do not listen to 
noise, we hear it; and in hearing its parasitic 
context, we find new information, new ground. 
Noise is "an affective, perturbing force" (ibid., 
60), and it becomes sound that allows a 
substantial communication between ends. When 
we hear stuff, we open; we are at a receiving end 
without having to be instrumental about taking 
something from the milieu for profit. We allow 
interruption; we are situated in a milieu that 
brings to us surprises along with what we 
receive. Thompson's argument confronts the 
average ears that the heard parasitic components 
can highlight relation and communication, and I 
realize the hearing component can be equally 
significant in thinking about street musicians' 
performance. However, when the passing 
audience member listens to the musicians for 
consuming a certain message inscribed on the 
fac;ade, the force of their songs and sounds 
becomes attenuated. In this essay, I want to take 
up the exercise of thinking about the audience's 
rhythms as they pause for the musicians who 
performed. 
The City 
In Politics of Affect, in a conversation with 
Joel McKim on Micropolitics, Massumi (2015, 59) 
talks about an "enacted past" running "active in 
the present." Regarding affective memory, 
Massumi argued that 
there is no such thing as starting from 
scratch. Everything re-begins, in a very 
crowded, overpopulated world. Even one 
body alone is prepopulated- by instincts, by 
inclinations, by teeming feelings and masses 
of memories, conscious and nonconscious, 
with all manner of shadings in between 
(2015, 51). 
Massumi reminds the reader that perceiving 
shock is elemental in understanding the 
workings of circulating affect. If the question is 
when and how a politics of something is born, 
then the thought of something is equally 
significant as the action in constituting the 
present, while that thought runs in the mass 
beyond its consciousness. When taking a selfie of 
a moment of musical performance found, 
listened to, and lost in the street is an affective 
act, the act begs to take us beyond the fac;ade, i.e. 
the listening fac;ade. I think that is how an 
"enacted past" will be observed "running active 
in the present." What brought the musician to 
that spot, and what brought the touring-body 
and the touring-ears there have a lot of personal 
reasons, of course; however, there are collective 
reasons to their encounter, too. There is a past 
that is not heard in such an act, and affect is one 
way how association can be formed between one 
body and the mass. Here, we are dealing with 
"microshocks" and their impact on us as 
"microperceptions"; and the latter is graspable 
as "something that is felt without registering 
consciously" (ibid., 53), with reference to 
Deleuze and Guattari. I recognize that the power 
of microperceptions speaks much to how the 
touring, listening, watching or musical body in 
the street swims in the material and immaterial 
currents of the street. So, such an active memory 
is alive in particular nodes and corners of a city, 
too; and yet, it sleepwalks as long as it circulates. 
In this sense, Istanbul's main public 
corridor, Istiklal Street, a touristic catch and a 
pedestrian street that opens up to Taksim Square 
next to a tiny public park with a much contested 
history that extends well beyond the local area, 
carries such nonlinear vibes to the present. 
Following a tide of youthful political protest in 
the Summer 2013 in Istanbul, the authoritarian 
response to it showed that the past is alive in the 
commercial and urban governmental ambitions 
to reshape the milieu of this square (see Dikec; 
2013; Hammond 2013; Hammond and Angell 
2013; among others, who noted that these 
ambitions very much circulated in the space). 
Then came 2014 and 2015, an intense period of 
elections and strife in the country. The protests 
had coincided with the fervent Arab Spring, and 
would touch Istanbul's already troubled mood; 
the latter, in the mood for elections, brought 
more of those complicated feelings about 
difference. According to Gene; (2016), the 
protests had incited a local generation of young 
artists' greater attention to the Taksim area, 
where tensions over an imperial reconfiguration 
of the site met with future-oriented concerns 
over what to make of this space. Yoriik (2013; 
2014) discussed how the liberating air from 
summer 2013 stirred a mobilized Kurdish 
politics in the country along with giving more 
space to other political discussions over rights 
and wrongs of religion, morality, sexuality, 
economy and so on. In my own field notes, I was 
able to record more relaxed and energized 
Kurdish voices next to Black Sea sounds and 
dances, joining musically to the space next to 
Turkish and Farsi songs, Balkan and klezmer 
tunes, or more exotic performances of, say, 
Korean dancers or vuvuzela performers, 
alongside the dances of the pride parades and 
political demonstrations. It was not surprising to 
have those all together; after all, this space was a 
massive tourist attraction. 
Meanwhile, businesses on the street 
noticed and responded to the flow of Arab 
tourists (see for instance, Tremblay's news report 
on it, 2016) along with a slow yet persistent 
inflow of refugees from Syria. Economic stress 
was also becoming a part of everyday, as 
business took off and shops closed. Now, new 
actors joined the rhythm of the place in their 
own ways; one, for displacement and escaping 
the conflict; the other, fulfilling the duties of a 
touring-citizen.· What is more, added to this 
pich1re was the 2014-2015 election frenzy in the 
country, which actually ended up creating a 
sense of mess, and pushing much of local youth 
away from this axis of the city. It was no longer 
fun, safe or interesting to be there in a 
cacophony. One day, one of my research 
participants would take me to an artists' cafe 
where many Middle Eastern (not necessarily 
Arab) musicians and youth were regulars; the 
next day, I would walk the Istiklal to hear a 
woman's random cry as she begged in Arabic in 
the middle of the pavement, next to the tram 
route. The male tourist who flew into the city 
from a country south of Turkey to get a "hair 
transplant" and took the family along for a 
vacation would perhaps understand the 
language, but did one need to know that 
language to "hear" the anguish and burden in 
her voice? Mind you, what is caricatured in the 
above character became a popular- i.e. selective 
Tutalar 
- image of a typical new tourist in the country 
since 2015 - and the image finds embodiment 
toward the right end in Photo 1 below, too, as he 
held out the selfie stick closely and ambitiously 
to capture the performance. One day I would 
find my way to a concert by a musician from 
Syria living in Istanbul, organized in the context 
of a festival to acknowledge her culture; another 
day, I would stand in the crowd and listen to a 
street concert, next to the typical new tourist 
holding a selfie stick attached to his phone 
camera, and usually surrounded by family on 
the trip. However, he was not the only figure 
who embraced the sounds with his camera as he 
toured; in that sense, many others in the 
audience repeated the act of "sonorization of 
images and all audio-visual icons," if I may 
build on Virilio's (2003, 69) phrase on the 
workings of global multimedia on works of art. 
The Musician 
I was curious if the musicians I talked to 
really liked this place, this mess, this flow and 
the rich attention it brought about. The city has 
showed up as a hub in global music production 
with world music tunes in the recent decades 
(Degirmenci 2010; 2013); and, even before the 
2000s, Istiklal Street was marked by sounds and 
sights of the musician as a transnational figure 
seeking new platforms: as early as 1990, Sun Ra 
had visited the city and played live on a truck 
touring Istiklal Street; his concert was apparently 
organized and video recorded by a music 
organization company in Istanbul still active in 
the sector (Kortun 2013). The jazz and 
experimental tunes of Sun Ra had met the street 
as a stage. When I learned about this visit in 
2016, after accidentally seeing a picture of it on 
the wall of a concert venue, I mainly thought 
about two things. First, this performance had 
already marked Istiklal Street as a stage, and 
regardless of whether musicians I talked to 
knew about this or not, it did not matter: it was 
already born as a stage, and it was constantly 
being (re)born as new bands, amateur and 
schooled musicians stopped by at its collective 
stage. If it did happen in the 1990s, in the wake 
of a stressful period of internal displacement and 
migration in the country, it was no surprise that 
it would happen now; the word would spread 
and it would attract more, alternative musical 
visits. While I am not making any inferences that 
this truck concert was what started it all, the fact 
that a concert organization company got 
involved in recording a performance that 
changed a lot in the soundscape of this street 
was striking enough. Second, I thought of 
whether and how mustoans ignored the 
audience circulating and flowing before their 
eyes, as I recalled listening to funky jazz tunes 
from an orchestra on a tram going back and 
forth on the street, which was part of a day of 
festivities organized by the local government. 
Sun Ra's orchestra had toured the same route; 
the resemblance was no surprise, given that this 
was the touristic corridor of the city. The 
transiency of the relationship between the 
performer and the audience was shocking, 
though. 
Taking note of a disconnect between 
street performers and audience, I am taken 
aback by how one of my early conversations 
with a street musician nailed it. Playing guitar 
and timbrel on his own on a night in October in 
the Galata area, near Istiklal, he told me that he 
was a travelling musician, originally from 
Greece. I had to stand on the sidewalk near him 
for a long bit before I was able to strike up the 
conversation. When he took a break from 
playing, I introduced myself. "You're not a 
musician, if you were, you wouldn't find it 
interesting. You would be like let's play, let's go," 
he situated me. "For a musician, it is [a] feeling; 
let's do it, let's play, come on [sort of feeling]," he 
added. It was noisy because the street was not 
closed to car traffic. In the really narrow street 
(see Photo 2), few people stopped to pay 
attention to the performance. At one time, I 
noticed that laborers across the street working 
on the construction of a store paid attention to 
him without coming closer. I asked him what he 
thought of people who "stopped and listened": 
"I visit [during] September-October-November 
every year. Doing this for four years, it is Ziilll~~ 
different than the last year. Last year, people 
Photo 1. Musicians performing in front of locals, tourists, street children. Ortakoy, Istanbul; 
August-September 2015. Photo by the author. 
Photo 2. Playing to a narrow street near Galata, October 2014. Photo by the author. 
were making music with me, joining. This year, 
it is silent. They just go by. [ ... ] Money is not 
important, sometimes they like your 'figure' so 
they give [you] money. I play in bars too. This is 
different [though], I want [random] people to 
join." He clearly desired the audience to 
participate; that came up again when I asked 
him to tell me more on what instruments meant 
to him: he explained that he used the timbrel to 
clue the audience into the rhythm and to help 
them join in. 
Other musicians may give different 
accounts of interactive music-making. A Turkish 
performer published his diaries chronicling the 
period when he made music in the street; he 
played Persian santur (dulcimer), which required 
him to avoid looking up or across to the 
audience. Anar (2018) mentioned being able to 
only look at people's shoes in front of him and 
not their faces as he played. This allowed him to 
avoid the audience in a sense, to play 
uninterrupted - unless by other means. It did 
not make a connection between musicians and 
performers impossible of course; perhaps, it 
simply hints at how the instrument imposes on 
genre, genre imposes on posture, posture 
imposes on the connection to the street. If 
someone in the audience wanted to get into a 
conversation with him, this would not stop the 
person. On the B-side of the narration, he tells of 
a time when someone who already worked 
elsewhere, say, in a public office, played with 
them on the street. This temporary band 
member wore sunglasses to go unrecognized, 
and simply did not feel like taking a share from 
the money donated by the audience (Anar 2018, 
172). In my notes and conversations, I recall 
instances of when someone in the audience 
could leave some money and take the change 
they wanted by picking coins from musician's 
instrument case/ donation box. Taking a picture 
or a video of such a public performance seems 
not to require permission. Taking a selfie with 
the musician during an ongoing performance is 
another story, though. Having witnessed such 
moments on Istiklal Street, as a random young 
woman jumped on the stage, got behind the 
performers as they played, asked her friend to 
take her picture with the band, not asking 
permission before or after, I asked the musician 
how they felt: "Just rude, but can you do 
anything?" was a common answer. I would get 
the feeling the musician wanted to disregard 
that instance. It is not like the listening-body 
changes their rhythm according to that of 
musician's; instead, it seems like they are 
interfering without being interfered with. How 
is that an affective moment? The flow of 
interaction in such an affective sphere reminds 
me of Kathleen Stewart's talk of "being in the 
mainstream" (2007, 51): being in tune without 
getting involved deeply in the tune (because that 
would alter you irreversibly). 
Unlike those who casually shoot a 
picture and keep going, children are welcome 
and not an interruption to performers. Many 
times, street musicians add that it is nice to get a 
response from children. It feels different. Bodily 
commotion, voice and informal interaction from 
kids dancing to their tunes, talking to the 
instruments and getting excited on the stage are 
all part of a child's affective involvement in the 
scene. This is not the same as the tourist who is 
hastily going for their camera and shooting with 
it. Above, in Photo 1 from Ortakoy, Istanbul, you 
can see working kids getting up close to the 
performers, placing chaplets on their heads and 
just hanging out around them. They are not 
street kids, but they are a regular part of the 
scene: working kids, who are supposedly sent 
there to sell those chaplets to the touristic crowd 
in this busy part of the city. They associated with 
the affective sphere as sharecroppers, not 
customers. 
Listening versus Hearing 
I'd like to end the essay with positioning 
touristic listening, which remains brief, on the go 
and on the surface, as opposed to situated 
hearing, which comes up to the fac;:ade in a 
constant struggle with tensions of the city and 
the place itself, and plays with an affective 
memory while surviving the place. The 
makeshift stage of the street is perfectly 
integrated in the economy of the city that relies 
on tourist inflow, which is indispensable for the 
municipality to make a profit, in the face of 
inherited tensions and practices from the past(s). 
To be fair, the street musician is also aware of the 
stage; otherwise they would not consider being 
there while their performance runs on selfies, 
donations and love/ attention coming from 
passers-by (stoppers-by). These are fundamental 
to their presence and performance. They are 
creating a performance to be watched as much 
as listened to in the street. They want to be seen, 
and they might honestly want to be seen for the 
sake of making a statement alongside the 
rhythm of capital on the street. Speaking of the 
street and its rhythms, Pasi Falk (1997, 181) 
conceived of the dynamic street as a platform for 
"serial looking," where touching is usually out 
of question. It should not be too intense to stop 
the flow. 
However, the kind of street I 
documented is quite tactile. There is a change in 
the rhythm of the place at the moment a 
performance hopes to turn strangers to (kind of) 
neighbors and sway them from "serial looking" 
into deliberate conversation. The musician 
welcomes this touch, too, even though it may 
fall short of a situated hearing. Meanwhile, the 
literature on encounter (Valentine 2008; 2013; 
Wilson 2017, among others), finds that 
"face-to-face encounter" can acknowledge 
tension and conflict. Being immersed in one's 
craft / art in the street is not a solitary act; the 
musician cannot escape the mess. Being on the 
street is a tool for "meeting between adversaries 
or opposing forces and thus a meeting 'in 
conflict' " stated Helen Wilson (2017). Based on 
that, we can state that we enter a strife with 
prejudice and "micro-publics" in the moment of 
encounter, according to Gill Valentine, utilizing 
Ash Amin's work. There are obvious gaps 
during an encounter; it is just that the encounter 
means a will to be open to be affected by that 
too. 
A gap between listening to the music and 
hearing the sound of it becomes relevant to 
understanding encounter in the street, as the 
tourist-body acts like immersed in the musical 
performance until the excitement of a selfie 
wears out. Sound studies scholars tell the 
difference of carefut active listening from just 
being exposed to sounds, and describe the 
former closer to what I take as situated hearing in 
this essay. Recalling Schafer, in his piece titled 
Open Ears, he simplified the gap to be between 
the developed, industrial world and the rest: 
"Sound objects in the oriental landscape 
encourage peripheral listening, while sounds in 
the West compete for focused attention- can this 
be true?" he asked (Schafer 2003, 18). In my 
understanding, hearing as an act is less than 
controllable; it is not a rationalized effort, 
whereas this fits into the frame of "deep 
listening" discussed by acoustic ecologists such 
as Schafer. In my case, the act of hearing is also 
more complicated than a situated contrast 
between the industrial urban and the rest in the 
countryside landscape. My motivation to 
distinguish listening from hearing so comes 
from bell hooks. In her autobiographical book, 
Wounds of Passion, there is a passage where she 
reminisces about her university experience in 
California, her encounters with class and ethnic 
differences. This passage might indicate a failure 
of hopeful encounter, but it also hints at how 
people can avoid being affected much by their 
surroundings, ·avoid hearing (the difference) 
when they are too busy affirming themselves. In 
hooks' words: 
When I speak everyone stops to listen but 
then no one hears. They are all white and 
they are all here to celebrate being female. 
They do not want to hear that the shared 
reality of femaleness does not mean an equal 
share in powerlessness. [ ... ]They listen to me 
but they don't hear. They don't have to hear. 
This is what it means to be among the 
colonizers, you do not have to listen to what 
the colonized have to say, especially if their 
ideas come from experience and not from 
books. They ask you if there is a book they 
can read that will explain what you are 
talking about (1997, 98). 
Listeners are indeed affected, but how? 
The story of encounter between street musicians 
and their audience becomes a visual moment 
that is disguised (and marketed) as a sonorous 
moment. In awkward interactive moments, the 
audience leans on the fact that the street, i.e. the 
musician's stage, is a visual dominion. The 
sound experience we get on the street is stuck in 
a visual experience when the audience fails to 
give in to hearing. It would still be a sonorized 
image that they are capturing, following Virilio's 
confrontation. It's the practice of a habit, which 
is quite different than nonconscious thought in 
Massumi's terms. Massumi warns that affect is 
not the same as "habit [which] has become a 
reflex, lost its adaptive power, its powers of 
variation, its force of futurity, that has ceased to 
be the slightest bit surprised by the world" 
(2015, 66). The street musician / performer may 
not primarily be concerned with such a reflex 
when they put themselves out to face the flow of 
the street: they attempt to change the flow as 
well as accept being changed by it; alas, what 
they have been witnessing lately is that reflex. 
Streets are always going to be porous and open 
to surprise - think about kids! - so being on the 
street is always helpful for being "in tune" with 
the affective sphere. When the habit of sonorized 
images may be taking over the affective sphere, 
the rhythm of the tourist-body is not the real 
trouble. We would need to be concerned why 
hearing what is not intentionally captured on 
cameras, selfies and ears is the challenge. 
Engaging in situated hearing is crucial in the 
sense that it will open up the street and let us 
trace what is "running active in the present." 
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Affect and Activism 
An Interview with Deborah Gould 
Deborah Gould is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of California, Santa Cruz 
(and Affiliated Faculty in Feminist Studies, History of Consciousness, and Politics). Her book 
Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP's Fight Against AIDS (University of Chicago Press, 2009) 
won the Distinguished Contribution to Scholarship Best Book Award from the American 
Sociological Association's Political Sociology Section (2010) and the Ruth Benedict Book Prize 
from the American Anthropological Association (2010). She is currently working on another 
book about political emotion, Composing Collectivities: Appetite, Encounters, and the Not-Yet of 
Politics. She was involved in ACT UP /Chicago for many years, and later in Queer to the Left, 
and was a founding member of the research/ art/ activism collaborative group, Feel Tank 
Chicago, most famous for its International Parades of the Politically Depressed. 
Brittany Frodge (BF): In the introduction to Moving Politics, you define affect as an unnamed 
force "bursting with potential" which suffers a reduction once it is labeled as an emotion. How 
can we harness the raw power of affect without subjecting it to potentially reductive linguistic 
labels? 
Deborah Gould (Gould): Your question touches on many things, it might be best to begin by 
saying something about how I understand the difference between affect and emotions, and the 
relationship between them. I'm drawing from Brian Massumi here who himself is drawing from 
Spinoza and Deleuze. They define affect as the capacity to affect and to be affected, so it has to 
do with a body's movement through a world of other bodies, all of which have the capacity to 
affect and to be affected. Following Spinoza, when a body is affected, its capacities are either 
augmented or diminished, and that change in capacity, however slight it may be, is felt, that is 
to say, it registers, not consciously but rather as a sensory experience of having been affected 
and thereby changed. An affected body prepares to respond - to affect in turn - and that 
response might go in any number of different directions, which is to say, the response is not 
predetermined. There is a lot going on in that relational experience of affecting and being 
affected and preparing to affect in turn. An emotion, according to Massumi, is a personalized 
expression or account of that experience, an approximation - using, for example, language, 
conventionalized meanings, gestures - of what the body has experienced in terms of that 
change in capacity, that transition which results from affecting and being affected and preparing 
to respond. 
To understand the relationship between affect and an emotion, it's helpful to think about 
how we try to make sense of a vague or barely perceptible bodily sensation or feeling . We pull 
from our storehouse of knowledge, from the prevailing ways of making sense of a feeling, from 
culturally available names and conventional labels for feeling· states, from habits and norms 
about feelings and their expression, and so on. That's what an emotion is, it's within a system of 
meaning and helps us make sense of what we're experiencing as we move through the world 
affecting and being affected by what we encounter. The less-than-fully conscious experience of 
being affected and sensing the accompanying change in bodily capacity, that is what is bursting 
with potential in the sense that there is nothing predetermined about what then will follow; 
given the bodily change in capacity, things could unfold in any number of different ways, even 
if things might tend to flow in a particular direction. An emotion - the personalized expression, 
through language and gesture, of that changed bodily state and all of the potential therein- is in 
that sense a reduction of an experience that really is more relational, multiple, and open-ended. 
The idea of affect bursting with potential is precisely what's interesting to me about 
affect as a concept. The notion of potentiality is a way to carve out conceptual space for the idea 
that any moment contains within it multiple possible unfurlings, meaning any moment holds 
within it multiple possibilities for something different to emerge, for the present and future to 
unfold differently than the past. The notion of potentiality points to the something else of each 
moment, to the fact that what gets actualized in social life is not all there is. And that's why it's 
important, conceptually and politically, to pay attention to affect. What doesn't get actualized is 
still there in potential, and in that sense is in the mix, exerting force, shaping social life. And 
because things always could have unfolded differently, and because things might unfold in any 
number of different ways in a situation we now might be facing, we need to tune into that 
moreness, that potentiality, if we care about how we might play a role in bringing about social 
change. 
To turn to the part of your question about harnessing what you call the raw power of 
affect without subjecting it to potentially reductive linguistic labels, I get why you say "the raw 
power" of affect, because it is a direct, and in that sense unmediated, experience of being affected 
and a body's capacity being changed, and so we might call that raw. But I'm a bit wary of that 
word because it seems to align affect with nature and the presocial. The way I see it, affect 
presupposes sociality. Affect is the capacity to affect and be affected, and thus has to do with 
contact, encounter, relation with other bodies. In that sense, affect is all about sociality, it's a 
body's way of processing the conditions it encounters, that it affects and that affect it. 
To address the part of your question about harnessing the power of affect before it is 
reduced through language, I would say that power, in general, operates in part by producing 
regularities, normativities, tendencies. In that light, cultivating an awareness of the potential of 
any moment, of any situation, developing an awareness of what else might be possible, of what 
might occur if we break out of those perhaps deeply grooved patterns of thought and action, in 
short, cultivating a sensibility that tunes in to the potentialities of any given moment, seems 
important for harnessing, as you say, the power of affect. 
BF: You also imply in the introduction that, while you were participating in ACT UP, you 
weren't aware how angry you and your fellow organizers were. Do you feel that, in revisiting 
this period of your life from an academic perspective and labeling the affects that structured 
your movement, something is lost? Is affect, in its extra-linguistic nature, impossible to truly 
capture in academic writing? 
Gould: I would probably need to look at how I wrote that. I don't remember saying we weren't 
aware of how angry we were. Maybe what I was saying is that being angry about the AIDS 
crisis was the "common sense" of the movement, it was hegemonic. In many ways, anger was 
the dominant emotion within what I would call our emotional habitus. And that meant that we 
were familiar with that anger toward state and society, we knew how to enact it and perform it, 
and in some ways, we thus knew how to feel it. Other affective states kind of fell by the 
wayside, or couldn't be acknowledged, and certainly did not have the same collectivized form. 
Anger, in contrast, was collectivized within ACT UP. 
So, I would say that something happened when I took the movement as my object of 
research. I had to defamiliarize and make strange what was my own common sense. To me, 
initially, it went without saying that lesbians, gay men, and eventually queers were furious 
about what was happening. But I began to see that that perspective was naturalizing anger. I 
needed to think more about the sources of anger, what prompted it, how did it come to be a 
given, something axiomatic, within lesbian and gay communities and even more so within ACT 
UP. That required me to defamiliarize the movement's and my own common sense, to take a 
step back. That's what turning something you participated in into your object of research allows 
you to do, you get to take some distance from it, and it becomes curious to you. Or at least, 
that's one way to approach it, as something to be curious about, to ask questions about: "Why 
were we so angry about a virus? About a medical issue?" I needed to historicize lesbians' and 
gay men's anger, to recognize that that feeling state came into being in a particular moment, it 
hadn't been there at the start of the epidemic but rather came into being under specific 
circumstances and took particular form and shape, and eventually spread widely throughout 
lesbian and gay communities, and became the common sense of ACT UP. To understand those 
processes and shifts over time required investigation and analysis; anger within lesbian and gay 
communities and within ACT UP was neither natural nor inevitable, so I needed to treat its 
existence and prominence as questions rather than as givens. 
Regarding the question about labeling affects, and coming to understand the affects that 
were in play after taking ACT UP as my object - is something lost, thereby? Is it possible to 
truly capture the extra-linguistic nature of affect in academic writing? These are great questions. 
We might say that a lot gets lost whenever we try to capture an historical event or moment in 
writing. You're pointing to certain things, you're emphasizing <;ertain things, you're ignoring 
other aspects, so it's an editing process, or better, an interpretive process. In illuminating 
something, something else gets obscured. And someone might say, "what about this aspect that 
you barely mention?" Suddenly a world opens, and you see things slightly differently; you 
might then need to revise your previous interpretation. What historical and social science 
writing ends up doing is giving us a particular take on something. It brings something perhaps 
inchoate and barely perceptible- like affect- into language, and it provides an interpretation, 
offering one way to understand something. The task in any kind of work like this is to try to 
make your interpretation compelling and persuasive to people, to substantiate your own 
interpretation in some way. But it will necessarily be a partial account with its specific analysis, 
of course. 
I think your question is also getting at something else, which is about how to convey 
affect, specifically, in academic work. To get at affect requires sensing, tuning in to, attuning to 
the transitions in bodily capacity and to the potentialities thereby generated, so one question is 
about that sort of attunement as a method, and a second question is the one you raise: can that 
be conveyed in academic work? I think it depends. I don't know that the standard ways of 
writing in the social sciences are great for conveying affect - and I come out of the social 
sciences, right? I have to say, the social sciences are not oriented towards great writing; in the 
humanities and in the arts, there is more freedom to try to be more performative or 
experimental in your writing, and that might allow for richer conveyances of affect. 
Gould: Yeah, there's a need to experiment with different ways of trying to convey affect. In 
Moving Politics, I begin with a "scene" and a long quote from David Wojnarowicz, who .died .of 
AIDS-related complications; he was an artist, a lot of his work came out of the AIDS ep1dem1c, 
and he was an AIDS activist. I felt like there was something about the way he put words 
together that had a speed, an intensity, a motion to it, and it seemed to convey some of the 
affects circulating in queer worlds, and within ACT UP, in that moment. Even if I'm ~ot able to 
write like that myself, I wanted to signal the ways in which a written work denves from 
affective states and can generate affective states as well. 
I think it'd be great, it would be liberating in many ways. And I really like a good 
argument, but that can be done in a way that is more creative. Experimenting more to try to 
enliven our writing more would be great. Would something be lost thereby, by bringing more 
affect into our work? I don't think so. Or I'm not too worried about that. So long as we 
recognize that academic work isn' t the only site for interpretations of the past and interventions 
in the present. 
Rory Baron (RB): I talk about this with a lot of my friends who are creative writing majors, and 
I'm not- I'm a thoroughly social science person- we talk a lot about the difficulties of trying to 
harness that affective writing within English or Creative Writing rather than a more 
argument-style type of writing. The structure's already there for you within a thesis-style 
writing, but within creative writing, you have to come up with that structure on your own. 
BF: Yeah, writing is so colonized by Western rationality. Alright, question three: In laying~o~u~t,ii~~ 
your usage of the emotional habitus, you describe it as a set of emotional labels, or an emotional 
pedagogy for group members to use, as well as a force which operates beneath conscious 
awareness. Can you talk more about how the emotional habitus provides labeling and 
pedagogy, but on an unconscious level? 
Gould: With the term emotional habitus (drawing from Bourdieu), I am pointing toward a social 
grouping's collective and only partly conscious emotional dispositions, that is, members' 
embodied, axiomatic inclinations toward certain feelings and ways of emoting. It operates at a 
nonconscious level by and large. I prefer nonconscious to unconscious because the word 
unconscious, as used in psychoanalytic theory, requires repression, whereas nonconscious 
denotes anything outside of conscious awareness. Now, of course, processes like disavowal or 
denial which push painful or traumatizing perceptions out of conscious awareness oftentimes 
are in play, but not always, and not only. That's why I prefer the word nonconscious. 
An emotional habitus is not consciously taken on and consciously used, but rather is 
something that works through us. By which I mean, it is produced and reproduced through a 
social group's emotional practices, and as a member of that social group engaging in and subject 
to such practices, it gets into you, suffuses you, becomes your "nature." What we experience 
and understand as our own nature, our human nature, is about this habitus shaping us, and 
disposing us towards particular actions. A habitus, as in a kind of disposition, an orientation, a 
kind of common sense, an axiomatic way of perceiving and being and acting, that's all 
happening largely outside of our conscious awareness. You're not thinking, oh, in order to be 
legible as an X, I need to walk in this way, and hold my body in this way, or talk in this way. It 
doesn't happen like that. It's more that we imbibe ways to be a proper X in a given field, 
through all of the ways that we look around ourselves and learn - that's what I mean by 
pedagogy; I'll return to that. 
In terms of an emotional habitus for, as you said, group members to use, that sounds 
slightly purposive, and voluntarist, and strategic. To be sure, that certainly happens. An 
example I discuss in Moving Politics is from very early on in ACT UP when AIDS activists 
wondered, "How do we turn grief into anger? How do we turn people's rage into action?" That 
was a form of strategic thinking around emotions. Activists do indeed sometimes try to 
cultivate in themselves and others what they think are the proper feelings for their activist 
goals. And that purposive "emotion work" helps to create the group's emotional habitus. But in 
using the term habitus, I'm trying to emphasize the more bodily and less-than-fully conscious 
dimensions of its forcefulness. 
Here's how I see an emotional habitus working. Operating beneath or to the side of 
conscious awareness, and instantiated through practices like enactments or intimations of 
feelings, and through statements about what is (non)normative regarding feelings and their 
expression, an emotional habitus provides members of a social grouping with an emotional 
disposition, with a sense of what to feel, with ways of figuring out, understanding, and naming 
what they are feeling, and with ways of then expressing those feelings . It is an emotional 
pedagogy in the sense that it offers a sort of template for what and how to feel under particular 
circumstances. It guides people's feeling and emoting by conferring on some feelings and 
modes of expression an axiomatic, natural quality and making other feeling states unintelligible 
within its terms and thus in a sense unfeelable and inexpressible. 
Arlie Hochschild's important notion of "feelings rules" speaks to these social and 
cultural dimensions of feeling and emoting. What I like about the habitus concept is that it 
allows us to see how such feeling rules or norms operate beneath conscious awareness. Indeed, 
an emotional habitus has force precisely because its bodily and axiomatic qualities obscure the 
social, conventional nature of feelings and generate the sense that what you are feeling is 
natural and individual, entirely your own. The habitus concept also allows us to grasp the 
bodily, nonconscious, affective processes through which we all are conscripted, unwittingly but 
willingly, into the social. 
the consciousness 
Gould: I do think it's possible to make what is nonconscious more conscious. I think that's a 
really good question. Psychoanalysis is a theory and method that uses talk therapy to make 
conscious what is unconscious; it is about trying to become more aware. Affect theorists such as 
Massumi talk about attending to the newness of every situation, being sensitive to its openness 
in the sense of remembering that nothing is predetermined and sensing that things could go in a 
number of different directions even if there may be a tendency for the present to unfold like the 
past. So, that sort of sensing and tuning in to the unactualized potentials of any situation, tuning 
in to and amplifying alternative responses, alternative capacities that have been potentiated by 
the unfolding of an event but that aren't yet being tapped into, that is a way to try to make more 
conscious what is happening at a nonconscious level. 
Something I've noticed in some contemporary activist contexts, some groups have 
what's called a - what is it? It's like a "feeling monitor," but there's a name for it and I can't 
remember what it is. Oh, it's a "vibe watcher," and sometimes that person will interrupt the 
whole meeting and say something like, "There's a lot of tension in the room right now." That 
may sound kind of new age-y, but really they're simply tuning in to the dynamics in the room, 
sensing that things are going awry or that the meeting has hit an impasse, they're feeling into 
the affects circulating in the space and interrupting a particular unfolding by drawing attention 
to what may be barely conscious but in the room even so, and exerting force. The way I 
understand it, the vibe watcher is paying attention to, trying to tune in to, the affects in the 
room, thereby opening up the possibility that the group might navigate internal dynamics and 
difficulties differently. That's an example of trying to tune in to the complex feeling states 
circulating in a scene of some sort, and trying to make them more conscious. And it's not that 
we can then navigate everything perfectly, but rather than allow them to take over and drive, 
it's about trying to develop more of a relation to the affective dimensions of activist scenes and 
use that greater awareness to hit pause: "Oh, something's happening here. Let's see if we can 
actually try to talk about it, think about it, and maybe approach things differently." 
Gould: Yeah, so the habitus concept as Bourdieu developed it ended up sounding very 
structural, almost deterministic, and very much about social reproduction. I don't really read 
him that way. I read him as thinking in terms of tendencies, probabilities, likelihoods, and I see 
him as recognizing that there's a shaping rather than determining quality to a habitus. So it's 
flexible in that sense. And I see it as flexible because a habitus gets reproduced- if differently-
through practices, human practices, human doings, through sociality, through the events of 
affecting and being affected by. All of those practices can cause a habitus to shift over time. In a 
way, Moving Politics is an ethnography of a shifting emotional habitus. It tries to account for an 
initial emotional habitus that shaped lesbians' and gay men's political horizons in very specific 
ways, their senses of political possibilities early in the AIDS epidemic, and then explores how 
that emotional habitus was transform~d in a manner that opened up different, more militant 
political horizons in lesbian and gay communities across the United States. I was interested in 
how that newer emotional habitus emerged and then was reproduced over time- how it took 
form, how it crystallized and solidified, and then why and how it too eventually was 
transformed, a transformation that contributed to the shrinking of ACT UP and the decline of 
many chapters nationwide. My point is that it's important to think about a habitus processually 
and historically. An emotional habitus comes into being under particular historical 
circumstances, or more precisely, through human practices that are shaped by and unfolding 
within particular circumstances, and as it solidifies and congeals and later may be transformed, 
all of that happens under very specific historical conditions. And, as I said earlier, I think all of 
those practices occur largely non-consciously. Which is not to s~y that there aren't conscious, 
purposive, strategic attempts by activists to alter an emotional habitus. But you can't simply say, 
"Okay, everyone! Be angry!" and then everyone suddenly is angry. It doesn't work that way. 
The task as a scholar is to track, through painstaking empirical research, the discursive, bodily, 
gestural, emotive practices that bring an emotional habitus into being, that stabilize and 
reproduce it over time, and that sometimes transform it as well. The political dimension of this 
scholarly pursuit is that it's helpful for us as activists to think about those practices and about 
the ways that a resulting emotional habitus shapes political collectivities, their political 
horizons, and their political doings. 
RB: You discuss the role that affect has in political and activist movements at several points in 
your book, especially in your observations about ACT UP's utilization of negative affects. In 
contemporary movements such as Black Lives Matter, there's also this use of affect both positive 
and negative, and we can see this in other movements like Water is Life, in the Standing Rock 
movement, and MeToo- being probably one of the most recent of these - and the very titles of 
these movements are based on affective responses to the hegemony. And you know, Black Lives 
Matter uses both positive and negative affects in phrases like, "Stop killing us!" "I can't 
breathe!" so in that sense it's similar to what ACT UP does. But in the case of BLM, the title itself 
refers to a positive affect. Do you feel that positive affects can survive generationally as a 
strategy the way the negative affects in social movements have? 
Gould: I'rr: not sure I'm fully grasping your question, but what you're saying about positive 
and ,negahve affect a~d social movements makes me want to say that movements, even if 
they re ~ot a~are _of 1t, .engage in affective politics in the sense that they often attune to the 
a~ects Clrculatmg m a pven co~text and, often not consciously, engage in practices that try to 
bnng out some. of the potenhal of the moment. Consider, for example, the Black Power 
m~vement and _1ts s~~~ol of the raised fist . That symbol consorts with positive affects like 
pnde, black pnde: JOmmg t~~t feeling t~ power and political militancy; the Black Power 
m?:ement tapped mto that m1htant potential. That raised fist is a symbol, tethered to pride and 
m1htancy, that h.as endured, and it has migrated: to women's and gay liberation movements, for 
example. Sometimes mov~ments try to reckon with the hard, negative affects- the bad feelings 
that_ people can have - trymg to transform those into either more positive feelings or activating 
feelmgs or whatev_er. C~ns1der t~e women's movement; consciousness-raising groups in some 
ways wer: reck?nmg w1th t~e depression that some women were feeling given life in a male 
supremae1st s_oClety. De~'ressw~ can be a .very individualizing feeling where the person feeling 
depr:ssed n:1ght say, T~ere ,~ somethmg wrong with me." Consciousness-raising groups 
pro~1ded a d~~erent narra_hve: No, ~h:re's nothing wrong with you, and you're not depressed, 
you_ re angry. That _consClou_sness-rmsmg work was emotion work. It transformed people from 
f~elm~ depressed mto fe~hng angry, allowing women to collectivize, and the women's 
hberatlon movement was m some ways born within and out of that process of emotional 
So, movements engage in emotion work; not necessarily consciously and strategically 
and purposefully, but sometimes they do, in order to produce the "right" kinds of feeling states 
to activate people. In my experience, the left sometimes prohibits certain feeling states. I write 
about despair at the end of Moving Politics, how there wasn't much space for it in the 
movement. And that's true in many left contexts. You're supposed to feel hopeful, and you're 
supposed to feel angry about all of the social injustice - this is kind of the pedagogy or 
emotional habitus of the left, you know- feel angry, and enraged by what's going on, and feel 
hopeful that through our collective action, we can and will change the world. And if you feel 
despair, well, there's not a lot of space for that. But come on, it's a really important negative 
affect. And there's a lot to feel despair about. So, in that chapter in Moving Politics about despair, 
I was trying to think about what it would have been like if, rather than disallowing despair, the 
movement had carved out some space for us to experience that despair collectively. Because the 
imperative was to be angry, and to continue to be hopeful that we would save our friends' and 
comrades' lives, and our communities. So, when people began to feel despair -this was before 
the invention of protease inhibitors, so people were feeling despair about the never-ending 
deaths, and about our inability to actually do what we said we were going to do which was save 
people's lives and bring social change - there was no collective space created for that bad 
feeling. So what ended up happening is people who started to feel despair would just kind of 
slink away from the movement, especially as the refrain in the movement increasingly became, 
"Where's your anger? Where's your anger?" And at a certain point, some people just felt 
despair. 
Many bad feelings are political. Disappointment is a deeply political feeling, and if the 
left was able to reckon with it, and politicize it, and collectivize it, we might be able to address 
that feeling and thereby mobilize people. I don't want to sound so instrumentalizing, as if we 
even could instrumentalize people's feelings for the purposes of social change, but my point is 
that those feelings are out there, and if we ignore them, if we don't create a space for them, or if 
we simply hector people into not feeling them, telling them, "No, don't feel despair, you've got 
to feel angry," then we're not really dealing with reality. And there's a lot of political potential in 
those bad feelings. 
RB: Yeah, so I'm thinking about how despair is highly discouraged, and you're only supposed 
to feel anger and hopefulness- that kind of ties into purity politics, and it drives a lot of people 
away. I think we live in a very apathetic time right now, and I think that these kinds of trends 
have kind of contributed to that. Do you think there's any way to utilize affect as a way to kind 
of collectivize, as you say, and kind of transform these apathies into despair, or as a collective 
kind of emotion that moves us forward into political action? 
Gould: So apathy implies not caring about what's going on, and I would rather understand 
what gets called apathy through what people's behavior actually is, which is political 
withdrawal; in multiple ways, people have withdrawn from political life. To call it apathy 
presumes to know that people are withdrawing because they don't care very much about 
what's going on, but we actually don't know whether people care or not. My hunch is that 
people actually do care deeply about what's going on around them, and so the question is, why 
..... then have they withdrawn? Why do people withdraw from the political? And I think that's 
really complex. Sometimes it has to do with the ineloquence o~ the political, by which I mean 
the way in which the political doesn't speak to them, doesn't address them, doesn't 
acknowledge people's needs, and desires, and aspirations, and pain, and difficulties. To the 
contrary, elected leaders, politicians, say things like, "the recession is over," and "the economy's 
booming." So then, if you're not booming, it must be your fault. What I'm saying is that the 
political repeatedly fails to address people where people are at in terms of their needs and 
wants, and so on. So then, I wouldn't call it apathy; what we see around us is political 
withdrawal, and that raises all kinds of questions as to why. I think that what we were talking 
about earlier- about tuning in to feelings- can help us, because if people feel disappointed by 
the political, if they feel dismissed by the political, if they feel unaddressed by the political, 
those are feeling states that if we tune in and attend to them, we can say to ourselves, well what 
kind of a political context do we need to build that actually listens to what many people are 
feeling, and that cares about people's disappointments, and despairs, and furies, and so on? 
Turning towards affect is in some ways just attuning to what's already there, which is that 
people are affected by whatever is going on around them, and if we're going to try to 
collectivize, we need to be really attuned to what people are affected by, and what that then 
makes them do or not do. And the idea of potentiality, the notion that things could go in this 
direction, or this direction, or this direction, and that the direction things will go is not 
predetermined, that is suggestive of the need to really try to tune in to the affects that are 
circulating, because in that attunement we might gain a more adequate grasp of what's going 
on, and that might allow us to push some of that potentiality in a good direction, in a direction 
that would, for example, bring about greater social change in the form of, say, greater freedom 
and a more just and equal distribution of resources. 
Gould: Yeah! And of course all movements -whether from the right, or the left, or the middle-
are trying to build some sort of a collectivity, and they're trying to intervene in some kind of 
way, and all of them are trafficking in affect. And of course the state works to produce all kinds 
of affective states like fear and anxiety that help to control populations. They may not be doing 
that purposively, or they may be doing that purposively, that's a question to be investigated, but 
my point is that we can't think politics without thinking affect, whether the politics is 
happening on the left, or the right, or the middle, or from the state, or from the people, from 
diFferent groupings of the people. Affect sa turates the political. 
RB: Yeah, I agree. So related to the last question, the neoliberal hegemony has caught on, in a 
sense, and I don't know if "appropriated affect" is a good term-
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RB: -yeah, as a method of manipulation in order to sell the hegemony. Seemingly "activist" 
organizations and movements such as "It Gets Better" is a good example of this, because they're 
kind of pushing a more capitalist, normative framework. Do you think that affect can be used to 
combat affect- and we've kind of touched upon this already- does it open up political horizons 
that were previously cut off? Do you think leftist activism can ever successfully use affect as a 
way to move on the offense rather than perpetually being on the defense? 
Gould: Yeah, I think so. What your question gets at is the way the state uses affect to control 
populations, to maintain the status quo, to continue the project of profit-making and staying in 
power. And movements are constantly lassoing affect, consciously or not, to oppose things, or to 
pursue their own agenda. I don't know that it's affect alone that would allow the left to go on 
the offensive rather than be always on the defensive. That requires organizing, building 
movements. There are already many movements, so it's about figuring out how to amplify 
those, how to have cross-fertilization among them, and affect obviously is in the mix there. 
Figuring out how to amplify solidarities, how to create the conditions for people to touch across 
difference and feel okay about that, and to desire that, how to create the conditions in which 
people feel they can survive in their daily lives while being activists as well. All of those are 
things that we need to figure out. Once again, I' ll just say that affect is in the mix there . You 
can't think about these kinds of questions of organization and of solidarity and 
movement-building without thinking about affect and emotion. 
RB: A question regarding your most recent book project- the "Not-Yet" of politics- how do we 
decide what's possible? What do you envision as the next step for leftist activism? 
Gould: I'm not sure about the second part of your question, about what I envision as the next 
step; my talk this afternoon is in some ways about not knowing what is to be done, and about 
inhabiting that unknowingness in a manner that allows us to act even so. But regarding the 
question of how do we decide what's possible. The word "decide" makes it seem like there are 
several options and we decide which one, or that we can simply sit down and consciously 
decide what's possible. And of course activists do sit around and ask, "Okay, what can we 
achieve here? What do we want to try to do?" But senses of possibility and impossibility, I 
think, are deeply political, as your question suggests, and movements need to be concerned 
about where senses of possibility, and perhaps more importantly, senses of impossibility, come 
from. We can't say in an abstract sense, or in a transhistorical sense, where a sense of possibility 
comes from or how we decide what's possible or not. But again, from a political perspective, it's 
important to be thinking about that question: where do senses of possibility come from? How do 
they emerge and take hold, and then sometimes change over time? Sometimes it's an external 
event that challenges our sense of possibility. Maybe you see what happened in Cairo, people 
occupying a public square and collectivizing themselves and challenging state authority and in 
fact bringing down a 30-year dictatorship, and you say, "We could try to do that too." You see 
what happened in West Virginia with teachers going on strike and winning, and you're in 
Oklahoma, and you say, "Maybe we could go on strike too." And so in thinking about this 
question of senses of possibility, we should note that we give one another senses of possibility. 
We also oftentimes destroy one another's senses of possibility by saying, "That's not realistic, 
that's not going to happen, that won't work." It's useful to attune to those tonalities, to those 
forms of knowingness, it gives us a sense of how we participate in creating particular senses of 
possibility and impossibility. Attuning to that is really important, I think. Which is all to say, I 
like the sentiment of your question a lot! And I think it's important to have an orientation 
towards creating senses of possibility. But of course, if we think about that question of what's 
possible only in terms of what's achievable, that can truncate our political horizons. We need to 
think about the seemingly impossible if we want to bring it into being. If we only allow 
ourselves to think about the achievable, we never think beyond what is; what is tells us what's 
achievable, and it thereby limits what's achievable, so we have to think beyond that, otherwise 
we can get stuck. In any event, this question of senses of possibility and impossibility is a very 
important question. 
Gould: Yeah, I mean, as I said, I don't have a blueprint [laughter]. But yes, I think we need to 
attune to despair and other bad feelings, and not deny them by demanding we all be hopeful 
and angry, you know, "Don't mourn, organize," as they used to say, or "Turn your grief into 
anger," or "Turn your despair into rage," or whatever. You can't command feelings into being. 
To harness our despair would require acknowledging it and trying to see its political sources, 
and then trying to lasso it, I suppose. During the Bush years - the Bush II years - and the 
beginnings of the (second) Iraq war, there was a group that formed that I was a part of called 
Feel Tank Chicago; it's a feel tank as opposed to a think tank, a group of artists, activists, and 
academics who are interested in the role that feelings play in public life. We held international 
parades of the politically depressed as a way to try to politicize our bad feelings, our political 
depression and despair. Politicize, collectivize, and put it out there into the world. There was so 
much response. We made t-shirts that said, "Depressed?" on the front, and "It might be 
political," on the back, and people either were confused or their faces just beamed with 
recognition. The shirt spoke to them, it's like we were saying, "We feel you." People's reaction 
of almost relief at being seen and felt really impressed upon me how important it is to politicize 
and collectivize these bad feeling states, because they're out there, and they often do have 
political sources, but they can be quite individualizing and defeating, leading people to 
withdraw from political engagement. · 
Gould: Yeah, it is. Well, regarding despair, you're right, it is widespread, and I think it's often 
individualized, and people just kind of throw up their hands. It's in activist scenes where, rather 
than throwing up our hands about how awful everything is, we typically try to figure out what 
to do. So, how appropriate in activist scenes to try to figure out what to do with that widespread 
despair! We do indeed need to tune in to the affective states that are widely circulating, and 
consider their sources, contours, and how they affect the composing, and decomposing, of 
collectivities. So, yes, despair does play a role outside of activist circles, and in some ways, that's 
precisely the audience for activist circles. 
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Ferrington, Hechler, and Parsons 
Jan~ell Parso~s (JP): ~he ~irst question we wanted to ask you, because we know you'll be 
~alkmg_a~out_1mme~wt10~ m your talk tomorrow, is how are you thinking about this notion of 
ur~medwtlon m re~atlonsh1p to affect? Or, maybe put another way, how did thinking about affect 
brmg you to wantmg to theorize a notion of immediation? 
Brian Massumi (Massumi): The two concerns came at the same time. My original interest in 
affect didn't separate affect out. It was enfolded with a number of issues, forming a kind of 
complex. That is why I was surprised when the term "affect theory" started being used and I 
found myself categorized as an affect theorist. It made no sense to me to approach it in 
separation, since it is a dimension of every event. What I was after, more than a theory of affect, 
was a philosophy of the event. In Parables for the Virtual, I approached the event through the 
question of movement, understood not as a simple displacement in space but as qualitative 
transformation. Affect was a way of getting at the qualitative registering, in the event, of change 
taking place. Affect comes flush with the event, in the immediacy of its occurring. But the 
registering wouldn't be of a transformation if there were not, wrapped in the affect, a sense of 
the state just left, as well as a sense of the shift in potential left for subsequent events to come. So 
immediacy couldn't be reduced to the present, figured in the traditional way as a width-less 
point of the present. It is, as William James said, a "saddle." It shades off in both directions into 
abstract, or non-present, dimensions of experience: the immediate past that is already no longer, 
and the future of potential that is not yet. I tried to address that inclusion of the abstract in the 
concreteness of experience through the concept of the virtual, highlighting the paradoxical 
question of how it is that the virtual - that which is real but abstract- might be actually felt. 
That question has stayed with me throughout my work, and became especially central in 
Semblance and Event, where I start turning to the concept of immediation in earnest. The 
question of immediation is: are there practices for making the potential dimension of affect 
more felt? This would amount to an intensification of experience, highlighting its changefulness. 
It requires practices of the event which take potential as their object. Which means, practices 
which take relation as their object, because potential, as the power to affect, is by definition 
relational. Changefulness, potential, relation: the question of immediation is immediately 
political. 
This is the terrain that the research-creation lab I have worked with since 2004 has 
explored. The SenseLab started from the question of what makes an event, and moved explicitly 
toward the question of immediation, which became the concern of a years-long collective 
project, some of the results of which will be presented soon in two collective volumes of the 
SenseLab's Immediations book series at Open Humanities Press. My thinking about immediation 
has been entirely bound up with the collective practice of the Sense Lab. 
JP: So, I think since you're talking about the SenseLab here, that maybe leads to the next 
question. We've been reading your The Power at the End of the Economy, but all of your wo~k 
seems to challenge the Cartesian rational / affective binaries we are so used to. You return agam 
and again to a need to rethink "the very concept of the rational in its relation to affect" (2). 
Could you talk for a minute about why we continue to cling to that division and what it might 
take for us to begin to move past it? To understand the rational and the affective as intertwined? 
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Massumi: The trick is to overcome the Cartesian dichotomy without throwing out the ability to 
make distinctions. Affirming one side of the dichotomy over the other just reproduces it, except 
with half of it under erasure. That makes it difficult, if not impossible, to give an account of the 
aspects of reality the suppressed term was trying to make thinkable. The tendency is then for 
the pendulum to swing back, to recover what can no longer be accounted for. The result is a 
sterile oscillation. The question is never "either-or." It is always a question of co-occurrence. In 
what distribution? With what concurrences or inferences? How does the one implicate the 
other? Can one become the other? If one can become the other, can they be construed as degrees 
on the same continuum? What kind of events contain both in germ, and how and why do they 
diverge from that embryonic coming-together? The capacity to diverge requires that we 
maintain distinctions, even that troubling Cartesian distinction between the mental and the 
physical. However, the co-occurrence, co-implication, and reciprocal becoming requires that we 
refrain from rigidifying the distinction into a dichotomy, or only operate with that distinction. 
What is needed is what I call a logic of differential mutual inclusion: a kind of monism of the 
multiple that studies how distinctions, any number of distinctions, and a proliferating count of 
them, come differently together. Philosophy is the art of making and multiplying distinctions. 
Nothing is thrown out, not even the bugbear of the rational. 
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What rational thought does when it strives to separate itself from affect is to judge as if it 
could stand aside from events and from that neutral vantage. point assess the best course of 
action based on the most complete understanding of order and causality it can arrive at. This 
conveniently brackets its constitutive co-implication with affect. As Hume argued, reason can 
rationalize many things, but its own exercise is not one of them: it can give no ultimate reason 1 
........ ~--.~-"' 
why reason is better. That is why its use is so often the object of passionate exhortation. It has to 
1 ~ ......... -t 
overpower the passions - in effect, make itself prime among them. Reason, then, is a passion. 
The preachy, overbearing affective tone of contemporary champions of rationality, such as r cEIUNG 
Richard Dawkins, says as much. But it is not only its birth that is affectively inflected, but also ~~:1~~M 
its end. Hume also pointed out that reason has nothing in its own operation that can tell it when 
to stop. It has a stopping problem, not unlike the halting problem in computer programming. 
NT PORCH (6' WID 
There might always be a key consideration or bit of information that was missed but could well 
prove crucial. Reason is, in fact, the functional equivalent of doubt. Its ruminations, endless by RST FLOOR 
right, can only be cut off by taking an affectively propelled leap into action at what is felt to be 
the propitious moment. This is an act of intuition. Affect is belief in the world- a noncognitve, -----
embodied belief in the world's potential, directly felt, and no sooner felt than acted-upon. =-=--= 
Without the corrective of doubt, affectively propelled action will often go awry. But without 
belief in the world, action is impossible. We are always plunging headlong into events, affect as 
the leading edge. 
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In The Power at the End of Economy I develop a number of vocabularies to talk about the 
differential mutual inclusion of rationality and affect in the event, specifically as it relates to 
economic thinking. The key is to understand that thought is not all on the side of reason, 
making affect simply irrational or unthinking. I build on Peirce's concepts of perceptual 
judgment and abduction, which are modes of hypothetical thought that come flush with the 
event, enveloped in affect. Affect has what Whitehead would call a "mental pole" to its 
operation. By this he means the capacity to "prehend" novelty, or inHume's terms, to exceed the 
given. This is what affect, as the feeling of capacitation and potential, contributes. Affect is not 
the opposite of thought. It is the movement of thought. It is the force of thought, embodied. It 
comes before conscious rumination, alimenting it with the direct perceptual judgments that hit 
like fate in the incipience of every event, but already with a felt sense of potential alternatives. 
In this aspect, it carries a force of what I call in The Power at the End of the Economy, borrowing 
from the linguist Oswald Ducrot, presupposition. Enveloped in the affect of every dawning 
event is a presuppositional field, proposing action. This is a lived thinking of importance, of 
situational constraint and enablement. But affect's force of thought also comes at the end, 
pressing beyond the given into the future, in the form of abductive leaps into a hypothetical 
course of action whose importance has yet to play out. In this aspect, it constitutes an enactive 
speculation. Affect, throughout, is what I call a "thinking-feeling." It is in no way the opposite or 
the absence of thought. It is in fact rationality that is a limited expression of the power of 
thought, of which affect is the impetus and leading edge. Affect and rationality are differentially 
mutually included on the continuum of thought- which is coextensive with the continuum of 
feeling. It is often where conscious rumination is silenced that thought is most effective. Many 
performers, in art and sport, speak of the need to silence the "ir:mer monologue" and refrain 
from "overthinking," to make their thinking coincide with their movements, rather than direct 
them. 
In what I just said, the added distinctions of thought and feeling were added to situate 
the way in which rationality and affect come together, in their difference. These added 
distinctions are not there to eliminate or subsume the distinction between rationality and affect, 
but to carry their difference. 
JP: So kind of continuing along in this vein of these binaries and breaking them down and 
thinking about them in relationship to each other, how do you think about affect in relationship 
to language? So for example, if we want to recenter the event, rather than bodies and subjects as 
I think you said to start, in our scholarship, how do we capture those affective intensities of the 
event via language? Can they be captured linguistically? Should we be capturing them 
linguistically? 
Massumi: That's a really central question . I don't think affect can be captured by language. I 
don't think it can be captured by anything without a remainder. There's always something that 
escapes because affect has to do with potential and potential can't all actualize at one time. That 
is the meaning of my widely misunderstood term, "the autonomy of affect." Affect is not 
autonomous from thought, or from language, in the sense of being separated from them or in 
opposition to them. The point of the concept is that whatever the formation you are talking 
about, affect will pre-infuse it with importance at the incipient levet and carry over a surplus of 
potential at the end of the exercise of whatever mode of activity the formation's operations are 
dedicated to. This surplus-over, remaindered at each pulse of process, for more to come, is the 
autonomy of affect. 
Specifically in relation to language, this means that there is an unabsorbed remainder of 
meaning left over after the statement is said and done. This is meaning that has yet to come to 
determinate expression, so it is, strictly speaking nonsense. But is not nonsense simply as the 
opposite of sense. It is nonsense as a surplus of sense, brewing with meanings to come. It is 
what Guattari, following Hjelmslev, sometimes calls "purport"- pure matter of meaning, as yet 
syntactically and semantically unformed, but already pragmatically preaccelerated. The purport 
narrows down toward determinate expression as the event of expression begins to take force. It 
forms, for the coming expression, a presuppositional field of the kind I was just talking about. 
Another word for that field is a "proposition." A proposition, according to Whitehead, 
cannot be reduced to its linguistic content. To do so, he says, is the fundamental error of logic. A 
proposition is a pattern of contrasts delineating alternative courses of the universe, embedded 
in a certain juncture of history. He puts it in those terms to prevent us from saying "alternative 
choices." For, he says, "the proposition awaits its subject." The subject of the statement is 
emergent from the playing out of the expression. It is emergent and occurrent. This asignifying, 
asubjective dimension of this primary phase of an event where the matter of meaning begins to 
narrow down toward a determinate issue is not in language. It is in the world, immanent to the 
act of language. It is what comes to expression through language. "Prelinguistic" would be a bad 
terminological choice for this . It is more "prolinguistic": toward language, in an anticipatory 
dimension that is immanent to its exercise, but cannot be reduced to its structure and 
signification. In What Animals Teach Us About Politics, I argue that animal play sets in place the 
conditions for language at this level, even where language as such is absent. "lnfralinguistic" is 
in fact a better word than "prolinguistic" for that dimension. And that dimension is affect. Affect 
cannot be divorced from language, even where language is absent. It is infralinguistic. Its 
relation to language has the paradoxical status I talk about in relation to the capitalist field in 
The Principle of Unrest and 99 Th eses for the Revaluation of Value of the "immanent outside": of it, 
but in it. It makes no more sense to say that an act of expression is outside language as it does to 
say that we can stand outside capitalism. There is no outside of either, in the spatialized sense of 
an external realm over against an interior realm. This in no way means that everything is "in" 
(capitalism, language). It's a question of modes and degrees of inclusion, anticipatorily and in 
fulfilment. In other words, as is always the case with affect, it is a question of potential and its 
playing out. 
How can language capture modes of affective intensity? The more it tries to capture 
them, the more they slip away, following the prerogatives of the autonomy of affect. 
Significations and propositions in the conventional logical sense try to capture affective 
intensity, and fail. It is always already elsewhere before the last "i" is dotted. What language can 
do is carry affective intensities. Language can make its movement coincide with the force of 
thought moving through affect. It can create openings for the autonomy of affect to lead it, 
rather than trying to subsume affect under its own structure and enclose it in its semantic 
content. It can follow affective movements as tensors of meaning in their dynamic making. The 
structure of language, and its formal propositions, are then catalysts for the self-expression of 
affect, rather than its overlord. The affective force of language moves across words, carried in 
their rhythm. When you feel that the meaning is as much in the gaps between the words as in 
the words themselves, and that it continues virtually after the words have ended, in the 
linguistic equivalent of one those optical illusions when you turn your eye from an image and 
you see virtual movement spin off from it, then you are feeling the affective force of language. 
We tend to call expressions that make that force felt "poetic," regardless of their genre. That's just 
the word we reach for when language is outdoing itself affectively. A good philosophical text is 
"poetic" in this way, however far it is from poetry as such. It carries a conceptually complex 
movement of thought that wants nothing more than to keep generating more concepts, beyond 
where the author stopped. A text carrying affective intensity is a generative text. From the 
autonomy of affect it inherits the surplus-value of always having more to say than it knew how 
to say- forcing a continuation in the same vein of thought. 
Jacob Ferrington (JF): Thinking about a field of potentiality as kind of collapsing into a decision, 
and the lived experience of somebody making a decision ~nd sort of rationalizing or 
cognitively / linguistically accounting for their decisions, how does that play into this discussion 
of this mutually constitutive affect and cognition that it seems like you're getting to? 
Massumi: Subjects don't make decisions- events make decisions. What we call the subject is an 
outcome of decision. We retrospectively own decisions. Whitehead says that decision should be 
taken in its etymological sense of "to cut." Decision is in the world, it's in the way the world's 
activity parses itself. It's in the way in which self-affirming modes of activity - tendencies, in a 
word- interfere and resonate with others toward a complex playing out that ends in a crossing 
from one threshold of consistency and co-composition to another. Decision is the cut, the cusp, 
of an emergent composition of forces. Whitehead also says that it is the exception, not the rule, 
when this happens at the conscious level of cogitation and reflection. Consciousness, he says, is 
the "acme of experience," underwritten by nonconscious levels of experience shrouded in the 
incipiency of thought and action. Consciousness follows the playing-out of those levels as they 
peak into an emergent composition of forces- taking "follow" both in the sense of coming after 
and in the sense of being in the wake of. The nonconscious level is replete with activity, of the 
propositional or presuppositional kind I was talking about before. It's the realm of what I call 
"bare activity" (an as yet asignifying, nonsubject-bound incipient working-out). 
One of the things that happens at that level is "priming": the modulation of action by 
nonconsciously registered cues falling in the gaps of consciousness, which, again quoting 
Whitehead, is not continuous, but rather continuously "flickers." The importance of priming is 
that it forbids any notion of "raw experience." Words can prime nonconsciously. In other words, 
"higher functions," the results of learned behavior of great complexity, fold back into bare 
activity through priming. I spend a great deal of time in The Power at the End of the Economy and 
Ontopower developing the concept of priming and talking about the implications of it. In 
Parables I approached it under the rubric of the "feedback of higher forms." The point is that the 
so-called "lower" levels of forming experience are no less complex - in fact, they are in many 
respects more complex - than the "higher," conscious levels. And that although experience at 
that level is not accessible to sovereign, conscious decision, it is open to modulation, and there 
are techniques for that modulation. This suggests alternative modes of affect-based politics. The 
status of rationality must be resituated in this context. Rationality is one modulatory technique 
feeding back into bare activity among others. It is by no means the only one or, in our period, 
the most effective. 
JF: That might be a good space for us to move into a question about the sense of, say, a voter 
who sees herself as an autonomous subject and when it comes to walking into the voting booth 
and casting a vote, how do you conceive of what we'll call the event-space of voting? So what 
drives a consumer to act the way a consumer acts but also a voter? The ideas we were thinking 
of in this situation were priming and jamming specifically and how that relational field brings 
about these seemingly autonomous subjects who go in and change. And also in the back of my 
head I'm thinking of this group of quote-unquote Obama voters who became Trump voters -
what is happening there in that emergent shift? 
Massumi: Voting is a way of individualizing co-activity. It's an activity that individuals do 
together - completely separately. It's a mechanism for decollectivizing activity. This makes it a 
power mechanism, in and of itself, and not only through its outcomes. Voting is a mass staging 
of individuals as - as if they were - separate autonomous willing subjects. It produces an 
effective feeling of this "as if. " It destroys any sense of the collective as transindividual - or 
infraindividual (which can also be called the "dividual"). 
Voting primes individuals into a sense of separation, in seclusion from every other 
individual, literally curtained off from any collective dynamic. Here, the collective figures as the 
simple opposite of decision-making individual segregation. It fosters the feeling that the 
collective is just some kind of magma of undifferentiated - or more like it in these days of 
migrant panic, an uncontrollably hyperdifferentiated - humanity threatening to swamp the self 
and disable decision. This primes for a tendentially aggressive, even paranoid, stance toward 
the collective. The last thing it does is carve out a space of reflection and considered decision. 
Instead, it catapults the individual all the more powerfully into affective mechanisms, but in an 
apparent vacuum of sociality and relationality. In that vacuum, decision is no longer a matter of 
passing a threshold to an emergent co-composition. It is formatted as a zero-sum game, 0 or 1, 
yes or no, thumbs up or down. This makes decision an exercise in mutual exclusion, rather than 
differential mutual inclusion. 
The vote in representative democracy, particularly in the age of social media, has become 
an accelerator of relationally unhinged affect, so much so that calls for a return to rationality 
ring ridiculously hollow. It's to the point that basing a decision on the reasonableness of an 
argument strikes voters as counterintuitive. Evidence-based thinking, or what the Bush 
administration criticized as "reality-based" thinking, can't compete. It is often said we are in a 
post-fact world. I think that where we are in is the realm of the affective fact. 
A matter-of-fact in process-oriented philosophy is the finality of an emergence that plays 
out the consequences of a thinking-feeling pulse of bare activity, peaking in the crossing of a 
threshold that makes an irreversible difference. That crossing of the threshold, because it is 
irreversible, because it has added something to the world that can't be undone, has import that 
makes relating to it imperative, and that imperative is directly felt. The next pulse of process 
cannot not take into account toward its own peaking. The thing is that the affective aspect can 
come without the crossing of the threshold actually taking place. A threat, for example, 
produces the fear and the felt imperative to flee or fight, even in the absence of an actual danger. 
This is "unhinged" in the sense that threats can conjure themselves with abandon, independent 
of the actual conditions for their fulfilment, taking effect purely affectively. This is what I call an 
affective fact. An affective fact is the felt imperative of an event that did not take place, except 
through the feeling of the potential that it might. It is a fact because once the potential has been 
felt, its consequences actually expressed, for example in fear, it can't be unfelt. It's irreversible. 
The fear has transpired, and can recur. It remains looming. A threshold has been crossed, but 
without ever leaving the realm of potential. The event is purely affectively felt, in the 
conditional: in the might-be, or could-have-been, or would-have-been. In an increasingly 
chaotic, far-from-equilibrium world, individuals are buffeted, through the media and the social 
media in particular, by the constant barrage of threats. The world has morphed into what 
security analysts call the "threat environment." We are barraged by affective facts, roiling 
together, increasingly autonomous in their triggering. The isolated voter in the booth is 
hard-pressed to counter this with evidence-based reasoning. 
However, in the end it's really not so much a question of fact versus affect, 
evidence-based rationality versus affect. In a sense, all matters-of-fact are affective facts, if we 
think of the genesis of every event in thinking-feeling, and the autonomy of affect running 
through events. It is more a question of postures toward potential, toward uncertainty and the 
unknown, corresponding to different valences, different modalities of affective fact: atomizing 
or relational; zero-sum or shaded and graded; trans/infra individual or "as if" merely 
individual; mutually inclusive or mutually exclusive; differential or hegemonic; positively 
bracing or paranoia-inducing; composing a world or exuding a threat environment; equal to the 
complexity of the event, or violently reductive of it in exasperated reaction to its element of 
uncontrollability. These are ways of rehearsing the Spinozist distinction, taken up by Nietzsche, 
between active and reactive forces. And it is as a function of this distinction that democracy 
needs to be reinvented, beyond representative democracy, in new forms of direct democracy. 
I'm not at all saying that evidence-based reason and rationality have no role. In this age 
of complexity and environmental emergency, to argue that rational assessment and 
instrumental reason have no role would be self-defeating. It is just to say that there no sense in 
returning to the fiction of their sovereign power of decision. That is just as self-defeating. The 
role of rationality has always been as course-corrector for affective movements- as a feedback 
of higher forms that acts as a prime to modulate the playing out of affective processes. The 
answer is not to oppose reason and affect, but to return reason to its affective ground, and to do 
so strategically, in ways that prime for differential mutual inclusion and peaks of decision that 
actively affirm life in all its complexity. Rationality has to learn to be a catalyst, instead of a 
sovereign. This is a necessity of survival as we hurtle into the growing effects of climate change. 
The neoliberal and liberal democratic priming for the "as if' of individual decision, supposedly 
governed by rational deliberation, and supposedly leveraging self-interest for the general good, 
has had a central role in leading us to this impasse, which is an inevitable outcome of the 
capitalist drive for more, for quantitative increase at all costs - with which liberal democracy 
has always been in symbiosis, to the point that under neoliberalism the nation-state has become 
little more than a territorial operator-console for the capitalist process. More of the same will 
only yield just that - more of the same. And in this context, more of the same is global 
catastrophe. 
JF: This leads me to something we've been discussing in the course, intersectionality and 
assemblage theory and trying to understand how that might work especially in relation to 
identity politics which I think reigns a little bit on the left, and I'm wondering if you can talk a 
little bit about how that might inform this discussion. 
Massumi: Affect theory - or as I prefer to name my own orientation, process thinking - is in 
many ways incompatible with identity politics. But to situate any critique of identity politics, it 
is crucial to start from the incontrovertible reality that the first, and still dominant, identity 
politics is the European identity politics of whiteness. Identity as we understand it today is an 
outcome of the dual genesis by which a purportedly sovereign subject mirroring at a smaller 
scale the sovereign nation-state to which it belongs by right arose out of the crucible of 
colonialism and the slave trade, issuing at the same time, as on parallel tracks, into the brutal 
rise of modern capitalism and the Enlightenment ideal of progress. The identity politics of 
oppressed and marginalized minority groups is in reaction to this ur-identity politics, in an 
attempt to turn its own model against it in order to oblige the dominant white society to live up 
to its rhetoric of progress and inclusion. The strength of this approach is that takes a known, 
historically validated form - that of identity - and uses it to confound the dominant usage, 
which has historically been for purposes of exclusion. The problem is that exclusion is written 
into the form of identity itself. Identity organizes itself around the self/other, 
in-group I out-group opposition. This is not incidental to it; it is of its essence. As a result, 
exclusion effects are impossible to expunge. They are just shifted down the road. You can see 
this when any identity-based contestation achieves a certain success, carving out a space of 
inclusion and recognition for itself. The identity schizzes. The success of second-wave feminism, 
for example, was experienced as an exclusion by lesbians and women of color. The success of 
the homosexual rights movement was in tension with the trans community, which had to rise 
up for its own account. 
The fact is that people do not live in their identity, they live their differencing. I say 
differencing because it continues. Every recognition of an identity leaves out a fraction that must 
then affirm itself and fight for its own recognition, leading to a proliferation of subdivisions and 
an expanding abbreviation list, now far exceeding the original "LBG" (I'm old enough to 
remember a time before there was even a "T"). I commented on this cascading of difference 
away from the form and content of what at the time I was calling the Man-Standard of 
whiteness almost thirty years ago in User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia. That tendency 
has only accelerated since. This is as it should be: differencing is fractal. It does not stop at a 
convenient boundary line, however finely cut. Its movement exceeds every category, so the only 
way to keep up with it and approximate its scope is to keep madly multiplying the categories. 
But at a certain point, another logic has to set in. An individual life is not a particular case of a 
general identity category, however finely defined. An individual life is a singularity, and 
singularities come not in categories but in populations, irreducibly dynamic and with fuzzy 
boundaries. An individual is a fuzzy subset of a population. Individuals do not identify so 
much as they schizz- invent a sui generis variation on the population to which they dynamically 
and complexly belong. Society is dividual. Every population is internally diverse, and the same 
is true of every individual within each population. There is always something in an individual 
that does not fit its assigned category, and that even in utter isolation stands for what Deleuze 
and Guattari call a "people to come": an emergent mode of life. 
Intersectionality is helpful to start getting at this complexity, realizing that identity lines 
cross, and everyone occupies a certain locus on the intersectional grid. But this doesn't go far 
enough, because it is still speaking in terms of identity, general category, and particular case. It 
compounds particularity, rather than fractalizing or dividualizing it, to grasp what Erin 
Manning calls the "diversity in diversity": the differing of difference. There's a lot of thinking in 
queer and decolonial thought and in the black radical tradition that go in this direction. 
Particularly inspiring to me have been Edouard Glissant's concept of "relation identity" and 
Moten and Harney's concept of the "undercommons," both of which propose a black sociality 
that opposes the dominant identity politics of whiteness without appealing to the traditional 
identity form. Although I have deep reservations about identity politics, and many aspects of its 
culture on the left, I see the need for it in the macro political domain, as a matter of self-defense 
and survival, and bristle at many criticisms of it, most especially from the right. It's a bit of a red 
herring to point the finger at the identity politics of the left. It is simply succumbing to media 
stereotypes. There is so much more to the social movements that is too complex to be 
meme-worthy, and so barely registers in the media. It's also a diversion from the point I started 
with: that the first and by far the most virulent and destructive identity politics is white identity 
politics. 
Alina Hechler (AH): And I guess kind of to close up on that, or end on maybe a more positive 
or futuristic note, in The Principle of Unrest you have said that considering the limits of political 
reason, and these affective facts that are kind of immune to a consistent rational argument, how 
can we move forward? In The Principle of Unrest you have suggested a politics of care. So in a 
sense, by pure rationality or pure argument we're not going to be able to turn the tide 
ultimately, so how could we practice a politics of care or promote that? 
Massumi: It's something we need to invent collectively. It's not easy. The first thing is to really 
let it sink in that a politics of care is not about a personal attribute. It's not about having a 
subjective feeling of care for someone else. That is more a politics of empathy. It doesn't work, 
because it is based on the face-to-face . It begins by subjectivizing the relation, upstream of any 
encounter. It puts the other across from the self on the outside, but then, as by a sleight of hand, 
includes the outside in a structure of mirroring. The mirroring is supposed to be of a 
commonality, of a common humanity reflected in the faces opposite each other. But this is very 
often more of an imposition than an invitation, because it neglects to ask the question, 
"commonality according to whom?" It is in fact an essential gesture of whiteness: assuming 
we're all the same deep down, "we're all human," so can't we all just get along? To which the 
answer is another question: "on whose terms?" Expressions of empathy risk doing the exact 
opposite of what they're meant to do because they neutralize the political, by making the 
political personal. 
A politics of care in the way I mean it has to be a quality of the event, not of a subject. It's 
a question of how the conditions for events are put into place. It assumes fractalization, not 
facialization. It assumes that the social field is made up of differentials, not boundary lines, 
however crossed. It assumes incommensurability: that if you scratch the surface of the mirror, 
you see that we are all differencing, each in our own dividual/transindividual manner, 
schizzing the populations to which we would belong into renewed being, always in becoming. 
Commonality is a veneer of whiteness. There is no commonality across the board. But that 
doesn't mean we can't live together. There is a word for a dynamic cohabitation of individuals 
and populations in correlated becoming, always already gone· differing: ecology. A politics of 
care is not about political psychology, it is a political ecology. Neither does it concern itself with 
ideology. It concerns itself with emergent comings-together: events of differential 
coming-together from which no common denominator is drawn, but which precipitate a further 
difference. It requires techniques of the event, which is what we have been working at the 
SenseLab for many years. These are techniques of relation, and of collective attunement to the 
mix of tendencies afoot, the potentials they carry, and how they can be primed. This can be 
theorized in terms of a revised notion of sympathy, in contradistinction to empathy, and that is a 
big part of the project in What Animals Teach us About Politics and The Power at the End of the 
Economy. 
AH: I had a question that I'm personally really interested in- we as fledgling academics, the 
academy is increasingly under siege, at least from a budgetary standpoint and everything, you 
know, and there seems to be a stratification that we become more and more isolated, and I have 
a sense that your work with the SenseLab might speak a little bit to this. What is our role in that, 
in creating that conditioning relational events as academics? 
Massumi: At the SenseLab, we're looking at creating an alter-university space, parasitical to the 
university. We mean that also in the sense of constituting a "para-site," a site that occupies a 
stratum adjacent to the university, operating by a different logic, not necessarily against it 
frontally, but rather maintaining what Erin Manning, who founded the SenseLab, calls an 
"approximation of proximity," so that we can avail ourselves of what the university has 
positively to offer without being beholden to it. Alter-"university" is a misnomer. It won't give 
credit or degrees, and it won't have a traditional course structure with the usual student-teacher 
hierarchy. It will be self-organizing, like the SenseLab, and oriented toward emergent results 
embodying collective expressions. We're calling it the 3 Ecologies Institute. Experimentation in 
new forms of value and collective alter-economies is a key aspect, in response to the student 
debt crisis. 3E will be organized along the lines of a gift economy. A basic principle is never to 
charge for anything, as has been the practice all along at SenseLab. Hence the urgency of 
alter-economic thinking. Personally, we're feeling cornered by the university, as it conforms 
more and more to the dictates of the neoliberal value system and management model. I have 
already left the university, through the privileged door of early retirement, and Erin is just 
holding on. The 3 Ecologies does not feel optional to us. It's a matter of survival. It's imperative 
that we find ways of creating sustaining milieus for thinking and acting together, imbued by a 
politics of care. They must be open to segments of the population for whom higher education is 
traditionally inaccessible, including those who are neurodiverse. This requires sustained 
attention to techniques of relation. The idea is to create a pre-figurative milieu- one of many, for 
there are projects of this nature popping up everywhere - enacting emergent modes of relation 
and new forms of knowledge production. There is no time to go more into detail here. Readers 
can refer to the SenseLab Web site (senselab.ca) for more details and links. 
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Stoler: I'm not sure it is terribly interesting: My sister, nine years older than I, was a Sanskritist 
with a passion for literature, poetry, and languages. She started teaching in "Oriental Studies" 
at Barnard the same year I began as a sophomore undergraduate. She was my measure of all 
things that mattered, my idol. Being an intellectual and getting my doctorate was my way (I 
thought) of escaping my fate in a category I despised: the smart but not brilliant, ordinary and 
ornery Jewish girl from a public school on the north shore of Long Island. 
However much I wanted to be like her, that was not in the cards. The fact that we came ~ 
of age in such radically different moments made all the difference. My generation was shaped 
by the Vietnam War, by how much we detested it, our kudos came from how well we knew 
Marx, to the number of times we were jailed. It meant that politics and intellectual work seemed 
organically to belong together and meshed . [ hdd thought to do an thropo logy (or something 
like it) in Vietnam. It was far from possible but I did have an opportunity to go for the summer 
to Indonesia in 1972, at the height of its plunge into the Green Revolution only seven years after 
the massacre of alleged communist sympathizers across the archipelago. World Bank was eager 
to make Indonesia "safe for democracy" and promised to reach "the poorest of the poor." As a 
feisty marxist feminist in the making, I thought to do a summer project about landless women 
in Java. I put off graduate school and didn't come back to New York and start at Columbia for a 
year and a half. 
.. .. ~ ~
For my dissertation research I had some under-formulated notion that I wanted to be in ~ ~ 
a place where the world capitalist system was playing out its contemporary course. I went to ~~ 
North Sumatra, to the heart of multinational agribusiness in Indonesia, what was once known ~~ 
as "The dollar land of Deli" -the plantation belt. Tobacco, rubber, and an expanding palm oil 
industry were represented by Goodyear, Uniroyal, Palmolive and in the late 19th century by ~ 
some of the biggest traders on tobacco futures, cutting across the axis between Europe stock 
exchanges and North Sumatra's agroindustry. A politics of knowledge and a grossly skewed 
distribution of power were stamped into people's bodies, the architecture, the land. I suppose 
one could argue that some course of work was set then: an effort to understand the mechanisms 
of unequal distributions of privilege, resources, wealth. 
I'm sure that being drawn to an attentiveness about entitlement and privilege was 
something with which I grew up. The north shore of Long Island in the 1960s was a place that 
took pride in its privilege and ascendance to the upper middle class. It was a well-heeled 
enclave made up of those who made sure those who came to mow their lawns and iron their 
clothes, and watch their children did so from a measured distance, lived most of the week in 
isolation near the kitchen quarters of a house, or took buses back to Queens at the end of the 
day. I remember how ashamed I was, how awkward I found it, how "easy" and common it was. 
Stoler: I'm not sure I've ever gotten very far from the quotidian weight of distinctions, of 
differences carved in the uniforms for maids, or in the creased folds of a taffeta dress. The 
metrics of distinction and the crafting of race were all there in what we were taught to find 
tasteful or distasteful. These were the implicit lessons of the everyday. 
Stoler: Categories of people and things, race was inscribed in that everyday- in who was not in 
our schools, where my father worked but did not play, where winter vacations took us, in places 
my family would not go. I'm ever more convinced that race was a subtext in my growing up-
those who would be excluded and those places my parents feared I might be excluded from. 
Stoler: I'm drawn to working in and on situations that feel unyielding, with ready answers 
eluding your grasp. I think that's what attracted me to working so long on the ambiguities and 
polyvalence of race and to thinking with Foucault. We all like to quote his thought that his work 
was an effort "to think otherwise," to "penser autrement." I wanted to figure out another way to 
get there. 
EC: That's actually one of our other questions . We were talking the other day about how there 
seemed to be a shift in your work, where you had been very interested in implementing 
Foucault and using his ideas in new ways, and then you suddenly switch to emotions and 
affect. So, maybe this ties back into this recursivity, but we were just curious more about the 
development of your theoretical lens? 
Stoler: I don't see anything very sudden about it- understanding how power works has long 
pulled me in different directions- from Marx to Foucault to Marguerite Duras and back again 
through Raymond Williams' "structures of feeling" and again to Foucault. I've been writing 
about Foucault's treatment of affect and thinking about why sentiment remains so often the 
object of his work but not a dispositif in itself. In one of my favorite of Foucault's essays on 
genealogy it made the forceful claim that "every sentiment has a history" but never pursued that 
insight as one of his projects . I've long had the sense of a prior recognition in reading Foucault, 
something I know is shared by many others. 
Stoler: He does something that's so enabling and that you know is right, but you didn't really 
quite know how to say it, nor could you have the kind of confidence to do so. I started teaching 
1 . 
Foucault's Genealogy essay 20 years ago to help me think about how to treat the stories and 
histories that whites in the colonies told themselves about how they felt in the colonies, and 
how they should feel toward others and by what measure they ascribed sensibilities to the 
colonized - all of this so much a part of the imaginary real. My work has pushed between 
inscription, prescription, and ascription, how race is inscribed in the colonial archives, how ways 
of being are prescribed for Europeans and how they in turn ascribed features to others, those 
populations who they so often saw as a potential threat. 
"Every Sentiment Has a History" 
JS: You have a really good quotation from Duress that I'll read to you, if I can. "Colonial archives 
can impede the task: They have a way of drawing our attention to their own scripted temporal 
and spatial designations of what is colonial and what is no longer making it difficult to stretch 
beyond their guarded frames." So can you talk a bit more about how you've personally 
navigated the tendency of archives to tell a story already in the way that they're built? 
Stoler: Archival labor is about confronting order as mess and what at first appears as arbitrary 
designations as the logic of an order. There are all kinds of ways in which the archive writes 
against itself as it's creating a kind of uniformity that can't be held. Along the Archival Grain was 
an effort to untangle obfuscations but also to stay with the tangled arts of governance, scripted 
through security regimes and segregated schools and in so many other ways. I think of what 
I'm after as writing history in a "minor key"- a history not of the crescendo of major chords but 
with lower case tonalities. 
Stoler: I read in the early hours at sunrise when I feel there is some sharpness to my attention, 
rarely late at night. I've been reading Kant's "Critique of Judgment" to think about taste and 
distaste with respect to race. Of course that's not what Kant was doing but I'm trying to 
understand how these concepts of taste and distaste (gout et degout) have been pulled apart. 
But to answer your original question: what's next to my bed right now - yes, Kant, and 
Foucault's first lectures from 1970 at the College de France on La volonte du savoir ( I love 
reading in French) ... and some students papers I should have commented on a while ago! 
Stoler: Well I could do a plug but you know we have so many applications I don't need to ... still 
I'd love to talk about this exciting venture that emerged from a fantasy of my own. In our 
academic lives, as graduate students, assistant professors and more senior ones, there are 
always so many more thinkers to read and that we feel we need to read, more than we have 
time for or feel we can grasp on our own: it might be Levinas or Lacan, Hegel or Marx, Freud, 
Arendt, or Foucault ... And each time you hear or see the name you think, "I've got to sit down 
and read this," feeling you should have already. So my thought was this: would it not be an 
amazing opportunity, after the semester of teaching is over, to sit with a small group of others 
for an intensive week and read and think with one of those thinkers- and do it with a "master" 
of sorts who has written on and thought with a Foucault or Marx for most of their careers? 
A trustee from the New School shared my enthusiasm for the venture and provided the 
funds to start five years ago and we are going stronger than ever. Applicants hail from 40 to 50 
different countries and the fellows we choose are a mix of advanced graduate students and full 
professor all there simply to learn, and learn more about what they have sought to know. It's an 
exhilarating and exhausting week each year and one in which fellows are always asking if they 
can come back again. 

Shannon Sullivan is Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy and Health Psychology at 
UNC Charlotte. She specializes in feminist philosophy, critical philosophy of race, American 
philosophy (especially pragmatism), . and continental philosophy. She is the author of four 
books, most recently, Good White People: The Problem with Middle-Class White Anti-Racism (2014) 
and The Physiology of Sexist and Racist Oppression (2015). She also is co-editor of four books, 
including Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance (2007) and Feminist Interpretations of William James 
(2015). 
© 2019 The Author(s). This is an open access article published under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License (https:/ I creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ 4.0/), 
which permits unrestricted non-commercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
that the original author(s) and the publication source are credited. 
Shannon Sullivan (Sullivan): I didn't intend to work on affect and emotion. When I taught a 
course last fall [2017] on philosophies of emotion and affect, I realized that I do work in that 
area and I hadn't really conceptualized my work that way before. But when I go back to your 
question properly and think about it, it was connected to being interested in embodiment, 
which is important to thinking about race in particular. And so, as I was writing the Good White 
People book, I was thinking about white guilt and white shame and how central those emotions 
are to a lot of discussions about how white people should respond to white privilege. Thinking 
about guilt and shame then led me to look at different affects and to focus on love, which is the 
most controversial part of the book. 
But the other answer is really three answers. One of them, I realize, is that it's Nietzsche 
who had a huge influence on me from early on, even before I started working in anything 
directly in feminist or critical philosophy of race. Nietzsche was an affect theorist before affect 
theory became popular, particularly in his criticism of guilt and resentment. And then, second, 
my most recent monograph on The Physiology of Sexist and Racist Oppression is, in many ways, 
about affect. I didn't design it that way initially, but it pushes further to think about being 
embodied in the context of racism and sexism. I really wanted to consider embodiment not 
merely phenomenologically or metaphorically, but to think about physiology: stress hormones 
and epigenetics and heart functions and the like. I wanted to do that in a way that understands 
affect and emotion in very bodily terms, and so, thirdly, William James's work has become really 
important to me. Recall the James-Lange theory of emotion, in which emotion is defined as 
bodily movements and changes. That's the sta~ting point of that book: to think about 
physiological unconscious habits and the ways that they are structuring and being structured by 
experiences with racism and sexism. So, I increasingly find affect to be an important part of my 
work, but getting to that point happened by accident. 
RC: I come from China, so race is really a new topic to me. This semester I'm taking a class on 
race and class. The books we're mainly reading focus on structural forces like police state 
violence and housing policy, but your work is actually focused on the body rather than 
structural forces. 
Sullivan: Yes. For better or worse, my work tends to focus a lot on that. I won't say on 
individual experiences necessarily, but on the person and personal experiences. Those are 
intimately connected with structural and institutional forms of racism or sexism. The personal 
and the structural are two pieces of a very complex puzzle and they feed into each other. And so 
my work leans toward looking at ontological issues, in the sense of how we as selves get 
constituted. That shouldn't be done in a silo or an isolated way from thinking about the world 
that we're part of and its institutions. But while they can seem to have a life of their own, 
institutions often are affectively invested in by individual people and this happens sometimes in 
a very unconscious and bodily way. 
We're not really going to fully understand structural and institutional forms of racism 
and sexism if we don't look at the invested self - affective and otherwise, not just financially 
invested, but affectively invested - this sense of the self that is invested in the structures and 
institutions of racism and sexism in ways that we don't consciously want to endorse or avow, 
but that might be there nevertheless. 
Sullivan: As you know, the concept of habit is really important to me as a way of thinking about 
patterned predispositions, ways, and styles of engaging the world. I think a lot of this does not 
happen through conscious deliberate instruction or education. But there are unconscious habits, 
unconscious ways of doing things as a kind of mechanism. This leads to my interest in 
childhood as a site, or a location, for the development of unconscious habits. Philosophers don't 
talk about children much at all. But how do habits that form us as adults get formed in very 
early ways? Here's where some version of Freud is very important: we need to pay attention to 
childhood. We get formed as the selves that we are in so many powerful ways as children, 
which we developmentally cannot consciously be aware of or shape or control as conscious 
agents. 
Branfield, Chang, and Saperstein 
Sullivan: It is a deliberate choice for different reasons. Part of it comes from finding a home in 
feminist and pragmatist philosophy and the way in which they both insist that philosophy is 
useful. Philosophy is like a toolkit for doing things with one's life. It's connected to real 
experience or real situations or practices. I'm not at all opposed to abstraction, but abstraction 
has got to tie back and be in some kind of interactive relationship with real experiences. That 
leads me to want to talk about actual experiences when I'm writing. I also find philosophy very 
therapeutic . It's very much about trying to work out crap in my own life. Hopefully what I'm 
writing about is not just about me, of course. It's also about broad features situated in human 
existence. As I'm reading and thinking, I'm sometimes either not finding answers to what I 
want or not agreeing with what I'm finding, so I'm trying to work it out for myself. How do I 
live this life as a white woman, as a parent? And can philosophy be a useful tool to help me do 
that? 
I find often it can be, which is why personal examples are in my work. Also, and 
especially as I began writing more and more about whiteness and race, I felt that it was very 
important to take the risks that I was implicitly asking white readers to take. I've got to have 
skin in the game. I've got to be just as much at risk in terms of feeling uncomfortable or feeling 
exposed, so I've got to be willing to put myself out there and do that too. And if I can't do that, 
then it doesn't feel very honest as an author. 
Some of this approach also comes from teaching. When I teach about gender and race, 
for example, it's never about scolding the students. I don't want students to think, "And now 
we're being schooled in how we're supposed to think about X, Y, and Z." For this reason, I try to 
have the classroom environment be one in which they see that I'm just as much flailing around 
with this material and just as much at risk existentially as they are. And so sometimes I will 
direct it back to me: "Here's an example in my life where this happened ... " and then that helps 
everyone relax a little bit. 
RC: Yes. I really like your approach that you use personal experience as a method. I really liked 
that. The next question I would ask is: there's one thing I have difficulty understanding in your 
book. It's about your mentioning that race is ontological. Can you elaborate more on this 
Sullivan: When I use the word ontology, I mean it in an historical, situated, embedded way. 
There can be ways of using that word that may sound like one is trying to point to something 
universal and essential for all of being, and I'm not doing that. I'm trying in some basic ways to 
talk about how we as selves get formed and that is always going to be ongoing- never a static 
process or a static thing. It's always dynamic, always changing. At the same time, if that 
formation is happening through habits, they provide a durability to the self that can be difficult 
to change, which the concept of habit helps explain. Habits also are one way in which the self 
can be somewhat plastic, somewhat capable of change. So, habit has become an interesting 
mechanism for thinking about both the durability and the plasticity of who we are. Another 
word I would use is "transactional": a co-constitutive formation between the self and its various 
environments, if we take "environment" in a very capacious sense - not just physical 
environments, but also social and affective environments. I really love the work of Sarah Ahmed 
and Teresa Brennan that talks about the circulation of affects. I think of circulation as a kind of 
transaction in which you've got selves and worlds and affects circulating to form the self in a 
way that is invested and affectively leads to wanting the world to be certain ways. 
RC: I also feel like if race is ontological, actually, we can apply this ontological view to gender 
and class and thus I feel like there's actually a possibility for solidarities between different social 
groups. Intersectional solidarity. 
Sullivan: I think ontology is always intersectional, so "intersectional ontology" might be the 
best term? At the same time, however, for certain temporary purposes we may need to consider 
some pieces separately. It's so complicated how we get constituted as selves. It's probably 
impossible to take it all in, to occupy a God's eye point of view that could see it all at once. 
There can be reasons to pick out some pieces at times, to focus on them more than others. But 
that's a functional claim, not a claim that we're constituted in isolated, siloed ways. I think 
especially in the United States, it's almost impossible to pull race and class apart, for example. 
This might be true in other countries and situations as well, but in the United States race is 
classed and class is raced and that's not to collapse them. 
I want to resist the notion that there is a neutral core to the self and that things like 
gender and race are epiphenomenal. And to resist the related claims that if you're doing "real" 
philosophy, you're examining the core of human existence, and that race and gender aren't 
important or they are secondary. I think that's changed a lot, but around 25 years ago when I 
was going through grad school, and even as a young assistant professor, that was definitely a 
fight that had to be waged. If you were talking about gender or race, it was supposedly a fad. I 
think a lot of that has changed now, but there are still pockets in philosophy where one has to 
argue for something like a weaving model rather than a core model. The self is a fabric that's 
woven together out of different strands, and some of them are more prominent strands and 
some are minor. It's admittedly not an even playing field where every strand constitutes you in 
the same way, but there 's no core that's neutral or separate from the strands that make you up. 
It's a very different model of the self than a core-periphery model. 
RC: But, if we consider embodiment - or bodies actually - as compared to the constructing of 
emotions, the body is actually something less constructible, or something real. So it feels like if 
we don't have a neutral core, actually, we have this body ... ? 
Sullivan: That's a great question, although I want to push to say even our literal bodies get 
constituted in these transactional ways. The Physiology book takes up that claim in a very 
detailed way. That's not to say that we can't find some generalities about human embodiment, 
such as we all have to eat or we'll die. But the minute you take that beyond some sort of simple 
platitude and start talking about it in some very concrete ways- about the food that constitutes 
us- then the core model is inadequate. For example, I have a chapter in the Physiology book on 
the gut as a site of resistance to taking in the world in certain ways (and I'm greatly influenced 
here by the work of Elizabeth Wilson) . There's a huge connection between what I call gut habits 
and gut character. In that chapter, I examine, for example, how there is a significant connection 
between women's guts and incidents of sexual assault and sexual trauma that are gendered. It 
doesn't mean sexual assault happens only to women or to feminized people, but this doesn't 
change the fact that gendered patterns exist regarding sexual assault. And this is where 
philosophy needs to catch up with a lot of material in the health sciences, because this has been 
known in the health sciences for the last 10 or 15 years. As for the gut - I'm literally talking 
about intestines and stomachs- it's the largest section of our body that's exposed to the outside 
world, more than the skin, and doctors will talk about the outside world coming into and 
passing out of your body via your gut. This is the site of exposure and a kind of dynamic 
interaction with the world in terms of what you're taking in and what you are- what's forming 
you, and then what you're giving back to the world. I want to talk about bodies as sites of 
habits, as physiological habits that are dynamically constituted in ways that are durable and 
plastic. We can find a transactional relationship developing physiological habits that are shaped 
by a world that's full of racist and sexist oppression, which helps form biologically unconscious 
habits. This is a kind of affective shaping in response to the world on the level of our 
physiological embodiment. Here again is where William James becomes important for tightly 
connecting movements and changes in the physiological body and with the effects of sexism, 
racism, and other forms of trauma. 
Sullivan: I don't know that all of this quickly or easily translates over to talking to a broader 
public, although I do think it can in part. The Physiology book weaves in very concrete case 
studies, and it opens with a concrete example of a physiological affective sense of pain or 
struggle, and unpacks it in ways that get to more theoretical points. On this question, I have to r-1 ... .,......,. 
admit that one of the things I'm proudest of is that Good White People was named Ms. Magazine 
Best Feminist Read for 2014 and a CHOICE academic outstanding title for the same year. That 
meant I was able to talk to both scholarly audiences and public audiences. A broader audience 
could pick up the book and feel like they got something important out of it. That is somewhat 
ironic because getting that book published was one of the hardest things I've ever done in my 
entire life. I don't mean writing the book - I was writing it, rewriting it, and revising it for 
several years - but the process of dealing with the pushback I got on the manuscript. I thought, 
"This book will never ever be published, it will never see the light of day," because I got such 
strong pushback. 
JS: Do you find that that happens often in your work? Because I know when we were 
discussing your article on white priority, there was a lot of discussion about whether it's good to 
talk about white priority when talking to a non-academic audience. But is it useful academically 
to separate out these terms? We had a lot of conversations regarding how we speak to a public 
audience and how we speak in academia . And should there be different conversations 
happening? 
Sullivan: I think the answer has to be "yes." There have to be places where you can move fast, 
when using technical terms don 't feel like jargon, because people know what you 're talking 
about and you can move quickly and you can do more things that way. But I think it 's also 
really important that there be spaces where one is intentionally trying to reach a broader 
audience. And there are a lot of times where those hopefully overlap. Context really matters, 
and paying attention to one's audience really matters, whether you're teaching or writing. It's 
wonderful when sometimes you can speak to multiple audiences at once, but I wouldn't want to 
insist upon that. There may be times when that doesn't work and you may need different tools 
in your toolkit and different ways of going at things. 
But if I go back to white priority, the worry I have is whether we really need another 
term. We've got white privilege. We've got white supremacy. We've got white fragility. And now 
we've got white priority, and this can sound like a mere proliferation of terms. The answer may 
be that an additional term doesn't turn out to be very helpful. One has to be experimental and 
see what works. However, I think harm is done if the term white privilege gets overused in 
ways that don't pay attention to the differences in how privilege cashes out in different people's 
lives. That's not to let white people off the hook. But I think the pushback that we're increasingly 
seeing regarding white privilege needs to be taken seriously in a critical way. Otherwise the 
concept of white privilege might seem to be about an elite set of white people beating down 
other white people with a stick, shaming and ridiculing them. We still need the concept of white 
privilege, but we've got to nuance the way we're thinking about whiteness. 
Gut Feelings 
SB: Can you talk more about the resistance you get to your work particularly with Good White 
People? You mentioned there was a lot of pushback. It was difficult to get published. What sort ~~ ~ 
of pushback did you get? And why do you think Good White People received more of that than 
your other work? 
Sullivan: When that book was going through the review process, it received very strong 
reviews: really positive and really negative, not much in between. The negative reviews 
effectively said, "Who cares what white people feel? Don't they need to go change the world?" I 
had to fight an uphill battle to establish that talking about emotions and affect had any kind of 
political relevance. Thankfully, I don't feel like I have to fight that fight anymore- that if I want 
to talk about affect or emotion, it could be connected to work in political philosophy. Then, once 
I got past that hurdle and when I criticized white guilt and shame, I received strong responses 
that were concerned that this was a kind of white supremacy in disguise. Or, even if that wasn't 
my intention, that I was really naive and didn't understand that my arguments were supporting 
or espousing white supremacy. To go then from criticizing guilt and shame to talking about a 
form of white self-love as an alternative to white shame, well, that confirmed all the worst fears 
of some of my critics. 
For example, someone told me when I was at SPEP [the Society for Phenomenology and 
Existential Philosophy] presenting some earlier work that fed into the book that there was a 
person in the audience who leaned over and said, "Next thing you know, she's gonna put on a 
white hood," referring to the Ku Klux Klan. This happened as I was reading the paper. I will 
admit that the book takes a lot of risks in saying that the comfortable divides we have between 
the white supremacists, that is, the bad white people over here, and the good ones over there 
who are anti-racist- that there are not really such sharp lines and that we cannot be confident 
where those lines are. For that reason, we need a lot of rethinking of strategies and tactics. But 
once you blur that line, it presents a difficult epistemological issue. How do you know for sure 
that you're not furthering a white supremacist agenda? And the answer is we cannot. The 
attempt to know that with certainty and to be really sure you're not doing that- I worry that 
often becomes an agenda of protecting yourself as a good white person rather than actually 
figuring out how we might rethink the problem of racial injustice and make some headway on 
it. It's pretty clear we haven't made much headway. That was true when the book was written 
and it is still true now. If you start blurring the line between the good and the bad, it's 
epistemologically and morally risky- even though I very explicitly argue in the book that this is 
not an argument saying to give up on the good white people, "Go be a bad white person 
because there's no difference." Nonetheless, some of the responses I received took the position 
that once you blur that line, you're just like the white supremacists, and not only that, you also 
open the way for all the white supremacists to stand as legitimate. That was one concern, and it 
equated to the claim, "Well, maybe because you didn't care about that line, you really weren't a 
good one after all." Your so-called true colors are showing. So, finishing that book was a very 
emotionally, affectively, and existentially difficult process. 
JS: We're talking about how you 're getting a lot of pushback on ideas concerning affect in the 
early 2010s. You might not be able to answer this, but what do you think has changed either 
academically or socially and politically that has allowed for that shift towards accepting ideas of 
affect, or being turned towards it? 
Sullivan: I'm not sure. I have a couple of guesses. There has been work going on in affect 
studies and affect theory in fields outside of philosophy for a long time. So, some of it feels like 
philosophy is late to catch up. We're still trying to figure out that we have bodies half the time, 
for example. And there are other things such as when Martha Nussbaum published her book 
Political Emotions: Why Love Is Important for Justice. Not that Nussbaum is hostile to feminism, 
but she's not a feminist philosopher, she's a political philosopher who works in ancient 
philosophy. When you get folks outside of the "fringe" group of feminist and critical race 
philosophers who are publishing major works with major presses that deal with emotion or 
affect, now suddenly it's okay in philosophy. 
RC: I have a question that goes back to the feedback you received about Good White People. 
When we discussed the book in our class, we also had separate opinions, like, "If we want to 
make political change we should make people cry, we should make people feel ashamed," 
which is just like the approach you are criticizing in your book. Another approach is that, "If 
you want other people to hear your pain, you should first hear their pain." So it's like trying to 
see even racist white people as emotional beings, to see them a.s persons with affects. So I feel 
like your book is trying to say, "OK, we have enough of the first approach. Now we should do 
something about the second approach." 
Sullivan: I do think that something like guilt and shame can be the result of being a white 
person and confronting that wall of ignorance. There are so many ways in the United States that 
people don't learn about this stuff and their families don't talk about it. I think back to 
childhood again: there are very few practices or habits in white, "normal," good white families, 
where the pattern tends to be: if you talk about race, you talk about people of color. To talk 
about whiteness and how it functions is very uncomfortable for most white people because it's 
not something they are used to doing. And if you do talk about whiteness, that tends to mark 
you as being one of the bad white people. So the safe thing to do is not talking about it at all. I'm 
not saying white people will never feel guilty qr ashamed when they learn about wrongdoings, 
both personally and in their families, and I also think of the long histories of white supremacy 
and white privilege in different countries. But cultivating white guilt and shame as the marker 
of how you've become enlightened to the fact that white privilege exists- I'm concerned that 
doesn't have much to do with actually trying to fight racism but instead with protecting your 
moral reputation. 
Sullivan: I think one of the biggest dangers is that the pushback against Trump will be merely a 
push to return to where the nation was before he was elected. I'm worried about the pushback 
of good white people who want to ensure that we get white privilege in the form of "good" 
rather than "bad" whiteness back in place. I recognize that Trump's election had a lot to do with 
Obama, that is, with the fact that there was a black man in the White House. But my worry is 
that anti-Trump energy is trying to go back to where we were before, when we "knew" who the 
bad white people were and they were kept in their place, so to speak- that's very problematic. I 
don't know if there 's another backlash coming. I think it's too early to tell. But the fact that there 
is resistance to Trump does not necessarily mean that it's going to tackle some of these other 
problems. It's not just that the choices are stale, "Accept a Trump-era or try to return to a 
pre-Trump-era." They also are harmful. There have got to be some different ways to live as a 
white person. There have got to be some different options both personally and politically. How 
we create those different ways of living is going to be hard, and it's going to be risky. But if the 
pushback against Trump is merely returning to the colorblind days of a supposedly post-racial 
Obama era, we're in trouble. 
Sullivan: The question that I want to get away from is: "Is race real?" That and similar 
questions have dominated critical philosophy of race for a long time. I know that's not true in 
other fields where critical race theory is done. In philosophy, however, we've exhausted that 
question. I also think we need to confront the vicious feedback that public philosophers 
sometimes receive. I'm thinking of George Yancy, an African American philosopher who ran a 
series in "The Stone" in the New York Times on race, and in December of 2016 he published an 
editorial the New York Times called "Dear White America." He also has a book coming out in 
April of 2018 called Backlash: What Happens When We Talk Honestly about Race. The massive 
amount of vile and threatening things that were sent to him in the wake of "Dear White 
America" is mind-blowing, and as a result Yancy had to have police presence with him when he 
was on campus for a while. Is this what critical philosophers writing about race have in store for 
them? Yancy has received support from academics, and the American Philosophical Association 
recently published a statement in support of him and other public philosophers. But the episode 
has a chilling effect. Yancy isn't going to back down, he's going to keep doing the work he does. 
But when you see what got thrown at him . .. 
I've heard a lot of people, including graduate students, pull back and say, "Why be a 
public philosopher?" or, "If you 're going to be a public philosopher, why talk about race, why 
go there, why risk yourself and your family?" It would be really easy to go back to abstractly 
analyzing whether race is real or not. Or for young scholars to decide, "You know, I don't need 
to write my dissertation on that topic, I don't need to have my first publications in that area. I've 
got to get a job, I've got to get tenure, I don't need that controversy, and so I'll just step back"? It 
reminds me a little bit of a book by John McCumber called Time in the Ditch, which examines the 
McCarthy era after World War II, what happened in the academic world, and particularly how 
that shaped what happened in philosophy. He also discusses the type of philosophy that was 
institutionalized in academic departments, and the kind of philosophy that got shut down. I 
didn't know this before reading McCumber's book, but philosophers were the main academics 
fired or otherwise harassed in the McCarthy era; philosophy was the primary discipline that 
was targeted. And so, there was a huge pullback away from doing anything connected to 
social-political issues. McCarthyism was very effective in shaping the discipline. And now my 
worry is: what kind of chilling effect are attacks on public philosophers going to have on the 
discipline, and not just philosophers but other scholars talking about difficult social political 
questions? It might seem easy to brush it off and call the 1950s "that strange McCarthy era," but 
similar things could happen again. 


